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MOTHERS WHO KILL: COMING TO TERMS WITH MODERN
AMERICAN INFANTICIDE*
Michelle Oberman**
I. INTRODUCTION
On a surprisingly routine basis, Americans are exposed to evidence of
contemporary incidents of infanticide.' Occasionally, stories of
infanticide become headline news, spread across the nation's papers day
after agonizing day. Susan Smith's confession to drowning her two
children by driving her car into a South Carolina pond is but one recent
example. More often, though, coverage is limited to a fleeting mention
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Infanticide refers to the homicide committed by a mother against her infant
child. From the time of the earliest laws against infanticide, the term has pertained
only to women who kill their children. See Katherine O'Donovan, The Medicalisation
of Infanticide, 1984 CRIM. L. REv. 259, 259 (stating that the first infanticide statute
applied only to women). In many countries, the gender-specific crime of infanticide is
codified as a distinct form of homicide. See infra notes 67 through 72 and
accompanying text. In the United States, however, state criminal codes do not
differentiate between infanticide and other forms of homicide, and thus, the issue of
gender-specificity does not arise. Nevertheless, for purposes of this Article,
infanticide refers solely to children killed by their mothers.
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in the local news: missing infant found in trash; mother charged with
murder; teen mother delivers baby into toilet; eighteen-year-old
accused of drowning her toddler. Despite the commonplace nature of
these incidents, we are so mystified and horrified by the stories of
mothers killing their offspring that we perceive each story as isolated,
as disconnected from--rather than consistent with--what we know about
human society. So we are surprised to learn that in the United States
and throughout the world, the population under one year of age is at
great risk of death from homicide.2 Their killers are more likely to be
their own mothers than anyone else.'
To the extent that Americans are familiar with the term
infanticide, they associate the phenomenon with developing nations
struggling with the twin burdens of poverty and "overpopulation." It
seems strange to associate this term with the thousands of American
infants who are killed each year by their mothers. Additionally,
although the word infanticide would seem to refer to the killing of
infants, there is no established age limit for victims of this crime.4
Clearly there are significant differences between the circumstances
surrounding a mother's killing of a three-year-old child, and that of a
three-month-old, or for that matter, her killing of a three-minute-old
baby. And yet, other than drawing an arbitrary chronological line,
there is no readily apparent principle by which one might distinguish
amongst these cases. Moreover, drawing a line at one year of age, for
example, eclipses the important similarities linking cases involving
older victims to those involving children under the age of one. When
evaluated from the perspective of the circumstances surrounding the
' In fact, in England, this age group runs the single highest risk of death by homicide.
Ania Wilczynski & Allison Morris, Parents who Kill Their Children, 1993 CRIM. L. REv.
31, 32. Furthermore, in the United States, between 1980 and 1985, homicide was the
leading cause of injury-related death for children below age one. N. Prabha Unnithan,
Children as Victims of Homicide: Part I--Historical and Anthropological Research, CRIM.
JUST. ABSTRACTS 146 (Mar. 1991) (discussing research on historical, anthropological, and
biological factors relating to infanticide). According to the U.S. Advisory Board on Child
Abuse and Neglect, "rmlore babies and young children die at the hands of their parents
than in car accidents, house fires, falls or drownings." At Least 2,000 Children Under Age
5 Die of Abuse Each Year, U.S. Study Says, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 27, 1995, at 21, zone N
[hereinafter At Least 2,000].
' Wilczynski & Morris, supra note 2, at 33.
4 This may be observed in infanticide statutes from around the world, which pertain to
victims of a surprisingly broad range of ages. For example, British infanticide laws apply
to any homicides committed by a mother against her child within the child's first year of
life, while New Zealand's infanticide statute includes any child killed by its mother before
age ten. Compare Infanticide Act, 1938, 2 Geo. 6, ch. 36 (Eng.), with Criminal Act of
1961, in SPENCE & GARROW'S CRIMINAL LAW 135 (W.S. Spence, ed., 1962) [hereinafter
New Zealand Criminal Act of 19611. See infra notes 67 through 73 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the scope of infanticide statutes from around the world.
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mothers who kill their children, as well as from the perspective of the
nature of the criminal justice system's disposition of these cases, the
differences due to the victim's age seem far less significant than one
might expect.5
I first became aware of America's infanticide problem several
years ago when I received a phone call about a case involving a
fourteen-year-old girl who claimed she never knew she was pregnant,
yet was charged with murder after delivering a baby into a toilet.6 Her
lawyer called to enlist my help in locating experts who might testify on
her behalf. Shortly thereafter, the lawyer called back to say that I could
discontinue my search, because the case was not going to trial. The
prosecutor had announced his intention to subpoena the girl's male
eighth grade classmates, many of whom claimed to have had sex with
her. Faced with the prospect of this public humiliation, the girl had
opted to plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter.
This girl, whose name I never learned, has haunted me.
Without exactly knowing why, I found myself gathering stories like
hers--seemingly inexplicable accounts of girls and women who, by
killing their offspring, violate our most cherished notions of life, safety,
and trust, and shatter the stereotype that universally casts mothers as
the altruistic protectors of their children 7 Once I began looking, I
found signs of these stories everywhere.
These cases came to evoke a profound ambivalence in me. On
the one hand, the killings seemed uniquely horrific, unprovoked, and
incomprehensible. Yet the more I thought about them, the less I knew
where to direct my anger. Although the babies died at their mothers'
hands, many others should be implicated in their deaths--the fathers,
5 Likewise, a focus on the circumstances surrounding the perpetrators of infanticide
reveals the gendered nature of this offense. Although fathers, boyfriends, baby-sitters,
strangers, and others may kill children, killings by mothers arise out of different
circumstances--those of a primary caretaker. Because they reflect the mother's response to
biological and sociocultural experiences surrounding pregnancy, labor, and delivery, the
killings of infants in the first twenty-four hours of life are gendered phenomena. See infra
notes 85 through 104 and accompanying text (describing these circumstances). Killings
that occur after the first day of life, however, are gendered primarily because of society's
allocation of caretaking duties to mothers. Thus, although I refer to infanticide as a crime
committed by mothers, it is possible to imagine a parent, grandparent, or step-parent of
either gender fulfilling the role of mother, and in that capacity, under the circumstances
described herein, committing the crime of infanticide. See infra notes 297 through 323 and
accompanying text (detailing the circumstances surrounding infanticide).
6 For a fuller description of this case, see Michelle Oberman, The Control of
Pregnancy and the Criminalization of Femaleness, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2-4
(1992) [hereinafter Oberman, Control].
7 Ania Wilczynski, Images of Women Who Kill Their Infants: The Mad and the Bad,
2 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 71, 73 (1991).
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grandparents, friends, schools and workplaces, and society as a whole.
As puzzling as it was undeniable, I often found myself empathizing
with these killers.
In an effort to come to terms with both the commonplace nature
of these killings and the ambivalence they evoked in me, I undertook a
systematic collection of infanticide cases. Over the course of several
years, I searched media data bases and had friends in small towns send
me news clippings. I found hundreds of cases, most of which received
only a brief mention in the press. Those cases that the media discussed
in any detail became my data base.
Read together rather than as isolated occurrences, these cases
provide a canvas, painted in admittedly broad strokes, that depicts a
vivid picture of modem American infanticide. These stories emerge as
distinctly patterned in nature, with marked similarities in the lives of
the mothers at the time of their infants' deaths. But the pattern does not
stop there; as my collection of stories grew, I discovered that my
empathy for these women was shared by the judges and juries who
determined the fates of the girls and women charged with killing their
offspring. The rhetoric of moral outrage expressed by society at large
and by judges and juries in individual cases is accompanied by an
equally strong tendency to view these crimes as arising out of external
circumstances, and therefore to resist equating these homicides with
murder.
What does not emerge from this review of cases is an
explanation for why we treat infanticide differently from any other type
of homicide. And yet, this result is not at all unique to modem
American culture. The same pattern of condemnation for the act and
mercy for the actor can be observed at various points in Western
history, and in various cultures today.
In order to place modem American infanticide cases in context,
Section II of this Article provides a brief historical and cross-cultural
perspective on the punishment of infanticide. The section focuses in
detail on the tension between the demand for condemnation and the
impulse toward mercy as revealed in the evolution of infanticide laws
over the course of four hundred years of British legal history. Section
III provides a detailed description of infanticide in the United States in
the late twentieth century. After exploring the various patterns
emerging from contemporary cases, this section illustrates the
persistently ambivalent response toward punishing those convicted of
infanticide.
Ironically, in both historical and contemporary societies, the
tendency to treat infanticide as less heinous than other forms of murder
seldom is acknowledged, let alone explained. Section IV describes the
[Vol.8.1:3
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problematic legacy of this ambivalence and undertakes a direct
exploration of the ways in which infanticide cases tend to be
exceptional. Focusing on the circumstances surrounding most
infanticide cases reveals with greater clarity the legitimate justifications
for partially excusing these homicides and reveals society's
contributory role in tolerating and even perpetuating infanticidal
situations. Therefore, Section V of this Article proposes two normative
responses to infanticide. The first response is to explore ways in which
society diminish what is fundamentally a preventable modem
epidemic. The second response is to articulate a coherent
criminological resolution to these cases.
A brief word about methodology is necessary. I had descriptive,
analytic, and normative goals in writing this Article. Ideally, I would
have found a rich literature in the areas of history, anthropology,
demography, sociology, psychology, medicine, and criminal justice
that would have provided the descriptive foundation for this Article,
enabling me to focus on the analytical and normative aspects of the
subject. Unfortunately, the literature on contemporary American
infanticide is remarkably scant, whatever the academic discipline,
forcing me to undertake documenting and describing the problem, as
well as attempting to analyze and resolve it. In order to accomplish this
task, I utilized a broad range of methodologies that seemed best suited
to depicting the phenomenon of modem infanticide. As a result, this
Article draws on a variety of traditions--historical, cross-cultural,
narrative, sociological, and medical--as well as the more conventional
doctrinal analysis of the law. My hope is that this Article will generate
sufficient curiosity about the subject that persons more expert in these
traditions than myself will undertake further studies and analysis,
thereby enriching our understanding of, and our ability to eradicate,
modem American infanticide.
II. AMBIVALENCE ABOUT INFANTICIDE
ACROSS TIME AND PLACE
There is every reason to believe that infanticide is as old as human
society itself and that no culture has been immune to it.8 Infanticide
was legal throughout the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia, Greece,
and Rome, and was justified by reasons ranging from population
8 PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN ENGLAND
AND NEW ENGLAND 1558-1803, at 3 (1981) (describing infanticide practices among
hunting and gathering cultures, including one where 38 out of 96 female children born
were killed) (citing E.A. WRIGLEY, POPULATION AND HISTORY 42-43 (1969)).
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control to eugenics to illegitimacy.9 Although Constantine declared
infanticide a crime in 318 A.D., all indications are that throughout
much of the history of Western civilization, infanticide remained
commonplace.'°
9 Historian William Langer notes that "[i]n ancient times, at least, infanticide was not
a legal obligation. It was a practice freely discussed and generally condoned by those in
authority and ordinarily left to the decision of the father as the responsible head of the
family." William L. Langer, Infanticide: A Historical Survey, 1 HIST. CHILD. Q. 353, 354
(1974); see also Kathryn L. Moseley, The History of Infanticide in Western Society, 1
ISSUES L. & MED. 345, 346-51 (1986) (exploring the social and personal motivating
factors leading to infanticide from a historical perspective).
'0 Langer, supra note 9, at 355; see also Moseley, supra note 9, at 352 (discussing
infanticide of female and disabled children during the early Middle Ages). Although it is
difficult to estimate infanticide's prevalence, historians have documented its persistence
through a variety of genres. Demographic studies relying on civil, church, and hospital
records yield information about sex-selective infanticidal practices as well as infanticide's
widespread incidence. Barbara A. Kellum, Infanticide in England in the Later Middle
Ages, 1 HIST. CHILD. Q. 367, 368-69 (1974); Richard Trexler, Infanticide in Florence:
New Sources and First Results, 1 HIST. CHILD. Q. 98, 100-01 (1973).
For example, in a normal population, a ratio of 105-106 baby boys are born for every
100 girls. Nicholas D. Kristof, A Mystery From China's Census: Where Have Young Girls
Gone?, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1991, at Al. During the first year of life, male babies are
more vulnerable to infection and disease than are female babies; therefore, by age one
there should be an equal number of boys and girls. Trexler, supra, at 101-02. As a result,
whenever a community reveals sex ratios that diverge significantly from the norm, there is
reason to suspect infanticide. Id. at 101-02; Kellum, supra, at 368-69. Modern
demographers utilize this same reasoning to document the extent of sex-selective
infanticide in modern China and India. Thomas Poffenberger, Child Rearing and Social
Structure in Rural India: Toward a Cross-Cultural Definition of Child Abuse and Neglect,
in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, 71, 78-79 (Jill E.
Korbin ed., 1981); Kristof, supra, at Al; Michael Weisskopf, China's Birth Control Policy
Drives Some to Kill Baby Girls, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1985, at Al. Thus, data from
fifteenth century Florence indicating 114.6 boys per every 100 girls, with the ratio
.jumping to 124.56 boys per 100 girls in upper class families, Trexler, supra, at 100-01;
100 boys per every 87 girls in 1971 in Punjab, Poffenberger, supra, at 79; and 111.3 boys
per every 100 girls in 1990 in China, Kristof, supra, at Al, all demonstrate a pervasive
practice of infanticide.
Other evidence of infanticide's prevalence comes from occasional references to
infanticide found in historical documents. For example, medieval handbooks of penance
describe the sin of "overlaying" a child by laying on top of it and suffocating it. Kellum,
supra, at 369. This sin is included in a list of the venial or minor sins, such as failing to be
a good samaritan or quarreling with one's wife. Id. at 368. From the ninth to the fifteenth
century, the standard penance for overlaying was three years, one of these on bread and
water, compared with five years, three of these on bread and water, for the accidental
killing of an adult. Id. at 369. Scholars consider this casual mention and lenient treatment
of infanticide to be evidence of its relatively commonplace nature. Mosley, supra note 9,
at 356.
In eighteenth and nineteenth century France, England, and Russia, growing public
awareness of the problem of abandoned newborns, both dead and alive, led to the creation
of "foundling homes." See RACHEL G. FUCHS, POOR AND PREGNANT IN PARIS:
STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1992) (detailing history of
[Vol.8.1:3
INFANTICIDE
There are a host of factors that give rise to infanticide. Other
than the perpetrator's relationship to the victim, there may not be a
tremendous amount in common between a mother who kills her female
child in one culture and a mother who kills her illegitimate offspring in
another. Nevertheless, across a startling expanse of time and place, one
remarkably consistent observation may be made: infanticide is not
treated like other homicides. Despite the moral condemnation of
infanticide, there is considerable evidence that societies have refused to
punish it as they do other homicides. When societies enforce laws
against infanticide, they do so in a selective or even targeted manner.
In the modem era, many societies have elected to codify the distinctive
treatment of infanticide in specific statutes, the overwhelming majority
of which articulate lesser penalties for homicides committed by
mothers against children. The following two subsections will illustrate
both the de facto and de jure mechanisms by which societies have
exceptionalized infanticide.
A. Infanticide and the Pattern of Lenience:
A Study in British Legal History
From the time of the Roman Empire, laws against infanticide have been
under-enforced." Despite the solidification of a moral norm
condemning infanticide in Western Europe from the Middle Ages
through the early seventeenth century, prosecutions and convictions for
the crime remained relatively rare.'2 Although the overall pattern of
lenience in prosecuting infanticide may have been due in part to
sympathy for the defendants, it also derived from the difficulty of
Parisian women who delivered and abandoned their babies at the largest foundling home
in France); Langer, supra note 9, at 357-59 (providing a brief history of the foundling
homes). By the mid-eighteenth century, most large European towns established homes
devoted to caring for abandoned children and providing an alternative to infanticide for
those mothers who could not afford to raise their children. Langer, supra note 9, at 358.
Although they were notoriously bad at saving infants' lives, these homes were so popular
that, ultimately, they became too costly to maintain. For example, in France in 1833
[tihe number of babies left with the foundling hospitals reached the fantastic figure of
164,319. Authorities were all but unanimous in the opinion that the introduction of the
tours had been disastrous .... Thereupon the tours were gradually abolished until by 1862
only five were left. Instead, the government embarked upon a program of outside aid to
unwed mothers.
Id. at 359.
" The breakdown of the Roman Empire returned to local jurisdictions the task of law
enforcement. Historians have noted the paucity of infanticide prosecutions and speculated
that the local law enforcement officials were "generally unwilling to prosecute an
'innocent' woman for the murder of her child, especially if she was married." Moseley,
supra note 9, at 355.
12 HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 4-6.
2004]
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distinguishing murder from infant mortality. Infant mortality was
commonplace in this period, as a result of both natural causes and
improper medical treatment. 3
In medieval Europe, married women so often escaped
prosecution for infanticide that one historian concludes that "[tihey
could kill their infants with relative impunity. ,14 The same was not true
for unmarried women, who often were singled out by the law. 5
Although infanticide prosecutions remained uncommon, unmarried
women who were convicted of infanticide generally received capital
sentences that were carried out in excruciating manners."
13 Constance B. Backhouse, Desperate Women and Compassionate Courts:
Infanticide in Nineteenth-Century Canada, 1984 U. TORONTO L.J. 447, 449. This became a
serious impediment to convictions in England, where the law required the state to prove
both that the newborn had been born alive and that the mother had intentionally caused the
baby's death. The state's case could be aided if there was evidence of violence on the
corpse, or if there were witnesses who could testify that the baby had been born alive.
However, decomposition of the body often concealed any signs of violence, and secret
delivery made the availability of witnesses unlikely. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 9.
1 Moseley, supra note 9, at 357. During the witchcraft inquisition, some women,
especially married women, escaped prosecution because the crime of infanticide was
widely attributed to witches. For a fascinating historical account of the witchcraft
inquisition in Europe, see ANNE L. BARSTOW, WITCHCRAZE: A NEW HISTORY OF THE
EUROPEAN WITCH HUNTS (1994). Witches were thought to exercise enormous power over
newborns. One historian of the Middle Ages notes that "[i]nfanticide was far and away the
most common social crime imputed to the aged witches of Europe by the demonologists."
Trexler, supra note 10, at 103. A second source found that "[a] full quarter of all the
indictments brought against witches in England from the fourteenth through the eighteenth
century was for bewitching infants." HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 28.
As was the case with most of the accusations brought against witches, there was little
evidence linking the accused to the crime. BARSTOW, supra, at 23- 29. Although it is
possible that some of the infants died at the hands of these women, it is far more likely
that the majority of these accusations were made in order to avoid casting blame on the
child's parents. Historian Richard Trexler, in his comprehensive study of infanticide in
medieval Florence, concludes that the selective punishment of infanticide, aided by
allegations of witchcraft, reveals a society that had internalized a norm condemning
infanticide, even though it attributed its commission exclusively to those who were
outsiders, guilty of sexual immorality and social deviance.
The law and conscience of Europe in the sixteenth century vented its force upon old
women and unwed mothers. There was no attention given to married women and their
spouses. How could one prove infanticide within the walls of the family home? ... It was
more reasonable to assume that witches passed through locked doors in the dead of night
to suffocate infants than to believe that man and wife ... would do such a thing.
Trexler, supra note 10, at 105.
,5 Many of the earliest statutes outlawing infanticide refer solely to the crime of
bastardy neonaticide--infanticide committed by an unmarried woman. See infra note 23
(providing the text of An Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard
Children, 1623, 21 Jam. 1, ch. 27 (Eng.)).
6 Medieval sources recount stories of women who, following conviction, were tied
into sacks, along with a dog or a cock, and then thrown into a river. Langer, supra note 9,
at 356. One city's court and prison records from 1513 to 1777 document punishments
[Vol.8.1:3
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In seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, several factors
combined to generate pressure toward a more vigorous enforcement of
laws against infanticide. By the start of the seventeenth century, rapid
population growth and increasing poverty led to the perception of a
growing social disorder. 7 In response to that fear, crimes involving
sexual offenses such as bastardy and fornication, which formerly had
been tried in church courts and punished by a moderate penance,
became secularized.'
8
Those who supported the regulation of sexual and reproductive
behavior through the criminal law recognized that, to the extent that
infanticide went unpunished, women who were guilty of crimes of
sexual "deviance" could evade punishment by disposing of the
"evidence."' 9 Thus, if a jurisdiction wished to insure obedience to laws
regulating illicit sexual and reproductive behavior, they also had to
insure the strict enforcement of laws punishing infanticide. Therefore, it
is unsurprising that in England, where the laws governing sexual
misconduct were most severe, the Parliament passed legislation aimed
at increasing the rate of infanticide convictions. 20 Because the British
used the law in a conscious effort to reverse the tendency toward
lenient treatment of infanticide defendants, and because lawmakers
continually failed in these efforts,2 ' this legal history provides ample
evidence of the ambivalence generated by this crime.
1. The Jacobean Law of 1623: A Presumption of Guilt In British
Infanticide Cases
In 1623, Parliament passed An Act to Prevent the Destroying
and Murthering of Bastard Children, or as it came to be known, the
ranging from burial alive to drowning and decapitation for 87 women executed for the
crime of infanticide; all but four were unmarried. Id.
1 HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 12-13; Langer, supra note 9, at 355, 357.
is These laws were particularly harsh in England, where the crimes were punished by
public whippings and imprisonment. For example, in 1576 Parliament passed a "poor law"
that punished impoverished parents of bastard children. Mothers of these children were
pressed to identify the men who fathered their illegitimate children, and fathers were
required to pay support to the local parish for the child. Noncompliance by either parent
resulted in whippings or prison. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 13.
19 The stigma and humiliation associated with crimes of sexual deviance were so great
that they may have led women to conceal illegitimate pregnancies and commit infanticide
rather than acknowledge their conditions and endure prosecution. HOFFER & HULL, supra
no.e 8, at 17. In fact, two historians of the era note a distinct correlation between the
heightening of sanctions against bastardy and the rise in the number of indictments for
infanticide. Id. at 18.
20 See infra notes 22 through 24 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 27 through 50 and accompanying text.
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Jacobean Law of 1623.22 The law focused exclusively on the
concealment of the death of "bastard" children by "lewd" women, or
infanticides committed by unmarried women. Although this may reflect
a belief that mothers of legitimate children had no reason to wish them
dead, or at least had husbands who would limit their ability to conceal
pregnancy and infanticide, it also may be seen as evidence that the
infanticide law was responsive to the difficulties in punishing crimes of
sexual deviance. The Act made it a capital offense to conceal the birth
of an illegitimate child--whether still- or live-born--by a secret
disposition of its dead body. The law essentially reversed the
presumption of innocence by providing that, unless the defendant could
prove by eyewitness testimony that the baby had been stillborn, the jury
must find her guilty of murder.23 Few women accused could meet this
evidentiary test. After all, the entire purpose of concealing a pregnancy
would be defeated by inviting a witness. Thus, given high infant
mortality rates, the law had the effect of "sentencing innocent women
to death in the many cases where a woman attempted to conceal her
childbirth but the foetus was stillborn or died of natural causes."
2 4
22 1623, 21 Jam. 1, ch. 27 (Eng.). Similar, if not identical, versions of this act were
incorporated into law in much of New England and Canada. See HOFFER & HULL,
supra note 8, at 59-63 (regarding the 1692, 1699, and 1710 adoptions of the Jacobean law
in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia, respectively); Backhouse, supra note 13, at
449 (regarding Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island statutes of 1758 and 1792,
respectively).
23 The statute read:
An act to prevent the destroying and murthering of bastard children.
WHEREAS, many lewd women that have been delivered of bastard children, to avoid
their shame, and to escape punishment, do secretly bury or conceal the death of their
children, and after, if the child be found dead, the said woman do alledge, that the said
child was born dead; whereas it falleth out sometimes (although hardly it is to be proved)
that the said child or children were murthered by the said women, their lewd mothers, or
by their assent or procurement:
II. For the preventing therefore of this great mischief, be it enacted by the authority of
this present parliament, That if any woman ... be delivered of any issue of her body, male
or female, which being born alive, should be the laws of this realm be a bastard, and that
she endeavor privately, either by drowning or secret burying thereof, or any other way,
either by herself or the procuring of others, so to conceal the death thereof, as that it may
not come to light, whether it were born alive or not, but be concealed: in every such case
the said mother so offending shall suffer death as in case of murther, except such mother
can make proof by one witness at the least, that the child (whose death was by her so
intended to be concealed) was born dead.
An Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, 1623, 21 Jam.
1, ch. 27 (Eng.), reprinted in HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 20.
24 Backhouse, supra note 13, at 450. It was the rare circumstance to find the Jacobean
Law of 1623 applied to married women, and when it was, acquittal usually ensued.
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 85 (a "servant, nurse, and wife" acquitted of murder in
1781 after she had wounded her newborn while untangling the umbilical cord), In 1803,
the Jacobean Law of 1623 was repealed, and by 1828, with the death penalty provision
[Vol.8.1:3
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The years immediately following the enactment of the Jacobean
Law of 1623 witnessed a dramatic increase in the conviction rates of
those prosecuted for infanticide. In their comprehensive empirical
study of infanticide in England from 1558 to 1803, Professors Hoffer
and Hull compare conviction rates for both ordinary homicide and
infanticide. One part of their study reviewed homicide and infanticide
prosecutions in the Essex assize by contrasting the forty-eight years
prior to the passage of the 1623 statute with the twenty-eight years
following its passage.25 Although they found no demonstrable change
in homicide indictment rates, they discerned a 225% increase in the
rates of infanticide indictments.26
Despite the law's effectiveness in obtaining convictions, the
threat of conviction and punishment had seemingly little deterrent
effect on the prevalence of infanticide. Evidence indicates that the
crime remained relatively commonplace throughout eighteenth and
nineteenth century England, much as it was in the rest of Europe.
27
Moreover, after the first several decades of applying this law, juries
reverted to the familiar pattern of lenience, even in those cases
involving unmarried women who were guilty of concealment. 8
The trend away from conviction and toward lenience was
facilitated by the adoption of several defenses that could be invoked
against the charge of infanticide by virtue of concealment. The most
common defense was based on a woman's preparation for the birth of
the child, otherwise known as "benefit-of-linen., 29  This defense
virtually guaranteed acquittal to any defendant who could demonstrate
that she had made linen for her infant before its birth.3° "Want-of-help"
was a second defense that was invoked to diminish culpability, or in
some cases, to secure acquittal. This defense permitted a woman to
eliminated and the statute focusing solely on concealment, application was freely extended
to married women. Backhouse, supra note 13, at 454.
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 23-25.
26 Id. at 18. Hoffer and Hull's study also demonstrates that the severe punishment of
infanticide was reserved for those defendants whose crimes fit the statute. Their data
indicate a guilty rate of 72.7% for women tried for infanticide whose acts fit the statute--
unmarried women who concealed pregnancy--as compared to a 33.3% conviction rate for
those who did not fit the statute--married suspects and/or older child victims. Id. at 25.
27 Langer, supra note 9, at 355-57.
28 See infra notes 32 through 33 and accompanying text.
29 HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 69.
30 Id. at 69. The authors note that in six cases where the mothers of dead newborn
bastards pleaded "benefit-of-linen," five were acquitted. For obvious reasons, the defense
was most effective in cases in which there was no sign of violence on the corpse. Id.
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argue that the infant's death had occurred despite her efforts to secure
assistance.3'
Armed with these defenses, British juries once again began to
resist convicting women of infanticide. By the early eighteenth
century, juries were as likely to favor the defendant as seventeenth
century juries had been to convict. Conviction rates for bastard
neonaticide between 1714 and 1722 were not only lower than in the
years immediately following passage of the Jacobean Law, but were
"as far below 50% as the rate for the period between 1614 and 1622
was above 50%.
33
2. Nineteenth Century British Infanticide Law Reform
From the 1720s to the early 1800s, the pattern of under-
enforcement and jury nullification of the concealment law led British
lawmakers, who already were troubled by the law's anomalous and
unfair nature, to call for its repeal.34 Finally, in 1803 Parliament passed
a revised infanticide statute.35 The new law made infanticide subject to
the same rules of evidence as all other homicides. Thus, the
31 The "want-of-help" defense took various forms: "[plrior arrangement with a
midwife, cries for help drowned out by passing carriages, a mistakenly locked door, a
sudden illness preventing the solicitation of assistance, or a fall on the way to obtain help."
Id. at 69. Likewise, juries were increasingly inclined to view a woman's failure to tie off
an umbilical cord or to stop the fall of a child onto a hard floor or into a privy as evidence
not of "murderous intent," but rather, of "a lack of skill or self-possession." Id. at 69-70.
32 Id. at 71.
33 Id. Hoffer and Hull also reviewed murder conviction rates from eighteenth century
Massachusetts, comparing jury outcomes in infanticide cases with outcomes in murder
trials with adult victims. Their review shows that
[wihen ... doubts [about premeditation] disturbed eighteenth-century infanticide
juries, they resolved them in favor of acquittal at a rate even greater than the combined
percentages of murder of adults ending in acquittals and verdicts of murder reduced to
manslaughter. These statistics lead to the conclusion that the eighteenth-century juries
were more lenient in infanticide cases than in murders involving adult victims.
Id. at 77-78.
34 Perhaps the most powerful plea was made in 1772 by Edmund Burke and Charles
James Fox, two members of the House of Commons, who argued that in the case of
women having bastard children, the common [and] statute laws were inconsistent; that the
common law subjected to a fine, to a month's imprisonment, and the flagellation; that this
institution necessarily rendered the having of a bastard child infamous; that the dread of
infamy necessarily caused concealment; that the statute law, in opposition to all this, made
concealment capital; that every mother, who had not at least one witness to prove, that her
child, if it was dead, was born dead, or died naturally, must be hanged; that nothing could
be more unjust, or inconsistent with the principles of all law, than first to force a woman
through modesty to concealment, and then to hang her for that concealment ....
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 85-86 (quoting PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF
ENGLAND, 17: 1771-1774, at 452-53 (London, 1813)).
35 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58, § 3 (1803) (Eng.).
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prosecution had a duty to establish that the victim had been born alive.
Contemporary forensic medicine proved ill-equipped to determine live
birth on autopsy and, as a result, the live birth requirement greatly
hindered findings of guilt.36 The 1803 statute provided for up to two
years in prison in those cases where women had concealed their
illegitimate pregnancies but live birth could not be determined.37 This
lesser offense became the overwhelming preference of 'juries in
infanticide trials, in part because infanticide carried with it a capital
sentence.38 As one historian of the era notes, "the courts regularly
returned verdicts of not guilty despite overwhelming evidence to the
contrary." 
39
Rather than correcting the problem of nullification, the 1803
law furthered the tendency toward lenience, particularly when, in 1828,
Parliament expanded the law to apply the crime of concealment to all
women, as opposed to just "lewd" women. n0  Faced with seemingly
ordinary women who had committed indisputably immoral acts, the
courts began to entertain for the first time defenses premised upon the
defendant's temporary insanity. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth
century, medical experts came to believe that the "disruptive effects of
36 There were several controversial and ultimately discredited methods that doctors
used to determine live birth. The best known was the Swammerdam test, which was based
on Jan Swammerdam's 1667 discovery that fetal lungs float on water after respiration has
occurred. Unlike their European counterparts, who concluded that it was impossible to
infer live birth from floating lungs, British doctors adhered to this test well into the
eighteenth century. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, "even English physicians
were conceding that a conviction for murder should not hinge upon whether lung tissue
sank or 'swam'." George K. Behlmer, Deadly Motherhood: Infanticide and Medical
Opinion in Mid-Victorian England, 34 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Sci. 403, 410 (1979).
" 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58, § 4 (1803) (Eng.). In England in 1828, a new law permitted a
direct trial for the crime of concealment without a prior murder trial. An Act for
Consolidating and Amending the Statutes in England Relative to Offences against the
Person, 1828, 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31, § 14 (Eng.); see also An Act for Consolidating and
Amending the Statutes in Ireland Relating to Offences against the Person, 1829, 10 Geo.
4, ch. 34, § 17 (Eng.) (extending the same statute to Ireland). Similar statutes were passed
in the New England colonies. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 90-91; see also Paul A.
Gilie, Infant Abandonment in Early Nineteenth-Century New York City: Three Cases, 8
SIGNS 580, 582 (1983) (citing Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York statutes
criminalizing concealment).
'8 Behlmer, supra note 36, at 412. One British jurist, testifying in the 1860s to the
Commission on Capital Punishment, stated that "almost every case tried for concealment
was a case of murder." O'Donovan, supra note 1, at 261 (citing Commission on Capital
Punishment, 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1866)).
39 Backhouse, supra note 13, at 448. As Section III of this Article demonstrates, this
resistance to convicting these defendants of murder remains commonplace today. See
infra notes 105 through 128 and accompanying text.
40 1828, 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31, § 14 (Eng.).
2004]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
birth on mental health" could lead a mother to kill her newborn.4" Two
psychological disorders, "puerperal mania" and "lactational insanity"
were thought to cause occasional infanticidal thoughts and actions in
newly delivered and/or nursing mothers. 42  Although some Victorians
objected to the widespread use of this "merciful legal fiction," juries
and judges generally were willing to believe that the "physiological and
psychological trauma of child-birth" was responsible for most
infanticidal behavior.43
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, this lenience again
became the subject of public debate. The growing concentration of
people living in urban squalor was linked to an increased visibility of
infanticide." Public officials expressed growing outrage over the crime
and frustration over.juries' reluctance to punish it.45 Disraeli decried the
fact that infanticide was "practiced as extensively and as legally in
41 Behlmer, supra note 36, at 413.
42 Id. at 413. The medicalized explanation for infanticide was not limited to England.
In France, infanticide defendants whose newborns had been killed in particularly violent
ways explained that their actions were due to "a fureur manique or folie passagere due to
the atrocious pains of the last moments of labor." James M. Donovan, Infanticide and the
Juries in France, 1825-1913, 16 J. Fam. Hist. 157, 169 (1991).
43 Behimer, supra note 36, at 413. In our own era, evidence of the preference of a
medicalized explanation of infanticide is manifest in numerous statutes from various
cultures, and also in the academic world's virtually exclusive focus on postpartum
psychosis in the otherwise sparse literature on modem infanticide. See infra note 141
(listing postpartum psychosis articles). Professor Michael Perlin, an expert on the insanity
defense, refers to infanticide defendants as "empathy outliers," owing to their frequent
success in establishing an insanity defense despite the fact that the overwhelming majority
of defendants who raise these defenses are unsuccessful. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 192 (1994).
44 During this era, Thomas Malthus posited that human fertility would exceed the
power of the earth to provide sustenance, that premature death of some type would thus
affect a large part of mankind, and that "[tihe vices of mankind are active and able
ministers of depopulation." GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 34-35 (1957) (quoting THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE
OF POPULATION, 139-40 (Bonar's 1926) (London 1798)). From this premise, Malthus
concluded that poverty and its ills were inherent in the social order. Id. So prevalent was
infanticide that "[olne may safely assume that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
the poor, hardly able to support the family they already had, evaded responsibility by
disposing of further additions." Langer, supra note 9, at 357.
45 Professor Langer documents a number of journalistic accounts from coroners, who
said that police thought no more of finding a dead child than of finding a dead cat or dog;
doctors, who said that women in lower ranks left their babies in the care of 'killer nurses'
who made short shrift of their charges by generous doses of opiates; politicians, who
described a seeming "carnival of infant slaughter"; and newspapers that reported dead
babies found in ditches, parks, and cesspools and noted the crime "is positively becoming
a national institution." Id. at 360-61.
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England as it is on the banks of the Ganges." 46 One justice testified to
the Commission on Capital Punishment in 1866:
It is in vain that judges lay down the law and point out the strength
of the evidence .... [Jiuries wholly disregard them and eagerly adopt
the wildest suggestions which the ingenuity of counsel can furnish
.... Juries will not convict whilst infanticide is punished capitally.47
The sympathetic response of nineteenth century juries to
infanticide defendants may have reflected a sense that the mandatory
death penalty was too harsh a punishment in light of the circumstances
surrounding the crime. This crime was overwhelmingly committed by
poor women, many of whom were seduced and then left alone to face
the consequences of pregnancy and an illegitimate infant 48  As
Adrienne Rich notes, "[t]he Victorian period abounds with cases of the
seduction (read 'rape') of servant girls by their employers; if they
refused sex, they would be fired, and many were fired anyway for
getting pregnant. '" 49 Thus, there was a common sentiment expressed by
those asked to convict these women of murder that one of the guilty
parties, and perhaps the primary one, was missing from the trial.50
46 ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD As EXPERIENCE AND
INSTITUTION 262 (1976). On the other side of the Atlantic, the incidence of infanticide and
infant abandonment were equally dramatic: 483 dead infants found in Philadelphia streets
in one four year period between 1860 and 1900. Id. From 1861 to 1871, 939 "foundlings"
were reported in New York City alone. Lawrence M. Friedman, Crimes of Mobility, 43
STAN. L. REV. 637, 655 (1991).
47 D. Seaborne Davies, Child Killing in English Law, 1937 MOD. L. R. 202, 219
(quoting Judge Keating's testimony before the Commission on Capital Punishment, 21
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 103 (1866)). Judges also were reluctant to convict and
they "not merely tacitly acquiesced in the methods used by lawyers to circumvent the law
but frequently played an active part in these conspiracies."
48 Donovan, supra note 42, at 169; see also Friedman, supra note 46, at 655
(describing a common scenario where young servant girls could not afford to raise
unwanted children, and would be fired if they disclosed their conditions to their
employers); Langer, supra note 9, at 357-60 (describing the prevalence of infanticide
among the poor, who could not afford to raise another child).
49 RICH, supra note 46, at 262.
50 One study of French infanticide cases during this era cites several experts who
concluded that many of the accused women were acquitted because the iurors felt that it
was unfair that the females alone should bear the responsibility for the crimes. This was
because the men who had impregnated the women ... often abandoned them and bore no
legal responsibility for the consequences of their lust. Therefore, jurors frequently
believed that the male seducers were at least partly responsible for the infanticides.
Donovan, supra note 42, at 169.
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3. De Jure Lenience: Great Britain s Twentieth Century Infanticide
Statute
Eventually, this debate led to the repeal of the 1803 infanticide
act in favor of a law that, for the first time, attempted to articulate a
justification for lenience in cases of infanticide. The new statute was
proposed by a series of British judicial commissions. The commissions
claimed that efforts to try infanticide under homicide laws inevitably
led juries and judges to nullify the law, and that this reluctance to
convict was making a mockery of the criminal justice system.5
The resulting British Infanticide Act of 1922 is premised upon
the belief that a woman who commits infanticide may do so because
"the balance of her mind [i]s disturbed by reason of her not having fully
recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child."52 As a result, the
statute provided that those defendants whose minds were so disturbed,
"notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for the Act
the offence would have amounted to murder," shall be guilty only of
manslaughter." The definition of "disturbance" of the mind is more
fluid and capacious than the modem insanity defense, thus making this
defense available to virtually all women accused of killing their young
children. 4
5, "It has been convincingly argued that the Act was the product, not of nineteenth
century medical theory about the effects of child-birth, but of judicial effort to avoid
passing death sentences which were not going to be executed." O'Donovan, supra note 1,
at 261; see also NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND, VOL. 1, 128-32 (1968)
(describing objections to the law and efforts at reform).
" The text of the law reads:
Where a woman ... causes the death of her child ... under twelve months of age, but at
the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not
having fully recovered from the effect ... of lactation consequent upon the birth of the
child, then, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for this Act the
offence would have amounted to murder, she shall be guilty of felony, to wit of
infanticide, and may for such offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty
of the offence of manslaughter of the child.
Infanticide Act, 1938, 2 Geo. 6, ch. 36 (Eng.). The 1922 Act originally was limited to
"newly born" children, but was amended in 1938 in response to a case that held that the
law did not extend to a woman who killed her 35-day-old child. The amended law
included any child under the age of 12 months and extended the defense of lactation-
related hormonal imbalance. WALKER, supra note 51, at 131-32.
53 Infanticide Act, 1938, 2 Geo. 6, ch. 36 (Eng.).
14 For example, one study of 89 British women who killed their children between
1970 and 1975 demonstrated the efficiency of the infanticide statute, as compared with
other homicide laws, in obtaining convictions. P.T. d'Orban, Women Who Kill Their
Children, 134 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 560, 566-67 (1979). Sixty subjects whose victims
exceeded the age of one year were charged with murder, yet only two were convicted of
this offense. Id. The vast majority of these defendants were convicted of manslaughter on
grounds of diminished responsibility or lack of intent to kill. Id. Five were acquitted
altogether. In contrast, of 24 subjects charged with infanticide, 23 were convicted. Of the
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Although manslaughter may be punished with life
imprisonment in England, actual sentencing practices under the
infanticide statute have been far more lenient. So many of those
convicted receive probationary sentences that one leading scholar of the
British criminal justice system concluded that the practical impact of
the Infanticide Act has been "the virtual abandonment of prison
sentences as a means of dealing with a crime involving the taking of
human life."55
Interestingly, the most fundamental criticism of the Infanticide
Act is not the law's lenience, but rather its quasi-scientific basis.
Professor Osborne echoed the sentiments of many when she concluded
that the Act did not recognize the existence of a link between childbirth
and infanticide, but created it.5 6 Even at the time of the Act's passage, it
was unclear whether the Act was based on an actual belief that women
who killed their children were mentally ill, or whether "a medical
model was adopted to justify moderation in the imposition of
punishments. 5 7  In recent decades, as various English law reform
groups have reconsidered the Infanticide Act,58 both supporters and
critics of the Act agree that "there is little or no evidence for an
association between lactation and mental disorder," and that mental
disorder is "probably no longer a significant cause of infanticide."
59
Despite the widespread consensus that mental disorders are not
the sole cause of infanticidal behavior, those reviewing the British law
23 convicted, 18 received probationary sentences (seven with a condition that they receive
psychiatric treatment), two were sentenced to imprisonment (one for 18 months and the
other for two and one half years), one was conditionally discharged, one received a
nominal one day sentence, and another was diagnosed as suffering from postpartum
depression and admitted to a mental hospital. Id.
5 WALKER, supra note 51, at 133.
56 Judith A. Osborne, The Crime of Infanticide: Throwing Out the Baby With the
Bathwater, 6 REv. CAN. D. FAM. 47, 55 (1987); see also WALKER, supra note 51, at 128
(describing the difficulties of fashioning a legal approach to infanticide); O'Donovan,
supra note 1, at 259-62 (same).
" Daniel Maier-Katkin & Robbin Ogle, A Rationale for Infanticide Laws, 1993 CRIM.
L. REv. 903, 911.
5 Professor Osborne lists three committees: The Committee on Mentally Abnormal
Offenders; The Royal College of Psychiatrists' Working Party on Infanticide; and The
Criminal Law Revision Committee. Osborne, supra note 56, at 57.
'9 O'Donovan, supra note 1, at 263 (describing the findings and proposals of The
Criminal Law Revision Committee's Fourteenth Report and the Butler Report). Of course,
contemporary science does recognize the medical phenomena of postpartum psychiatric
disorders. See infra notes 140 through 154 and accompanying text (discussing postpartum
psychosis). While it is not known precisely what percentage of women who kill their
children suffer from postpartum psychosis, both psychiatric research and analyses of
mortality statistics suggests that it is only rarely the cause of infanticide. Wilczynski &
Morris, supra note 2, at 35.
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have not called for its repeal. This remains so in spite of the
availability of a diminished responsibility defense. 6° In fact, one law
reform committee that has studied the Infanticide Act recommended
retaining the law precisely because the mental health act was not broad
enough to cover most women convicted of infanticide.6' Moreover, two
of the three committees studying the law recommended that its
medicalized definition of disturbance of the mind be broadened by
adding socio-economic considerations to the list of factors that might
precipitate infanticide. The Fourteenth Report of the Criminal Law
Revision Committee recognized that mental disturbance could arise
from the effects of giving birth or from the socio-economic
"circumstances consequent upon birth," and recommended that the
latter phrase be included in the statute.62
Ultimately, the determination to retain a quasi-medical
justification for treating infanticide differently from other homicides
emerges as further evidence of the ambivalence infanticide generates.63
The decision not to repeal the infanticide law despite widespread
criticism of its underlying logic reflects ongoing support for the view
that infanticide is a distinct form of homicide that constitutes a lesser
offense than murder.
B. Contemporary Infanticide Statutes: A Cross-Cultural Pattern of
Lenience Toward Infanticide
Western history reveals that, in spite of the moral turbulence infanticide
generates, communities have withheld harsh punishment from most
mothers who kill their infant offspring. A cross-cultural
anthropological survey of contemporary infanticidal practices is beyond
the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, it is important to situate
Western infanticide within the broader context of cross-cultural
60 WALKER, supra note 51, at 134-36 (describing applications of the insanity defense
in England).
61 In 1978, the Working Party on Infanticide of the Royal College of Psychiatrists
'recommended that unless the mandatory life sentence for murder is abolished Infanticide
should remain as a separate offence." d'Orban, supra note 54, at 570.
62 O'Donovan, supra note 1, at 263 (citing CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE,
FOURTEENTH REPORT, OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON, 1980, Cmnd. 7844, at $ 105)
(emphasis added). The Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders recognized that "the
operative factors in child killing are often the stress of having to care for the infant, who
may be unwanted or difficult, and personality problems." Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON MENTALLY ABNORMAL OFFENDERS, 1975, Cmnd. 6244, at 245).
63 As one study of current dispositions in British infanticide cases concluded, "women
who kill their own infant children constitute a distinct class of offender in the English
system .... The Infanticide Act emerged from a policy decision to promote leniency for
women who murder their own children." Maier-Katkin & Ogle, supra note 57, at 911.
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infanticidal practices. In anthropologist Susan Scrimshaw's study of
infanticide in human populations, she notes that infanticide takes on
many forms across human societies and includes "behavior ranging
from deliberate to unconscious which is likely to lead to the death of a
dependent, young member of the species." 64  Studying infanticide's
prevalence is complicated because societal definitions of infanticide
vary according to normative cultural practices, as do beliefs regarding
the beginning of life; therefore, the starvation-induced death of a
toddler, for example, may not be considered infanticide in some
cultures.65  Likewise, the underlying causes of and justifications for
infanticide are numerous and varied, including the age-old preference
for sons that contributes to female infanticide in modem China;
poverty; and concerns with witchcraft and sorcery that lead some
cultures to sanction the killing of disabled newborns, twins, premature
and breech birth babies, and/or babies born to mothers who died during
childbirth .66
Despite the variable construction of infanticide across cultural
lines, the extent to which numerous contemporary societies
differentiate infanticide from murder and resist punishing its
perpetrators as murderers demonstrates the continuity and
pervasiveness of this practice throughout Western history. A survey of
contemporary infanticide laws from cultures around the world reveals
the manner in which many modem societies have continued this
historical pattern. Evidence of the differential treatment of infanticide
readily is observed in the numerous statutes that provide distinct
definitions and lesser penalties for the crime of infanticide as opposed
to other homicides.67
64 Susan Scrimshaw, Infanticide in Human Populations: Societal and Individual
Concerns, in INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES 439, 442
(Glenn Hausfater & Susan B. Hrdy, eds., 1984).
65 See generally Carolyn F. Sargent, Born to Die: Witchcraft and Infanticide in Bariba
Culture, 27 ETHNOLOGY 79, 80 (1988) (studying how urban Bariba continued to kill
newborns believed to be "witch babies" as a response to traditional ideas about good, evil,
and the social order).
66 See, e.g., Sharon K. Hom, Female Infanticide in China: The Human Rights
Specter and Thoughts Towards (An)other Vision, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249
(1992) (regarding sex-selective infanticide in modern China); Sargent, supra note 65, at
79-93 (describing the practice of infanticide in Bariba culture as a response to signs at
birth that were perceived to demonstrate that a newborn was a "witch baby"); Scrimshaw,
supra note 64, at 442 (charting the broad range of religious and cultural beliefs
contributing to infanticide in varying societies).
67 As an empirical matter, it is difficult to ascertain the manner in which a nation
punishes infanticide without considering that country's entire law of homicide. Although
this research would be both useful and fascinating, it would be extraordinarily difficult to
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Many nations around the world have statutes specific to
infanticide; all but one of these makes infanticide a less severe crime
than ordinary homicide." The majority of these statutes provide
maximum sentences that are considerably less than the standard
penalties for manslaughter and murder.6 9 Although the various statutes
all refer to the crime of "infanticide," the definition of this crime is
somewhat ambiguous. At a minimum, infanticide refers to mothers
who kill infants to whom they have given birth.7° Aside from this fact,
however, the laws vary in breadth and leniency. Several jurisdictions
limit the applicability of infanticide depending upon the defendant's
marital status. For example, in Austria and the Philippines, the
compile. Therefore, I have restricted this search to those nations with statutes explicitly
governing the crime of infanticide.
6 Luxembourg specifically provides a more severe penalty for killing a child than for
other homicides. PROVOCATION, DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY AND INFANTICIDE, New
South Wales Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper, August 31, 1993, at 129. The
following have criminal codes that recognize infanticide as a specific, less culpable form
of homicide: Austria, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES, PENAL ACT CONCERNING FELONIES AND GROSS AND PETTY MISDEMEANORS 66
(Norbert D. West & Samuel I. Shuman, trans., 1966) [hereinafter AUSTRIAN PENAL
CODE]; Colombia, New York Univ., The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, The
Colombian Penal Code 106 (Phanor Eder, trans., 1967) [hereinafter Colombian Penal
Code]; Finland, New York Univ., The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, The Penal
Code of Finland 71 (Matti Jousten, trans., 1987) [hereinafter Finnish Penal Code]; Greece,
New York Univ., The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, The Greek Penal Code
148 (Nicholas B. Lolis, trans., 1950) [hereinafter Greek Penal Code]; India, The Law of
Crimes 855 (Ratanlal Ranchhoddas & Dhirailal Keshavlal Thakore, trans., 1966)
[hereinafter Indian Penal Code]; Italy, New York Univ., The American Series of Foreign
Penal Codes, The Italian Penal Code 193 (Edward M. Wise & Allen Maitlin, trans., 1978)
[hereinafter Italian Penal Code]; Korea, New York Univ., The American Series of Foreign
Penal Codes, The Korean Criminal Code 109 (Paul Ryu, trans., 1960) [hereinafter Korean
Penal Code]; New Zealand, New Zealand Criminal Act of 1961, supra note 4, at 135; The
Philippines, The Revised Penal Code Annotated 355 (Jose Nolledo, ed., 1988) [hereinafter
Philippine Penal Code]; Turkey, New York Univ., The American Series of Foreign Penal
Codes, The Turkish Criminal Code 145 (Orhan Sepici & Mustafa Ovacik, trans., 1965)
[hereinafter Turkish Penal Code]; New South Wales, Western Australia, and Tasmania,
Provocation, Diminished Responsibility and Infanticide, supra at 120, 127.
69 For example, in Colombia, parricide (the killing of one's parent) is punishable by 15
to 20 years' imprisonment, while infanticide is punishable by two to six years'
imprisonment. COLOMBIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 105-06. In Italy, parricide is
punishable by 24 to 30 years, and infanticide is punishable by three to 10 years. ITALIAN
PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 193. In Korea, parricide is punishable by death or life
imprisonment, and infanticide is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years.
KOREAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 68, at 109.
'0 Some also include adoptive mothers, and several include other family members
such as fathers and grandparents. See, e.g., KOREAN PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 109
(including lineal ascendants); PHILIPPINE PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 355 (including
maternal grandparents); TURKISH PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 145 (including husband,
son, father, grandparent, adoptive parent, and brother).
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punishment for killing an illegitimate child is far less severe than that
for killing a legitimate one.7' Additionally, Korea and Italy specify that
their laws apply to those who commit infanticide in order to save their
honor--surely a tacit reference to maternal marital status.72
The notion of permitting greater lenience in the case of an
unmarried mother is somewhat unexpected in view of Western society's
historical tendency to punish "outsider" mothers, while permitting more
"conventional" mothers to avoid the law. It seems at least possible,
however, that the assumption that the laws in fact are more generous
toward unmarried mothers is not borne out in reality. The focus on
illegitimacy, like the focus on medical factors in the British law, may
be viewed as a legislative effort to explain why infanticide occurs, as
well as to provide a justification for not punishing it as stringently as
other forms of homicide. By ascribing to unmarried mothers a motive
for this crime, however, these statutes may serve to cast more suspicion
on unmarried defendants while permitting married defendants facing
generic homicide charges to enjoy a greater benefit of the doubt.
Moreover, the dichotomy between legitimate and illegitimate births
reflects only the law on the books in these various nations; infanticide
prosecutions against married mothers may well remain a rarity.
With regard to the infants' age, the statutes range from those
that govern only deaths occurring immediately after birth to those that
apply to any death prior to age ten.73 The majority of the statutes
explicitly or implicitly follow the British model and pertain to any
infant killed within its first twelve months of life.
71 In Austria, the law provides for 10 to 20 years' imprisonment as opposed to life
imprisonment, AUSTRIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 66, and in the Philippines, the
punishment is reduced from one to six years to one to three years, PHILIPPINE PENAL
CODE, supra note 68, at 355.
72 Article 578 of the Italian Penal Code is titled "Infanticide for Reasons of Honor"
and begins "in order to save his own honor or that of a close relative .... ITALIAN PENAL
CODE, supra note 68, at 193. Article 251 of the Korean Criminal Code begins "in order to
avoid disgrace .... KOREAN PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 109.
7' The Italian statute provides for "the death of a child immediately after its birth,"
ITALIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 193, while the New Zealand statute provides for
"the death of any child ... under the age of ten years," New Zealand Criminal Act of 1961,
supra note 4, at 158. The New Zealand law is truly an outlier. It not only applies to any
child killed before age ten, but it does so on the basis of the quasi-medical justifications
found in the British statute. Id. It is somewhat mind-boggling to imagine a woman
claiming that she killed her nine-year-old child as a result of a disturbance of the mind due
to childbirth or lactation, unless, of course, she has recently given birth to another child.
Still, the law may have been drafted to insure that these particular defendants, if found
guilty, would be spared the manslaughter penalty of life imprisonment, and instead would
receive the statutory maximum sentence for infanticide of three years.
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The infanticide statutes from around the world evidence a
shared sense that it is both legally and morally wrong for a mother to
kill her infant. At the same time, they evince an equally powerful
consensus that, both in terms of its genesis and in terms of maternal
culpability, infanticide is a far different crime from other homicides.
III. INFANTICIDE, AMERICAN STYLE: OUTRAGE AND
AMBIVALENCE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CASES
This brief overview of historical and contemporary cross-cultural
responses to women who kill their children reveals a persistent pattern
of moral condemnation coupled with ambivalence about punishment
and a tendency toward mercy. This section will demonstrate that the
contemporary American response to infanticide is entirely consistent
with this pattern. The process of identifying the American response to
infanticide is challenging. Unlike England, the United States lacks a
series of legislative initiatives against infanticide. Instead, twentieth
century American infanticide is punished under general homicide
statutes.74 Furthermore, American society lacks a conscious awareness
of infanticide as a domestic problem.
Unlike in other societies throughout history, it is, at first blush,
difficult to fathom the reasons for the persistence of infanticide in our
affluent society. Professor Langer, a social historian, reasons that
[olnly since the Second World War has the contraceptive pill, the
intrauterine device, and the legalization of abortion removed all
valid excuses for unwanted pregnancy or infanticide. To the extent
that these problems still exist, at least in western society, they are
due primarily to carelessness, ignorance, or indifference. 5
Yet, even if we are uncertain as to what causes an American
mother to kill her child, and even if we are hesitant to view this
homicide as evidence of a larger problem of infanticide, a close look at
the American response to cases where mothers kill their children
reveals our tacit understanding that these cases are more than isolated
occurrences perpetrated by careless, ignorant, or indifferent women.
Read together, the cases of modem American infanticide demonstrate a
74 See, e.g., Jones v. Washington, 836 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ill. 1993), affd, 32 F.3d
570 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing the habeas corpus claims of a woman convicted of
murder for killing her child); Illinois v. Ehlert, 654 N.E.2d 705 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 660 N.E.2d 1274 (I11. 1995) (same); Illinois v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 806 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (same); Vaughan v. Virginia, 376 S.E.2d 801 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (same).
75 Langer, supra note 9, at 362.
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familiar, patterned nature. Our society, like others before it, responds to
infanticide with anger, empathy, and a profound yet unarticulated sense
that these cases differ from other forms of homicide.
A. Latent Signs of a Modern Epidemic
Outside of homicide statistics documenting homicide rates for infants
and children, very little is known about the nature and extent of
contemporary infanticide. Perhaps the largest problem in studying
American infanticide is finding a systematic method for gathering
evidence of its occurrence. Underdetection is a perennial problem in
estimating the incidence of infanticide; given the frequently
serendipitous nature of discovery of the crime (e.g., the body is left
exposed, rather than buried), there is little reason to believe that even a
small percentage of the cases are discovered." Evidence of modem
American infanticide emerges primarily through autopsy examinations.
This measure is a fallible one, due to the limited number of autopsies
performed on infants and the failure of medical examiners to detect
signs of abuse that might have precipitated infant deaths.8
Despite the difficulties inherent in obtaining a precise measure
of infanticide, one gains a sense of its nature by collecting and
reviewing reports of identified cases. As is true for all crimes, the
76 Unnithan, supra note 2, at 146.
[A] search of the literature ... indicates that, while child homicide has been more
frequently addressed than in the past, it still receives less attention than other forms of
homicide and other types of child abuse and neglect. For example, Psychological
Abstracts listed 1,264 entries on 'child abuse' in the last [twenty] years, but only a handful
dealt specifically with child homicide.
Id.
77 See generally Lester Adelson, Slaughter of the Innocents: A Study of Forty-Six
Homicides in Which the Victims Were Children, 264 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1345, 1348
(1961) (noting that failure to perform autopsies results in mislabeling homicides as "crib
deaths"); Janine Jason et al., Underrecording of Infant Homicide in the United States, 73
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 195 (1983) (attributing a sudden drop in homicide rates of infants
from 1967 to 1969 to changes in reporting classifications and revision of the standard
death certificate); George A. Little & John G. Brooks, Accepting the Unthinkable, 94
PEDIATRICS 748, 748 (1994) (addressing the evidence that about 5% of cases diagnosed as
SIDS actually are the result of deliberate human actions); Murray A. Straus, State and
Regional Differences in U.S. Infant Homicide Rates in Relation to Sociocultural
Characteristics of the States, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61, 63 (1987) (recognizing that official
causes of death of children may underestimate the true incidence of homicide for
children).
78 The U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect reported that "[iut has been
estimated that 85% of childhood deaths from abuse and neglect are systematically
misidentified as accidental, disease-related or due to other causes." U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, A NATION'S SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN
THE UNITED STATES, Washington, D.C.: Department of Health and Human Services xxviii
(5th Report 1995) [hereinafter FATAL CHILD ABUSE] (citations omitted).
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discretionary and variable nature of investigation and subsequent
prosecution renders it impossible to estimate prevalence based upon the
number of cases in which charges are filed.79 Furthermore, even a
study of reported infanticide cases yields no information about those
that ended either in verdicts that were not appealed or in plea-bargains
prior to trial.80 Nevertheless, in gathering evidence of infanticide cases,
one may identify a phenomenon and demonstrate that it occurs with
considerable frequency by showing that the cases bear marked
similarities.
With these goals in mind, I compiled a data base of cases and
news reports describing infanticides by searching in the LEXIS and
NEXIS data bases. I focused my research on cases reported between
approximately 1988 and 1995.81. I make no claims that the ninety-six
that I have chosen to study constitute a statistically valid representation
of infanticide cases during the relevant time frame.82 The set of cases
that I analyze are among the best documented instances of American
infanticide--I am certain that there are many more cases that my
searches failed to detect. I excluded hundreds of cases that contained
such scant detail that I could not trace the circumstances of the
pregnancy, the crime, or its disposition.
Read together, these cases yield two main findings. First, an
extraordinarily high number of infants are killed within twenty-four
hours of birth. In medical circles, these cases are known as
'9 For an excellent description of the limitations inherent in estimating the incidence
of a crime from prosecution rates, see Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed?
Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1013, 1025-31 (1991).
80 Of the cases in my sample, only two of 96 were reported to have ended in a plea.
This number, however, most likely underrepresents plea bargains, as many of the cases
provided no information regarding outcome. In several cases the state indicated a
willingness to engage in plea negotiations. See, e.g., Robert Modic, Hopfer Guilty: Teen
Sentenced to 15 Years to Life, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 23, 1995, at Al [hereinafter
Modic, Guilty] (reporting conviction of mother for killing her newborn and quoting
prosecutor as saying, "the state was always willing to discuss the case"); see also Robyn
Lansdowne, Infanticide: Psychiatrists in the Plea Bargaining Process, 16 MONASH U. L.
REv. 41, 48-49 (1990) (finding evidence of a pervasive pattern of plea bargaining in
Australian infanticide prosecutions).
81 The maiority of cases were retrieved via multiple search queries run in the CURNWS
file on NEXIS. These findings were supplemented by articles sent to me by friends and
family who found various accounts reported in their local papers.
82 Virtually every article in the sparse academic literature on modern infanticide
struggles with the problem of quantification and statistical relevance. Ultimately, it seems
that the best one can do is to study a sampling of cases, noting that they may not in fact be
representative. See, e.g., Wilczynski, supra note 7, at 73.
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"neonaticides, 83 and they constitute almost half of the cases in my
sample. The circumstances that surround neonaticides are remarkably
consistent and, on the whole, entirely distinguishable from the fact
patterns associated with the homicide deaths of older infants and
children. As a result, my analysis is divided into two groups--
neonaticide and infanticide--depending upon the age of the victim.
Second, in spite of the factual differences between neonaticide and
infanticide, society's response to both of these crimes reflects a
profound sense of confusion, ambivalence, and general unwillingness
to equate these homicides with murder.
B. Neonaticide
Dr. Philip Resnick identified the phenomenon of "neonaticide" in a
1970 article in which he described a series of cases involving women
who killed their newborns within twenty-four hours of childbirth.8
Using Resnick's definition of neonaticide, I selected forty-seven cases
of neonaticide reported in the media between the years 1988 and 1995.
Journalistic reports provide unsatisfying, incomplete answers to the
haunting question of why these deaths occur. Nevertheless, the
accounts yield considerable information about both the fact patterns
and the range of legal dispositions reflected in modem neonaticide
cases.
1. Neonaticide Described
At first blush, the girls and women accused of neonaticide have
little in common with one another. They come from every race,
ethnicity, and socio-economic class." They live in big cities and small
towns, in housing projects and suburban luxury homes. Some are new
immigrants who have only recently learned English.86 Others are from
83 Resnick defines "neonaticide" as the killing of a neonate on the day of its birth.
Phillip Resnick, Murder of the Newborn: A Psychiatric Review of Neonaticide, 126 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1414, 1414 (1970).
'4 Id.
Although the articles that provide the basis for our research did not provide specific
demographic information on the subjects, the articles included many tacit references to
these factors. Many of the women in our neonaticide sample lived in apartments with
several other immediate family members. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 7, Jones v.
Washington, 32 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion) (noting that Barbara
Jones lived in a three bedroom apartment with 11 other family members). Moreover, none
of the articles reported that the subjects were homeowners; most either lived with their
parents or in rented housing. Very few articles mention the race or ethnicity of the
subjects.
See, e.g., Ron Soble, Woman Convicted of Killing Baby in Toilet, Los ANGELES
TIMEs, May 30, 1992, at BI (noting that the woman accused of this crime, a farm worker
in the Saticoy onion fields, was illiterate and did not speak any English).
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families that have been in the United States for generations. Their ages
range widely across the span of women's reproductive years. 7 Many of
the women are of seemingly limited intellectual ability, with low I.Q.s
or poor school records.88 Yet almost as many are above average; many
reports describe quiet, studious, college-bound honor students. 9
Despite these superficial variations, the individuals accused of
neonaticide share many important underlying similarities. Most of the
women accused of neonaticide are young and single. The modal age of
my sample was only seventeen. 90 The vast majority live either with
their parent(s), guardian(s), or other relatives.9 ' Only two of the forty-
seven subjects lived alone.92 When one considers their financial
resources, as distinct from those of their parents, virtually all are
independently poor.
One particularly striking similarity is the attenuated nature of
the women's relationships to the men who impregnated them. Virtually
none of the women were married to or lived with their male partners at
the time of the neonaticide.' In part, this may reflect the relatively
young age of this population and the fact that many still lived with their
parent(s). Additionally, when asked about their relationships with their
male partners, many of the women described highly unstable liasons.
This was particularly true of the high school-aged women, who
87 The ages of the women in my neonaticide sample ranged from 15 to 39. See
appendix, Age Data.
88 Information regarding educational level was found in only 19 of the 47 cases in my
sample. Of these subjects, 11 women/girls had not completed their high school education.
See appendix, Coding Result Totals.
89 Of the 19 women/girls for whom educational level was indicated in the articles,
seven had achieved an educational level of high school or college. See, e.g., Jim Carlton &
Sonni Efron, 0. C. Schoolgirl May Not Have Meant Baby To Die, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1989, at AI (describing an incident of neonaticide involving a 15-year-old honor
student). Given their ages, it is likely that most of the women/girls in the neonaticide
sample were in school. However, this information was not included in many of my
sources.
90 The mode represents the most commonly appearing figure within a group of
numbers. The mean age of the subjects in the neonaticide sample is 21, while the median
age is 20. See appendix, Age Data.
9' Of the 37 women for whom living situation could be ascertained, more than half, 24
women/girls, lived with their parents. Nine of the subjects lived with other relatives or
roommates. See appendix, Coding Table Results.
92 See appendix, Coding Table Results.
93 Marital status of the subjects was reported in 43 of the neonaticide cases. Of these
cases, 35 subjects were single. Only four subiects were married. Additionally, in only two
cases of the 40 cases that included information regarding the living situation of the
subiects did the woman/girl live with her boyfriend/partner. See appendix, Coding Table
Results.
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commonly reported that the relationship was a one- or two-week
romance that ended before they even knew they were pregnant.
94
An even more fundamental similarity among these cases is the
accused woman's seemingly self-imposed silence and isolation during
pregnancy. Very few of the accused women told their families or
friends that they were pregnant.9" Many of the other women and girls
who did disclose their pregnancies did not disclose them to people with
whom they were intimate, such as their male partners, their parents,
relatives, or friends.96
The most profound similarities arising from modem neonaticide
cases involve the patterned circumstances that lead to the infants'
deaths. 97 All of the neonaticide cases I identified presented the same
basic facts: the women experienced severe cramping and stomach
pains, which they often attributed to a need to defecate. They spent
hours alone, most often on the toilet, often while others were present in
94 It is difficult to make too many generalizations about the nature of these
relationships, however, because the articles and cases tell us remarkably little about the
men who fathered these babies. In fact, an overwhelming majority of the articles, 32 out of
47, fail even to mention the fathers. See appendix, Coding Table Results.
95 Of the 32 cases that discussed whether or not the subjects disclosed the fact of their
pregnancy, only three women/girls reported that they did not conceal their pregnancy at
all. See appendix, Coding Table Results.
96 Of the 32 cases that noted whether or not the woman/girl had concealed the fact that
she was pregnant, 19 of the articles reported that no one, including the accused
woman/girl in many cases, was aware of the pregnancy. Nine of the 32 subjects concealed
their pregnancy only from their parents. See appendix, Coding Table Results.
97 In a recent New York case involving neonaticide, the defendant attempted to raise
the defense of "neonaticide syndrome." New York v. Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d 839, 840
(1995). An expert was prepared to describe this syndrome as a phenomenon wherein a
woman denies that she is pregnant, and then, at the moment she gives birth, is overcome
with a reactive psychosis due to the mental and physical shock of the birth. Id. The
defense was not permitted to go forward because of the attorney's failure to establish it as
accepted medical knowledge. Id. at 840-41. In the course of the debate over this defense,
however, it became readily apparent that this defense, like the rape trauma syndrome and
the battered woman's syndrome, quickly would be used against defendants. Anticipating
the defense expert's testimony that the defendant suffered from this syndrome, the
prosecution called an expert who testified that the defendant's behavior actually was
atypical of neonaticide syndrome, and that she therefore was not psychotic at the time she
delivered her baby. Id. at 843 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
The fact patterns in the neonaticide cases identified by my research are considerably
more varied than this "syndrome," which seems to represent a subset of cases involving
the denial of pregnancy. For discussions about denial of pregnancy, see Laura Miller,
Psychotic Denial of Pregnancy: Phenomenology and Clinical Management, 41 HosP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1233, 1233-36 (1990) (discussing psychotic denial of pregnancy
treatment and case studies and comparing them with nonpsychotic denial) (1990); A.
Spielvogel & J. Wile, Treatment and Outcomes of Psychotic Patients During Pregnancy
and Childbirth, 19 BIRTH 131, 132-33 (1992) (discussing women "with delusions or
psychotic denial about pregnancy").
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their homes. At some point during these hours, they realized that they
were in labor. They endured the full course of labor and delivery
without making any noise.
After delivering the baby, the women's actions range from
exhaustion to utter panic. Many of the women temporarily lost
consciousness, leaving the baby to drown in the toilet.98 Others left the
baby in the water while they frantically cleaned the messy remains of
the delivery from the floors and walls of the bathroom. Still others
immediately pulled the baby from the toilet and actively contended
with their situations. In several cases, the women threw their babies
out of bathroom windows. 99 More commonly, the women suffocated or
strangled the babies in order to prevent them from crying out.'04 A few
of the women silenced the baby with blows to its head or stab wounds
inflicted with scissors.0 °
The women disposed of their babies' bodies in a number of
ways, demonstrating a range in understanding of what had transpired.
One girl simply took the bundle to bed with her, and fell asleep holding
it.'O2 Many more placed the bundle somewhere in or near their homes--
more often than not, in the trash.' 3 The women did not necessarily
endeavor to hide the baby's body, as a significant number of these cases
came to the attention of the authorities when someone discovered the
bundle in passing.'04
98 Nine of the 44 cases that included information regarding the method of the crime
reported that the infant drowned in the toilet in which the mother had given birth. In two
other cases the baby drowned in the bathtub. Five subiects simply did not attend to the
infant, leaving it either on the bathroom floor or someplace else unattended. See appendix,
Coding Table Results.
99 Four of the 44 cases that reported the method by which the infant was killed
reported that the women/girls threw the baby out of the bathroom window. See appendix,
Coding Table Results.
'00 Sixteen out of the 44 cases that noted the method by which the infant was killed
reported that the subject suffocated her baby, either with a towel, plastic bag, or her hand.
See appendix, Coding Table Results.
o'0 Two of the women/girls stabbed the infant to death, typically in an effort to cut the
umbilical cord. Only one case reported death of the infant due to bludgeoning. Thus, in
only three cases did the subject utilize violent means to kill her infant. See appendix,
Coding Table Results.
' See infra text accompanying note 269.
103 See, e.g., Wemick, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 840 (finding that the mother wrapped her
baby in a garbage bag and had a friend throw it away for her).
0'4 Of the 44 cases in which information was available regarding the discovery of the
crime, 17 involved an "accidental discovery." In 11 of these cases, the crime was
discovered only after the subject sought medical treatment. See appendix, Coding Table
Results.
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2. Neonaticide in the Criminal Justice System
Neonaticide elicits a surprisingly wide range of responses as the
cases work their way through the criminal justice system. This range
extends from the investigative phase in a possible case of neonaticide,
where it is evident that criminal charges are not always brought, to the
sentencing phase, where punishment ranges from probation to life
imprisonment. 5
The range of criminal charges brought against the neonaticide
defendants in my sample varies from unlawful disposal of a body, a
misdemeanor, to first degree murder. Of the forty-two accounts that
reported the specific criminal charges brought against the accused
women, only twenty-nine revealed murder charges. An additional and
perhaps unsurprising observation is that prosecutors were more likely
to seek the most severe criminal sanctions when the newborns' bodies
were mutilated in some fashion.'06
The process of gathering definitive information regarding the
outcomes of the neonaticide cases is challenging due to the fact that
many such cases probably ended in pre-trial plea bargains, many others
are still pending trial, and still others simply do not receive media
coverage. Moreover, appeals of neonaticide decisions are rare;
therefore, there are few reported opinions in modem neonaticide
cases.'0 7 As a result, I was able to ascertain the dispositions of only
seventeen of the neonaticide cases in my sample. Because the
outcomes in the other cases are unknown, there is a significant risk of
inaccuracy in attempting to make inferences based upon the sub-sample
of cases that proceeded to trial. It nevertheless is instructive to note the
range of sentences imposed upon those who either pled guilty or were
convicted of infanticide-related charges. The sentences imposed
105 In any criminal investigation, prosecutorial discretion permits a range of factors to
influence the decision to indict, as well as the crime with which the defendant is charged.
For example, research suggests that the decision to prosecute a suspected rapist may be
influenced by the state's perception of the victim's credibility, because this affects the
chances of obtaining a guilty verdict. See Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims'
Allegations of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 38 Soc. PROBS.
213, 213 (1991) (citing four separate studies).
106 See appendix, Coding Result Tables.
107 There were only six reported appeals in my sample: Jones v. Washington, 836 F.
Supp. 502 (N.D. Ill. 1993), affd, 32 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 1994) (habeas appeals following
a murder conviction in state court); Ohio v. Hopfer, No. 15345, 1996 WL 391756 (Ohio
Ct. App. July 12, 1996); Illinois v. Ehlert, 654 N.E.2d 705 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 660 N.E.2d 1274 (Ill. 1995); Illinois v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 806 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991); Vaughan v. Virginia, 376 S.E.2d 801 (Va. Ct. App. 1989); Pennsylvania v.
Reilly, 549 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1988). The scarcity of appeals in these cases may reflect an
acknowledgment that the outcomes are relatively lenient.
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ranged from intensive therapy, parenting classes, and probation to
incarceration for thirty-four years. Convictions were reported in only
fifteen of the forty-seven cases. Thus, despite the fact that at least
twenty-nine of the defendants were charged with murder, far fewer
were convicted. Still, at least ten of the fifteen women whose
convictions were reported presently are serving prison sentences.' 8
3. Ambivalence About Neonaticide: A Case Study
The broad range of charges brought against these defendants
and the widely ranging dispositions of their cases reflect America's
confused response to neonaticide. An additional indication of
ambivalence emerges from the public debate surrounding well-
publicized neonaticide cases.
A recent Ohio case illustrates all three of these factors. In
August 1994, seventeen-year-old Rebecca Hopfer gave birth to an
infant in the bathroom of her home, which she shared with both of her
parents.' °9 Following the delivery, she wrapped the baby in a towel,
concealed the bundle in plastic bags, and placed it in the garbage. Two
days later, she told a friend what she had done, and the prosecution was
set in motion.
The case was on a roller-coaster long before it went to trial.
Because of her age, Hopfer initially was arraigned in juvenile court.
The .judge, however, found that "the safety of the community requires
... [that she] be placed under legal restraint, including, if necessary, the
period beyond her majority" and determined that she should be tried as
an adult." ° Public sympathy for Hopfer in response to the decision to
try her as an adult was overwhelming. One reporter summarized the
collective community sentiment: "'What are they thinking?' people
wondered. 'Wasn't this a classic example of an adolescent's poor
,08 For evidence of this same trend in another jurisdiction, see Wilczynski, supra note
7, at 85, n.2:
Given that between 1982 and 1987 in England and Wales only 44 women were
convicted of the murder, manslaughter or infanticide of their children under 12 months,
and yet it is estimated that at least four children (mostly under 12 months) in Britain die
from abuse or neglect each week, it is likely that at least some women who kill their
children are not convicted.
(citation omitted).
109 Rob Modic, A Friend: Hopfer Admitted Killing; Teen's Testimony Details Phone
Call, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 14, 1995, at A l [hereinafter Modic, A Friend].
11 Wes Hills, Judge Sends Teen to Adult System; Hopfer Case Goes to Grand Jury,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 18, 1994, at AI (quoting Montgomery County Juvenile Court
Judge Michael B. Murphy).
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decision-making in a crisis?'""' The case went to a grand jury, which
indicted Hopfer on charges of abuse of a corpse and first degree
murder. She was released on home arrest in time for Thanksgiving."
2
Hopfer's release on home arrest precipitated a reversal in public
sentiment, as many speculated that she had received preferential
treatment because she was white, suburban, and middle-class."3 Over
the course of the months between the indictment and the trial, the
community debated the Hopfer case in a manner that one reporter
referred to as "a 10-month community talk show."'l 4
The scope of these debates, as recorded in the local news media,
is somewhat surprising. Letter writers and reporters paid little attention
to Hopfer's actions or to the circumstances surrounding the crime. Nor
did they address questions about the baby's father and whether he
should be regarded as responsible or culpable."' No one speculated
about the parents, teachers, or doctors who saw Hopfer on a regular
basis yet claimed they never noticed the signs of pregnancy. Instead,
this case became the focal point for a broad-scaled debate about
responsibility and moral decay. Hopfer's pregnancy was seen
alternately as the result of permissive sexual norms, parental failure to
discipline, or inadequate sex education. Some attributed the baby's
killing to legalized abortion; others to the failure to teach children the
difference between right and wrong.116
A local cable television station took advantage of the
community's fascination and confusion by providing live coverage of
the trial. The two-week trial escalated and intensified the dialogue.
Expert witnesses disagreed over whether the baby was asphyxiated by
the umbilical cord, and therefore not born alive, or whether it lived for
two to six hours inside the plastic bags before it suffocated."7 The jury
heard testimony from Hopfer's former best friend, who claimed that
Hopfer told her that the baby had cried."8 Then Hopfer testified that
". Kevin Lamb, Trial Touched on Some Emotional Issues, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
June 23, 1995, at B 1.
112 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 In fact, the only article about the baby's father appeared after the verdict. Even
though his identity was known, the press made no mention of him until the day Hopfer
was found guilty. The article begins, "rhe's the mystery person in the sad and confusing
case of Rebecca Lynn Hopfer." Wendy Hundley, Hopfer Baby's Dad Still in Shock,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 24, 1995, at Al.
16 Lamb, supra note 111, at B 1.
117 Cheryl L. Reed, Expert Says Baby Lived 2-6 Hours, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June
17, 1995, at Al.
118 Modic, A Friend, supra note 109, at Al.
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the baby was born expressionless and did not cry because its umbilical
cord was wrapped tightly around its neck. She was unable to loosen or
cut the cord and, believing that the baby was dead, she wrapped it in
towels and bags and said a prayer for it." 9
The closing arguments were emotional. Defense attorneys
argued that Hopfer had been demonized by the trial, and claimed that
"[s]he's a jewel.... Some of you would be proud to have her as a
daughter."'2  Prosecutors used a plastic garbage bag to act out the
manner in which Hopfer allegedly took the baby's life."' The jury
convicted Hopfer on both counts, and the judge issued the mandatory
sentence: fifteen years to life.'
The debate over Hopfer's culpability did not end with the
verdict. Defense attorneys filed an appeal and succeeded in freeing
Hopfer on an appeal bond, which permits her to remain under house
arrest pending the appeal of her conviction. In granting the bond, the
Ohio Appeals Court wrote that
[alithough this court does not customarily grant bail to persons
convicted of murder, this appeal does not involve a typical murder
case.... It does not diminish the gravity of the crime of murder to
say that this particular murder, without (prior criminal history), is
not impressive evidence that Hopfer poses a danger to others or to
the community."3
"9 Rob Modic, Hopfer Denial: Baby Dead at Birth, She Says, DAYTON DAtLY NEWS,
June 20, 1995, at Al.
120 Modic, Guilty, supra note 80, at Al.
121 One journalist captured the moment as follows:
Franceschelli slowly pulled a fresh plastic trash bag from a box taken as evidence
from Hopfer's home. In the silence of the courtroom, he snapped it open with a flick of his
hands. He knelt, taking the package of blood-stained towels that once enveloped Hopfer's
baby and slid it into the bag. The jury leaned forward to watch.
Franceschelli took the end of the bag and began to twist it at the opening, once, twice,
three times around, and then knotted the end just as the bag had been found by
investigators .... As he looked up at the jurors, knotted bag in one hand, he said: "That's
purposeful. That's intent. That's the taking of a life of an innocent baby."
Id.
... Id. One can only speculate about the impact that Ohio's statutory sentencing
guidelines had on the penalty Hopfer received. The amount of community support for a
merciful resolution well might have led a judge not bound by such guidelines to mete out
a lesser sentence. Perhaps the most articulate critique of sentencing guidelines, albeit at
the federal level, is found in Charles Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections
on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1938 (1988). Ogletree
argues that the laudable goals of the U.S. Congress have been undermined by the
Sentencing Commission: "the Sentencing Commission's obsession with justice in the
aggregate, with identical treatment regardless of individual differences, will eviscerate our
more refined notions of individual justice, and the belief that 'justice is blind' will yield to
the reality that, in fact, blind justice is injustice. Id. at 1960.
123 Rob Modic, Hopfer Free for Appeal, Judges Rule, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 1,
1995, at Al.
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Not surprisingly, the decision to free a convicted murderer
pending an appeal intensified the debate over Hopfer's
blameworthiness. Many wrote letters to the Dayton Daily News
decrying Hopfer's special treatment.1 24  Many more responded by
questioning whether the case should ever have gone to trial' 25 and by
defending the court's treatment of Hopfer. 26 Although the outcome of
Hopfer's appeal remains pending, the decision is unlikely to resolve theambialene srroudin thi " 127
ambivalence surrounding this cnme. It is not unheard of for a
homicide committed by a minor to generate public debate about the
blameworthiness of the family, the community, and society at large.
28
124 See, e.g., Ruth L. Pennington, Letter to the Editor, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 17,
1995, at A6 ("Whether Hopfer is guilty or innocent, she has been found guilty in a court of
law, and she should be treated as such."); Michael A. Scott, Letter to the Editor, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, July 17, 1995, at A6:
There have been several cases right here in the Miami Valley in which young mothers
have been accused and convicted of killing their children .... Why is it that these girls were
not afforded the same special treatment as Hopfer? ... Could it be because her parents have
influence and money? Could it be because Hopfer is white?
15 See, e.g., Randi Potasky, Letter to the Editor, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 17, 1995,
at A6 ("The only real crime here was ignorance.... No one paid enough attention to this
girl to even realize that she was pregnant.... The only thing this girl deserves is some
mental-health treatment.").
126 See, e.g., David Cream, Letter to the Editor, DAYTON DALY NEWS, July 19, 1995,
at A10 ("It seems to me that the 'outpouring of community sympathy' toward Hopfer is
responsible for the court's leniency."). One exceptionally thoughtful editorial writer noted
that Hopfer's special treatment was justified, and that the real problem with the case was
that the court's lenience was unlikely to be extended to teens of a different race and social
class than the judges:
Certainly, Ms. Hopfer is no ordinary murder convict. Whether black, white, poor or
affluent, the circumstances of her crime are unusual and don't suggest that she is a threat to
society.
It is an indisputable tragedy that a teen who appears to have had a promising future
would come face-to-face with the prospect of a long prison term.
But it is an indisputable tragedy whether it happens to a suburban teen, such as Ms.
Hopfer, or an inner-city teen by any other name. Ms. Hopfer isn't the first young adult to
come before Montgomery County courts worthy of compassion.
Caroline Brewer, Editorial, Hopfer Shown Exceptional Kindness, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, July 1, 1995, at A10.
... On July 12, 1996, the Ohio Appellate Court affirmed Hopfer's conviction, and
Hopfer began serving her 15-year sentence. Ohio v. Hopfer, No. 15345, 1996 WL
391756 (Ohio Ct. App. July 12, 1996). Her attorneys are appealing the case to the Ohio
Supreme Court.
121 See, e.g., Grim Reality Check on Youth Crime, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 1996, at 14,
zone N (editorial on the proper treatment of 10- to 12-year-old killers, noting in part that
the Illinois legislature had reduced the minimum age for imprisonment from 13 to 10);
Gary Marx, Brother's Testimony Opens Trial in Eric's Death, CHI. TRm., Oct. 18, 1995, at
1, zone N (covering trial of 10- and 1 1-year-olds charged with first degree murder for
dropping a five year-old from a 14th story window).
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Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that the community would have
nearly this level of sympathy had Hopfer murdered her best friend,
rather than her baby.
C. Infanticide
Although the ambivalence surrounding neonaticide cases may be
surprising, it is not incomprehensible. As the Hopfer case
demonstrates, juries and judges might be sympathetic toward the
neonaticide defendant for a number of reasons. In contrast, when a
mother kills her child after the first day of its life, there is little reason
to expect a similar response. At a visceral level, the horror of
infanticide seems to grow as the victim's age increases.' 29 Thus, there is
a strong temptation to regard the killings of infants after the first
twenty-four hours of life as ordinary murders and to distinguish
neonaticide alone as uniquely problematic.
To do so would be to tell a half-truth at best, for there are
similarities between neonaticide and infanticide--and among the
various forms of infanticide--that extend far beyond the fact that all of
the perpetrators share the status of mother. The most important of these
similarities is that, despite the increased sense of horror and outrage,
when infanticide cases reach the criminal justice system, they generate
almost exactly the same dialectic of condemnation and mercy
associated with neonaticide.'3° Therefore, in spite of the wide variety of
fact patterns and the limited extent to which one can generalize about
these homicides, the infanticide cases fall squarely within the scope of
this Article and must be considered together with neonaticide. In this
section, I will describe certain commonalities present in modem
infanticide cases and discuss the confusion and ambivalence that
accompanies their dispositions.
"9 Philosopher Michael Tooley discusses society's tendency to place a higher value on
the lives of persons as they grow beyond infancy. His analysis begins by focusing on
attitudes toward severely disabled newborns. He notes that 55% of Australians who were
surveyed believed it was morally permissible to "allow life to be painlessly terminated in
the case of babies who rwerel either 'mentally abnormal' or 'physically seriously
deformed,"' yet it is virtually unheard of to advocate the same for a "mentally abnormal"
or "physically seriously deformed" adult. MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE
311 (1983). From this, Tooley deduces an underlying rationale reflecting a belief that
infants do not enjoy the same moral status as adults. This leads Tooley to posit that "[i]f it
is correct [that] ... infanticide is not to be treated as a crime in the case of infants suffering
from certain defects, and, even in the case of normal infants, [then it] is not wrong to the
same degree as the killing of a normal adult human being." Id. at 311-12.
3o See infra notes 194 through 240 and accompanying text.
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1. Infanticide Described
The circumstances surrounding infanticide deaths, unlike those
surrounding neonaticide deaths, are quite varied. In many ways,
infanticide cases bear seemingly little resemblance to one another, and
even less resemblance to neonaticide. In order to describe the patterns
associated with contemporary American infanticide, it is first necessary
to define the population encompassed by this term. Although the word
infanticide would seem to refer to the killing of infants, there is no
established age limit for victims of this crime. Many countries have
infanticide statutes, yet even these do not have consistent definitions of
the crime.3 ' While there are significant differences between the
circumstances surrounding a mother's killing of a ten-year-old child
and that of a six-month-old, there is no readily apparent principle by
which one might distinguish between the two situations other than
drawing an arbitrary line. Moreover, drawing a line at one year of age,
for example, would hide the important similarities linking cases
involving older victims to those involving children under the age of
one. The differences due to the victim's age seem far less significant
than one might expect when considering the circumstances giving rise
to the crime and the criminal justice system's disposition of these cases.
As a result, I have chosen not to set a definitive chronological line at
which a mother's killing of her child should no longer be considered
"infanticide."
Even beyond issues of the victim's age, it is difficult to
generalize about infanticide cases. The women in my sample of forty-
nine cases, drawn from the same span of years as the neonaticide cases,
reflect a broad range of backgrounds.1 32 They are far more likely to be
131 Recall that the British infanticide statute pertains to mothers who kill their children
within the child's first year of life, while New Zealand's law includes any child killed by
its mother before age ten. Infanticide Act, 1938 2 Geo. 6, ch. 36 (Eng.); New Zealand
Criminal Act of 1961, supra note 4, at 158. See supra notes 67 through 73 and
accompanying text (discussing the scope of infanticide statutes from around the world).
... The most dispositive factor limiting my sample is that I excluded all cases in which
the mother killed her child along with her partner, as well as those in which the partner
killed the child, but the mother was named as an accomplice. I opted to include only
women who killed their children while acting alone because of my sense that these crimes
were qualitatively different from those involving other adults. Cases involving children
who died from abuse and neglect perpetrated either by the mother's partner, or by the
mother together with her partner, trigger a broad set of issues involving intimacy and
violence that are somewhat, although not entirely, tangential to this Article. For a
thorough analysis of the overlap between domestic violence and maternally-inflicted child
abuse, and a critical evaluation of the trend toward holding mothers criminally
accountable for their failure to protect their children from an abusive partner, see Mary E.
Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems,
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married or living with a partner than those who commit neonaticide,
and many of them have more than one child. 3 3 The modal age of the
mothers in my sample, twenty-one, is higher than that of the
neonaticidal mothers.3 4  The ages of the infanticide victims in my
sample range from six weeks to eight years, with the modal age being
five months. Although deaths by suffocation predominate, the causes
of death range from chronic neglect to overt acts of aggression.
35
Several of the women were accused of killing more than one of their
children, either in the same incident or over the course of time.
3 6
Despite their many dissimilarities, women who commit
infanticide all manifest, to a greater or lesser extent, consistent
vulnerabilities in terms of mental health status, economic stability, and
social support. Most of the women in my sample were poor and
socially isolated. At the time of their crimes, only five of the women
accused of infanticide were employed outside of their homes. In
virtually all of the cases, the women were the full-time caretakers for
'" " 37
their children. Thus, the vast majority of these women were
Custody Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
13 (1995).
"3' Of the cases that included information regarding the subject's living situation, 22 of
the 41 subjects lived with their significant other, 16 with their husband, and six with their
boyfriend or partner. Twenty-six cases reported that the woman had other children. In 14
cases, the woman lived alone with her children. See appendix, Coding Table Results.
" See appendix, Coding Table Results. This is consistent with the findings of other
researchers on this topic. See d'Orban, supra note 54, at 561 (stating that mothers
committing neonaticide averaged 21 years of age, youngest of any category in d'Orban's
study).
' Two of the cases reported that the infant/child was starved to death, while one
reported the mother running a six-week-old child over with her car. Larry King Live: A
Mother Tells Why She Killed Her Son (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 17, 1994)
[hereinafter Larry King Live] (Michael Jackson sitting in for Larry King, interviewing
Sheryl Lynn Massip and her defense attorney, Milton Grimes).
136 For example, Susan Smith confessed to killing both children in what she described
as a failed suicide/homicide attempt. Rick Bragg, Carolina Jury Rejects Execution for
Woman who Drowned Sons, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1995, § 1, at 1. At the other extreme, in
September 1995, Waneta Hoyt was convicted of killing five of her children over the
course of six years, all of whom were originally thought to have died of SIDS. William
Kates, Mom Convicted Of Killing 5 Kids Gets Prison Terms, Denies Guilt At Sentencing,
THE RECORD, Sept. 12, 1995, at A4; see also JOYCE EGGINTON, FROM CRADLE To GRAVE:
THE SHORT LIVES AND STRANGE DEATHS OF MARYBETH TINNING'S NINE CHILDREN
(1989) (describing in depth the case of Marybeth Tinning, eventually convicted for the
ninth death of one of her children).
... This fact is striking in light of current statistics indicating that 52.2% of single
mothers of children under age six work outside the home, 61.7% of married women with
children under age six are employed outside the home, and 58.8% of married women with
children aged one or younger are working outside the home. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 406 (indicating the
employment status of women by marital status and presence and age of children).
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economically dependant upon either their partner's income or public
assistance. 38
The issues of mental health status and social isolation are more
complex. At a common sense level, it may seem self-evident that
"[m]others in our society simply do not kill their children unless they
are seriously disturbed individuals, usually psychotic. ' 3 9 Indeed, many
women who commit infanticide do so while suffering from an
identifiable mental disability that renders them temporarily or
permanently incapable of caring for themselves and/or their children
without considerable outside assistance. It is critical to note at the
outset that it is not the fact of mental illness or disability alone, but
rather the combination of a vulnerable mental health status and social
isolation that leads to infanticide. My analysis begins by addressing
issues of mental health status, and then explores the intersection of
social isolation, mothering, and mental health.
Infanticide cases can be classified according to the mental
health status of the mother. I have classified these cases into four
categories based on mental health vulnerabilities associated with
infanticide: postpartum psychosis, chronic mental disability, affective
disorders with postpartum onset, and addiction-related disorders.
These classifications are not necessarily mutually exclusive--for
example, a woman may be both mentally disabled and addicted--but for
purposes of this discussion, I will address each category separately.
a. Infanticide and Postpartum Psychosis
Out of every one thousand women who give birth, one or two
will suffer from postpartum psychosis.'40 Postpartum psychosis has
received considerable attention from the medical and legal
communities, and the vast majority of academic articles on the subject
of infanticide relate to this disorder.14 ' Postpartum psychosis represents
138 Although it is difficult to ascertain socioeconomic status on the basis of newspaper
reports and legal records, there was only one obviously middle-class woman in the
sample. See Larry King Live, supra note 135 (noting that Sheryl Massip killed her six-
week-old son by driving over him with her Volvo).
139 Amy L. Nelson, Comment, Postpartum Psychosis: A New Defense?, 95 DICK
L. REV. 625, 625 (1991) (quoting report prepared for sentencing hearing in
Pennsylvania v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)).
140 Debora K. Dimino, Comment, Postpartum Depression: A Defense for Mothers
Who Kill their Infants, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 231, 233 (1990).
"' See, e.g., A. Kathleen Atkinson & Annette U. Rickel, Depression in Women: The
Postpartum Experience, 5 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 197, 205 (1983)
(summarizing postpartum psychosis studies conducted from 1957 to the present); Michael
W. O'Hara, Postpartum 'Blues,' Depression, and Psychosis: A Review, 7 J.
PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 205 (1987) (providing a comprehensive
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the far end of a spectrum of psychiatric ailments that may be triggered
by childbirth.' 42  The timing of onset varies, but symptoms usually
appear within the first three months after delivery, and most often
within the first two weeks.' 43  Some experts believe that postpartum
psychosis is more commonly experienced by women with a prior
history of mental illness and that it is less likely to occur in mentally
healthy women.'44 All agree that a mother who experiences postpartum
study of postpartum psychosis). Indeed, the only mention of infanticide in the law review
literature is found in the various articles addressing postpartum psychosis as a criminal
defense. See, e.g., Anne Damante Brusca, Note, Postpartum Psychosis: A Way Out for
Murdering Moms?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133 (1990) (contending that current insanity
statutes should be relied on in pleading postpartum depression as a defense, and when
insanity is not found, arguing that evidence of postpartum psychosis should be a
mitigating factor in sentencing); John Dent, Comment, Postpartum Psychosis and the
Insanity Defense, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355 (using California law as a model and
proposing a reduced burden of proof for those defendants asserting the postpartum
psychosis defense); Dimino, Comment supra note 140, at 231-64 (proposing legislation to
make infanticide a distinct crime and postpartum depression a defense similar to insanity);
Nelson, Comment, supra note 139, at 625-50 (concluding that more education of judiciary
and the public about postpartum depression is best way to deal with the issue).
142 Postpartum disorders range from mild, fleeting anxiety and depression to
hormonally-induced psychosis. By far the most common form of postpartum mental
health ailment is mild postpartum depression, commonly known as the "baby blues." This
fleeting form of depression, beginning on the third to the tenth day after delivery, and
lasting at most several days, occurs with such frequency that it is regarded as normal. Irvin
D. Yalom et al., "Postpartum Blues" Syndrome: A Description and Related Variables, 18
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 16, 16 (1968) (estimating that between 5% and 80% of
women experience some postpartum psychiatric disorder). While postpartum depression is
widely recognized in medical and lay literature as a phase consisting of "unhappiness,"
"irritability," and "exhaustion," current scientific understanding indicates that the rate and
the quality or intensity of postpartum depression is utterly indistinguishable from the
incidence of transient depression rates within society at large. Maier-Katkin & Ogle, supra
note 57, at 906. In other words, the "baby blues" are not that different from the "going to
work blues" suffered on Sunday nights by most of the population, and in late August by
law professors and students. Id.
143 LAURENCE KRUCKMAN & CHRIS ASMANN-FINCH, POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION: A
RESEARCH GUIDE AND INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY XV (1986). The earliest estimate
for possible onset of symptoms is the third day postpartum, since many theories attribute
the ailment in some measure to hormonal fluctuations following childbirth. See generally
Christine A. Gardner, Note, Postpartum Depression Defense: Are Mothers Getting
Away with Murder?, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 953, 960- 66 (1990) (discussing the
definition, causes, and symptoms associated with postpartum depression).
144 Atkinson & Rickel, supra note 141, at 205 (citing several studies finding that
women with other mental illnesses were more likely to develop postpartum psychosis);
d'Orban, supra note 54, at 562 (finding that 41% of women studied in postpartum
psychosis study previously had been treated for psychiatric illness); Gardner, Note, supra
note 143, at nn.88-89 (citing Dr. Stuart Asch, Crib Deaths: Their Possible Relationship to
Post-Partum Depression and Infanticide, 35 J. MT. SINAI HosP. 214, 215 (1968); Marianne
Yen, Women Who Kill Their Infants: A Bad Case of the 'Baby Blues'?, WASH. POST, May
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psychosis after the birth of her first child is at higher risk for recurrence
with her second childbirth.
145
Although experts are divided on the etiology of postpartum
psychosis,14 there is general agreement on the symptoms associated
with this disorder. Postpartum psychosis is characterized by a dramatic
break with reality accompanied by "a grossly impaired ability to
function, usually because of hallucinations or delusions. '147 One of the
primary markers of postpartum psychosis is delusional fantasies related
to the newborn. Most women report auditory hallucinations, in which
voices urge them to kill the child.14 8 In addition to having psychotic
hallucinations, women suffering from postpartum psychosis
characteristically display other unusual behavioral tendencies. They
tend to isolate themselves, they stop speaking to others, and they are
observed talking to themselves in an agitated fashion. They are severely
sleep-deprived and emotionally labile.
149
Women who kill their infants during an episode of postpartum
psychosis tend to manifest these characteristics at an extreme level.
For example, consider the case of Sheryl Massip, a California woman
who was charged with killing her six-week-old son. At her 1987
murder trial, the evidence showed that she threw her son into oncoming
traffic, picked him up and carried him to her garage, hit him over the
head with a blunt object, and then finally killed him by running him
over with her car.150
10, 1988, at A3; The Darkest Side of Postpartum Depression, THE SUNDAY NEWS
(Auckland, New Zealand), May 31, 1987, at E3).
145 Yalom et al., supra note 142, at 26; see also Gardner, Note, supra note 143, at 964
(noting that "in the cases in which women have killed their infants and claimed insanity as
a defense, every infant killed was a second child").
16 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION'S DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed.
1994) [hereinafter DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS]
(containing the psychiatric profession's official classification of mental disorders, but not
listing postpartum psychosis as a distinct psychiatric ailment; instead, considering
postpartum psychosis to be a variety of mental illness that happens to occur in the
postpartum phase).
147 O'Hara, supra note 141, at 217.
148 Mary E. Lentz, A Postmortem of the Postpartum Psychosis Defense, 18 CAP. U. L.
REV. 525, 532 (1989). Some report a belief that the child is a phantom, or was "conceived
from unnatural processes such as impregnation by the devil." Id.
149 See d'Orban, supra note 54, at 567 (noting depression, irritability, exhaustion, and
apathy as symptoms displayed by many women in the study); O'Hara, supra note 141, at
217-18 (noting inability to function, hallucinations, delusions, confusion, and agitation as
symptoms of postpartum psychosis).
"o Eric Lichtblau, Appeal Argued in Postpartum Case, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 24,
1990, at BI.
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The events that preceded her son's death reflect Massip's
deteriorating psychological condition. Her lawyer noted that
[flor two weeks, Sheryl Massip's family recognized something was
wrong with her. Her husband, five days before she killed her child,
sent her away to her mother's home to spend a night, to get some
rest, because they thought that would solve the problem. She came
back, he sent her away again. On the 27th of April, the Monday
before she killed her child, she came home from spending the night
with her mother, and she went to the doctor and said, "Doctor,
what's wrong with me? I'm hallucinating. I can't sleep. Something is
wrong with me. Help me." He looked at her and said, "Oh, you're
just suffering from baby blues," [and] gave her a couple of Mellarils
... [w]hich aggravated her psychotic state."'
Massip's story is fairly typical of postpartum psychosis-related
infanticides. She continued to manifest severely disordered thinking
after she killed her child, telling investigators that a black object, who
"wasn't really a person," with orange hair and white gloves, had
kidnapped the baby.'52 By definition, postpartum psychosis is brief in
duration and, even if untreated, symptoms virtually always disappear
within several months of onset.'53 Therefore, by the time of her trial,
Massip was no longer psychotic. The jury found Massip guilty of
second degree murder, and Massip was .jailed. Two months later, the
*judge overturned the verdict and acquitted Massip on insanity
grounds. '
There is no doubt that during her psychotic episode Massip was
incapable of caring for her infant. Nevertheless, it is critical to note the
many missed opportunities for intervention. Massip gave notice of her
inability to cope to her husband, mother, and physician. None of them
took the time to evaluate in a serious fashion the gap between her
present abilities and the caretaking tasks she was required to perform
when left alone with her child. Had any one of these three people
recognized Massip's needs, he or she could have identified a myriad of
ways in which to assist her. Therefore, it is evident that Massip's son's
death was not simply the result of her mental illness, but also of her
social network's failure to provide her with any meaningful support.
151 Larry King Live, supra note 135 (interviewing Milton Grimes, criminal defense
attorney for Sheryl Massip).
152 i d
51 O'Hara, supra note 141, at 220.
,54 Larry King Live, supra note 135 (interviewing Milton Grimes, criminal defense
attorney for Sheryl Massip).
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b. Infanticide by Mothers with Chronic Mental Disabilities
Although a diagnosis of postpartum psychosis may help us to
understand why a mother committed infanticide, only a small
percentage of infanticides are committed by women suffering from this
ailment. One study surveyed eighty-nine women charged with
infanticide during a six year period and 1ound that, at most, twenty-four
of the women were mentally ill, and fewer still suffered from
postpartum psychosis.'55 Thus, even within the narrow category of
women who commit infanticide while suffering from a mental illness,
postpartum psychosis accounts for only a portion of the cases.
Nevertheless, to the extent that postpartum psychosis makes infanticide
comprehensible, so too does a diagnosis of a severe chronic mental
disability.
In order to discuss infanticides committed by women who are
chronically mentally disabled yet living and parenting independently, a
clear definition of mental disability is needed. There is no consensus,
however, on what constitutes a mental disability. Rather than focusing
on a medical categorization, I use the term "chronically mentally
disabled" to refer to those mothers whose mental disabilities were
sufficiently pronounced that, at the time they killed their children, the
state was on notice that they had marginal ability, at best, to care for a
child without assistance.
These cases are uniquely frustrating in that hindsight reveals
many missed opportunities for intervention.'5 6 There were only four
infanticide cases in my sample that involved women who suffered from
medically-diagnosed chronic mental disabilities. Two discussed these
mental health issues in particularly rich detail, illustrating the range of
women falling into this category. One mother was. schizophrenic; the
other was mildly mentally retarded, suffered from manic depression,
and had attempted suicide several times.'5 7 Both women lost custody of
"' d'Orban, supra note 54, at 560-62.
156 The case of six-year-old Elisa Izquierdo is representative of this phenomenon.
Although she apparently was abused by her step-father as well as her mother, and I
therefore have not included her in my sample, the media coverage of the case bears
witness to the frustration borne of the difficulty in allocating blame. New York state's
child protective services long had been wary of Elisa's mother's ability to parent, and yet
they scarcely followed up on the case after reuniting Elisa with her mother. David Van
Biema, Abandoned to Her Fate; Neighbors, Teachers, and the Authorities All Knew Elisa
Izquierdo Was Being Abused. But Somehow Nobody Managed to Stop It, TIME, Dec. 11,
1995, at 32; Marc Peyser & Carla Power, The Death Of Little Elisa, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11,
1995, at 42.
,' The second of these cases, involving a woman named Simone Ayton, is discussed
in detail infra, at notes 308 through 318 and accompanying text. There is a rich literature
on the support mechanisms that can assist parents with mental disabilities to raise
children. For a general description of them, see Linda Dowdney & David Skuse, Parenting
2004]
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their babies shortly after birth, when state child protection agencies
found that they were unable to care for the children. Many months
later, the babies were returned to their mothers. In both cases, the state
failed to provide the mother with any assistance or supervision, and in
both cases, the children were dead within a matter of days.
The first of these cases is particularly poignant, as it involves
Amanda Wallace, a schizophrenic woman whose mental illness was so
pronounced that, from the day of his birth, her son had been almost
constantly in the care of the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services. '  Because of a series of bureaucratic errors, the agency
released Joseph Wallace three and half years later to the unsupervised
custody of his mother for the first time. Several days later, he was
found hanged in her apartment. When the state originally brought
murder charges against Amanda Wallace, she was found legally
incompetent to stand trial. She was then institutionalized, and a
judicially-appointed committee conducted an official inquiry into the
various state agencies that had failed to protect the child.'5 9 In 1995,
state psychiatrists found Wallace fit to stand trial, and she was
convicted of murder.' 6° The state's decision to seek the death penalty
astonished many observers. A psychologist who knew Ms. Wallace
since she was seven years old remarked, "[i]t's absolutely ridiculous to
even think of executing someone like Amanda Wallace. She is ill.
Provided by Adults with Mental Retardation, 34 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 25
(1993).
158 Starting at age 11, after she survived years of abuse and several suicide attempts,
Amanda Wallace was institutionalized in a state mental facility. She was in her late
twenties, still living in a state mental hospital, when her son Joseph was conceived and
delivered. For a full description of the Amanda Wallace case, see REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE To INQUIRE IN TO THE PRACTICES, PROCESSES, AND
PROCEEDINGS IN THE JUVENILE COURT As THEY RELATE To THE JOSEPH WALLACE CASES,
Oct. 1, 1993 [hereinafter JOSEPH WALLACE COMM1TTEE REPORT] (on file with the author).
159 The committee's report is a stark condemnation of the state of Illinois'
dysfunctional bureaucracy:
Over a period of 3-1/2 years, five judges in Cook and Kane Counties presided over
the Joseph Wallace cases. Four of those judges and at least a score of Assistant State's
Attorneys, guardians ad litem (including Assistant Public Guardians), and DCFS
caseworkers actively or passively participated in sentencing Joseph to the unsupervised
custody of a very dangerous mother. The fact that Joseph did not die earlier was strictly
fortuitous. The Wallace cases reveal so many errors in judgment by so many people that
statistical inference compels the conclusion that the system itself is responsible for the
human error. This conclusion does not let any of the foregoing participants off the hook; it
merely adds to the list of responsible people who inhibit meaningful systemic change.
Id.
160 Don Terry, Mother Sentenced to Life in Killing that Shook Chicago, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 1996, at A14.
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What is society's excuse. How did we become so mean?"'6 ' After the
judge announced a life sentence without parole, Patrick Murphy, the
Cook County Public Guardian, remarked that "[e]veryone in the system
failed Joey Wallace, including me.... She is very, very insane. But we're
all getting off scot-free. She's going to spend the rest of her life in
prison. ,162
The Wallace case illustrates the complicated nexus between a
parent's mental illness and the threat to a child's well-being. Amanda
Wallace never was well enough to undertake the tasks of raising Joseph
alone. Society was aware of her limitations as a parent long before she
gave birth to her first child. Its attempts to intervene, however, were
incomplete and inadequate. As a result, although Wallace's son's death
was tragic and horrifying, it was not a surprise. And although Wallace's
actions were the immediate cause of her son's death, it is far from easy
to establish who is to blame.
c. Infanticide as a Manifestation of an Affective Disorder with
Postpartum Onset
In addition to women with easily identifiable mental disorders
who commit infanticide, a larger category of women kill their children
in seemingly unprovoked displays of violence. These homicides tend
to be impulsive, disproportional reactions to some emotionally stressful
event in the mother's life. Psychiatrist Laura Miller, an expert in
treating postpartum mental disorders, refers to this phenomenon as a
manifestation of "affective disorders with postpartum onset.' ' 163 Dr.
Miller notes that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV) recognizes mood disorders following pregnancy
by using generic diagnoses, accompanied with a "postpartum onset"
qualifier.' 64 The DSM-IV limits this category to episodes with an onset
within four weeks after birth.' 65 In contrast, Dr. Miller's experience
with these disorders has led her to conclude that they are not solely
biological in nature, but that they often arise out of a woman's response
to the "sociocultural and economic" influences in her environment. As
a result, symptoms may persist long after the birth of a child.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Interview with Dr. Laura Miller, University of Illinois Hospital, in Chicago, Ill.
(Jan. 11, 1996).
164 DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, supra note 146,
at 386.
165 Id. at 387.
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Of the forty-seven infanticide cases in my data base, at least
three might be viewed as falling into this category.166 These cases are
dissimilar in terms of the circumstances of the children's deaths, but
similar in terms of the circumstances of the women's lives, both prior
and subsequent to childbirth. In spite of the incomplete nature of the
newspaper accounts of these cases, two common themes emerge. First,
these women had histories of considerable physical, emotional, and
sexual abuse. 167 Second, at the time they committed infanticide, these
women lived alone with their children and had little or no outside
financial or emotional support.
The legacy of abuse is a complex one. 168 Although it is clear
that many survivors of abusive childhoods go on to become perfectly
competent parents, a growing body of evidence indicates that the
majority of parents who are abusive were themselves abused as
children.6 9 Low self-esteem, poor impulse control, depression, anxiety,
and antisocial behavior, including aggression and substance abuse, are
among the personality characteristics observed in survivors of abuse. 7°
It is not difficult to envision how these particular characteristics might
complicate parenting. By definition, parenting requires tremendous
feats of patience, energy, endurance, and maturity. If one combines the
166 Because newspaper coverage is incomplete, I have not included several additional
cases that appear to fall into this category.
167 Eight of the cases in my sample falling into this category mention that the woman
was abused as a child or an adult. See appendix, Coding Table Results.
168 There is a growing literature exploring the tendency of survivors of abusive
childhoods to replicate abusive family patterns as adults. For a summary of this literature,
see FATAL CHILD ABUSE, supra note 78.
161 Id. at 13 (finding that "the average abusive parent is in his or her mid-twenties,
lives near or below the poverty level, often has not finished high school, is depressed and
unable to cope with stress, and has experienced violence first hand"); see also Nora
Dougherty, The Holding Environment: Breaking the Cycle of Abuse, 64 Soc. CASEWORK
283 (1983) (describing a treatment program for abusive and neglecting parents, who often
were themselves denied a nurturing environment in their early lives); Brandt Steele,
Reflections on the Therapy for Those Who Maltreat Children, in THE BATrERED CHILD
382-84 (Ray E. Heifer & Ruth S. Kempe eds., 1987) (stating that an important source of
childcare behavior is patterns acquired from one's own childhood experience). But see
Susan L. Smith, Significant Research Findings in the Etiology of Child Abuse, 65 Soc.
CASEWORK 337, 344 (1984) (stating that research does not substantiate the "overwhelming
conclusion of earlier writings" that indicated that a majority of abusive parents were
themselves victims during childhood).
170 See Sally Cantor, Inpatient Treatment of Adolescent Survivors of Sexual Abuse, in
CHILD SURVIVORS AND PERPETRATORS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 24, 25-26 (Mic Hunter ed.,
1995) (discussing findings about the dangers of repeated abuse, including substance abuse,
self mutilation, suicidal tendencies, and eating disorders); Ruth S. Kempe, A
Developmental Approach to the Treatment of an Abused Child, in THE BATTERED CHILD,
supra note 169, at 362 (listing poor self-esteem, social isolation, dependent relationships,
and poor coping abilities as long term effects of child abuse).
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preexisting vulnerabilities of a woman who has been abused with the
challenges of parenting in socially isolated and economically
vulnerable circumstances, it is unsurprising that some of these mothers
abuse and even kill their children.'
Perhaps the most striking of these cases in my sample involves
Guinevere Garcia, an Illinois woman who spent five years on death row
before her sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in January
1996.72 From the time that she was six years old, Garcia was raped
repeatedly by an older male relative with whom she lived. 73  Her
mother, who also had been raped by this man, committed suicide when
Garcia was eighteen months old.' 74 Garcia began drinking heavily at
age eleven. Between ages eleven and nineteen, she suffered numerous
traumas, including being gang-raped and being forced into a sham
marriage with an undocumented man.171
At age nineteen, Garcia gave birth to a daughter and was
struggling to support herself and her daughter by prostitution and nude
dancing. 76 By the time her daughter was eleven months old, Garcia
became terrified that she would lose custody and that her daughter
would be raised in a home environment similar to the one she and her
mother had lived in. 77 One day, overwhelmed by these fears, she
smothered her daughter.7 7 The police did not discover the crime until
they came to interview Garcia two years later regarding two fires that
had occurred in her apartment building.'7 9 She told the police that she
had set the fires on the first and second anniversaries of her daughter's
171 Studies have noted a correlation between child abuse fatalities and household
isolation, whether in rural or urban areas. Abusive behavior not only is more likely to
occur when the primary caretaker receives no parenting support from neighbors, friends,
and relatives--it is less likely to be discerned and thereby prevented by others. FATAL
CHILD ABUSE, supra note 78, at 125-26 (citing National Research Council, Understanding
Child Abuse (Washington, D.C., 1993); Smith, supra note 169, at 338.
,72 Eric Zorn, Prison in Life; For Garcia, Commutation May be Ultimate Punishment,
CHI. TRM., Jan. 17, 1996, at 1, zone N.
173 Kathryn Kahler, Women on Death Row: A Chilling Sign of the Times, PLAIN
DEALER, May 26, 1993, at Al.
'74 Zorn, supra note 172, at 1, zone N.
175 id.
176 John Carlin, Wife on Death Row Spurns Clemency Plea, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct.
1, 1996, at 11.
177 Id
178 id.
179 Illinois v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100, 115 (Ill. 1995) (Freeman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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death."8 ° Garcia confessed to having killed her daughter and led the
police to the spot where she had buried her daughter's body.'8'
Not all of the women whose infanticides fall into this category
killed their children with the deliberateness manifested by Garcia.
Many of these cases involve impulsive actions such as suffocating or
fatally beating a crying child.'8 2  A few involve women who were
struggling with depression and who intended to kill themselves as well
as their children.' Read together, these cases all involve women who
simply lacked the internal and external resources that enable other
mothers to withstand the pressures associated with being the sole
caretaker for an infant or child. These cases reflect a disturbed mother's
spontaneous or irrational and disproportionately violent response to the
very real challenges of parenting in isolation.
d Addiction-Related Infanticide
The final category of infanticide involves women who are
substance abusers and whose crimes are an indirect result of their
addictions. Of course, substance abuse may be a contributing factor in
all of the other categories of infanticide as well.' 84 The effect of
addiction upon a woman's capacity to parent is always harmful in that
the addiction, by definition, renders the parent both less attuned to, and
less able to respond to, her child's needs.'85 When a parent is addicted
to an illegal substance, there is the additional complication of financing
180 Id.
181 Id.
112 For a discussion of one such case, the Latrena Pixley case, see infra notes 205
through 220 and accompanying text.
83 See Joe Chidley, "I have put my faith in God," MACLEAN'S, July 31, 1995, at 41
(indicating that, at the time of her crime, Susan Smith was being treated with Prozac for
depression).
"4 For example, there is considerable evidence indicating that a high percentage of
women who are addicts suffered violent and abusive childhoods and developed drug
habits in order to cope with the symptoms of this abuse. See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Sex,
Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women Who
Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 512 (1992) [hereinafter Oberman, Sex, Drugs]
(noting that between 70% and 100% of all female drug abusers are victims of incest or
sexual violence).
... Shoni K. Davis has constructed a profile of the chemically dependent woman and
explains that her addiction (as well as the problems that contributed to the addiction such
as childhood trauma and financial problems) impairs her ability to parent. She generally
will have problems with parental self-concept, maternal attitudes, bonding, and frustration
tolerance. Shoni K. Davis, Chemical Dependency in Women: A Description of its Effects
and Outcome on Adequate Parenting, 7 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 225, 226-27
(1990).
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and securing a steady supply of the drug. 1 6  As a result, it is not
surprising to find that as many as 50% of child abuse and neglect cases
referred to juvenile court involve allegations of parental substance
abuse.
87
There are numerous stories of women whose children died,
either directly or indirectly, as a result of the women's addictions. The
most common scenarios seem to involve cases like that of Pamela
Rother, who was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for the crime of
felony child neglect after her two-month-old infant starved to death.'88
An expert witness testified that Rother, who lived alone with her
daughter in "a dilapidated and unkempt trailer," was delusional and
paranoid, and that her deep psychological problems were aggravated by
her addiction to methamphetamine. 8 9
There is a growing literature describing the psycho-social
problems relating to drug addiction in women. Unlike male addicts,
who tend to describe their substance abuse as recreational, female
addicts tend to describe their addictions as therapeutic--as coping
mechanisms that enable them to bear the overwhelmingly difficult
circumstances in their lives.'9 Indeed, the life circumstances of most
addicts are, by any obiective measure, challenging. 9' Moreover, once
they have children, these women are not miraculously transformed into
"supermoms." They still face the same demons that led them to
anesthetize themselves in the first place, and still need help to quit, but
now they also need child care, more money, more patience, and self-
control.' 92
186 Oberman, Sex, Drugs, supra note 184, at 513 (noting that addicted women often
obtain their drugs in exchange for sex).
117 j. Michael Murphy et al., Substance Abuse and Serious Child Mistreatment:
Prevalence, Risk, and Outcome in a Court Sample, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 197, 207
(1991).
88 Paul Elias, Woman Gets 10 Years in Baby's Death, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 26,
1995, at B 1.
"9 Id. In a similar case, a Chicago woman whose daughter starved to death was
charged with first degree murder. Allegedly, the mother had sold her baby's formula
coupons from the federal Women, Infants and Children program in order to support her
cocaine habit. Phillip J. O'Connor, Public Guardian Rips DCFS Over Deaths of 2 Kids,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at 61.
190 Beth G. Reed, Developing Women-Sensitive Drug-Dependence Treatment
Services: Why So Difficult?, 19 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 151, 152 (1987).
191 In my earlier work on pregnancy and substance-abusing women, I noted that
addicted women "often report extreme levels of depression and anxiety, in addition to very
low self-esteem.... [They] are often involved in abusive relationships.... [Tlhis
vulnerability to physical abuse may stem from a history of being abused as children."
Oberman, Sex, Drugs, supra note 184, at 512-13.
192 See Davis, supra note 185, at 226-27 (describing a profile of the chemically
dependent woman in which childhood trauma, psychological characteristics,
2004]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
Social isolation also plays a role in the infanticide deaths of the
children of addicted mothers. These children commonly are neglected
while the parent is either on drugs or in search of drugs. Family,
friends, and the state often are fully aware of this neglect long before
the child is physically harmed. Tragically, however, the failure to
intervene seems to be a consistent theme in these cases. In fact, in
several of the seven cases in my sample that involved evidence of
maternal substance abuse, the state department of child protection
already was on notice of the potentially abusive situation, but failed to
intervene in time to save the child's life. 193
2. Ambivalence in Punishing Infanticide: The 'Mad" and the "Bad"
Unlike in the neonaticide cases, there is considerable uniformity
in the criminal charges brought against women suspected of infanticide.
The vast majority of the women in these cases were charged with first
degree murder. Nevertheless, the case outcomes are remarkably varied.
At one end of the spectrum, at least two women convicted of
infanticide have been sentenced to death, while at the other end, there
are several women who were convicted, but released without a prison
sentence.' 94
Although the outcomes are varied, the cases tend to reflect a
pattern of lenience.'95 This pattern has been noticed by criminal law
experts, who have come to view infanticide defendants as "empathy
outliers"--defendants "to whom jurors have appeared to be inordinately
(and, perhaps, even inappropriately) sympathetic," in spite of the
socioeconomic factors, and pregnancy issues impinge on the capacity to parent); Kelly
Kelleher et al., Alcohol and Drug Disorders among Physically Abusive and Neglectful
Parents in a Community-Based Sample, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1586 (1994) (comparing
frequency of substance use disorders and symptoms between adults reporting child abuse
and neglect and match controls); Dianne 0. Regan et al., Infants of Drug Addicts: At Risk
for Child Abuse, Neglect, and Placement in Foster Care, 9 NEUROTOXICOLOGY &
TERATOLOGY 315 (1987) (comparing pregnant drug-dependent women and comparable
drug-free women and suggesting that failure to resolve the conflicts resulting from
childhood sexual trauma and/or the use of illicit drugs to cope with these feelings appears
to disrupt the ability of women to parent their own children); Lynn Singer et al., Increased
Psychological Distress in Post-Partum Cocaine-Using Mothers, 7 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE
165 (1995) (describing psychological distress as reported postpartum by poor women who
used cocaine during pregnancy).
".. See, e.g., Nathan McCall, Child's Death a Tragedy in Waiting, Neighbors Say,
Wash. Post, Apr. 10, 1991, at Dl (describing the routine visits of Washington, D.C. social
workers to the apartment of Judith Coleman in response to reports by neighbors that
Coleman was abusing her children).
194 For a sense of the breadth of case outcomes for women charged with infanticide,
see appendix, Coding Table Results.
"9 See appendix, Coding Table Results.
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increasingly limited reach of the insanity defense. 196 This phenomenon
was reported in a New York study of the insanity defense that
concluded:
[wlhile from psychiatric reports, it is apparent that some of these
mothers were grossly insane at the time of the infanticidal acts (e.g.,
believed child was turning into evil beings), there are others whose
primary difficulty seemed to be one of personal inadequacy and,
more specifically, an inadequacy in the wife-mother-homemaker
roles, with resulting stress. Basically, it is our belief that society, in
its desire to preserve an illusion of "mother love", is hesitant to
carefully scrutinize the mother-child relationship and recognize
realistically that the most reasonable target for a mother's frustration
and anger is her child. Instead, to preserve our illusions about
"mother love", we categorize women who murder their children as
"insane". 1
97
Yet, it also is clear that not all infanticide defendants are treated
with lenience. Instead, it seems that the criminal .justice system and the
media cast these diverse defendants as either crazy women, who are
punished leniently, if at all, or evil women, who are punished rather
harshly.
Others have identified the criminal justice system's general
tendency to polarize female defendants by portraying them as either
"mad" or "bad.""19 It is hypothesized that "the reasons for women's
crimes are sought within the discourse of the 'irrational' and the
'pathological' " because violent criminal activity is not consistent with
stereotypically feminine behavior.'99  One study of images of
infanticidal women found that this dichotomization was particularly
evident in these cases. Professor Wilczynski of Cambridge University
studied a sample of twenty-two British cases, and found that in
virtually all the cases, "the women were clearly viewed as either 'mad'
or 'bad' ":
[iln 14 cases, the women were seen as "mad" and as fulfilling the
female stereotype of having mental or psychiatric problems. These
PERLIN, supra note 43, at 192.
'9' Henry J. Steadman et al., The Use of the Insanity Defense, in A REPORT To Gov.
HUGH L. CAREY ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK 37, 68-69 (1978) (prepared
under the direction of William A. Carnahan, Deputy Commissioner and Counsel).
198 Wilczynski, supra note 7, at 72.
199 Id; see generally Susan M. Edwards, Neither Mad nor Bad: The Female Violent
Offender Reassessed, 9 WOMEN'S STUDIES INT. FORuM 79, 79 (1986) (stating that women
who are "suspects, defendants or offenders" are "dealt with in accordance with the degree
to which their criminal and social behavior deviates from appropriate gender role
expectations").
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offenders were viewed as essentially good women and mothers, for
whom something had gone tragically wrong. Their responsibility
was, therefore, lessened, and hence they were treated
sympathetically.... In the other eight cases the women were
perceived as "bad" and as having behaved in a way inconsistent
with the female stereotype (e.g., as neglectful, uncaring or sexual).
They were seen to have committed "wicked" acts for which they
were totally responsible and were treated punitively. All were given
prison sentences. There did not appear to be anything between these
two extremes.2°
The cases falling into the "mad" category of infanticidal
mothers do not necessarily involve women who meet the legal
definition of criminally insane. Rather, "madness" refers to an
intuitive understanding, evidenced by those who pass judgment upon
the defendant, that she was crazy. °2 The vast majority of the women in
my study who were perceived and portrayed as "crazy" by the media,
the lawyers, and the judges or juries did not plead an insanity defense,
nor were they psychotic.
The broad scope of madness in infanticide cases is illustrated by
the case of Latrena Pixley, a nineteen-year-old woman who admitted
that she suffocated her six-week-old baby "because no one was helping
... take care of it."2 °3 In her statement to the police, Pixley said that on
the morning of her baby's death, she made breakfast for her one-year-
old son, but had no baby formula in the house to feed her crying
newborn. She fed the baby a bottle of water, but the baby continued
200 Wilczynski, supra note 7, at 74.
201 Wilczynski notes that "[i]n most cases of infanticide ... the mental illness is usually
not of sufficient severity that it would be recognized by the law in any other context (e.g.,
as sufficient basis for a plea of diminished responsibility)." Id. at 76 (citing d'Orban, supra
note 54, at 570). Only one of the women in my sample clearly met the legal standard for
insanity, and she was found unfit to stand trial. Two other women pled and were acquitted
on insanity grounds after proving that they killed their children while suffering from
postpartum psychosis. See appendix, Coding Table Results. Although the limited sample
size affects the significance of this success rate, this success rate actually is remarkably
high in light of statistics suggesting that the insanity defense is raised in only 1% of all
felony cases, and results in acquittal (not guilty for reasons of insanity) in only 26% of
these cases. Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense
Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIAT. LAW 331 (1991).
102 See Nelson, Comment, supra note 139, at 625 (noting that in absence of a serious
mental illness, most women do not kill their children).
203 Gabriel Escobar, Mother Charged in Killing, Infant's Body Found in SE Trash Bin,
WASH. POST, June 21, 1992, at BI.
204 Paul Duggan, Leniency in Baby's Death; Judge Gives D.C. Mother Weekends in
Jail, WASH. POST, June 5, 1993, at Al.
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crying. She went to a neighbor's to use the phone, but the neighbor
206 207
was not home.' °6 When she returned, the baby was still crying. She
picked her up and began to rock her. When the baby failed to stop
crying, Pixley put a blanket over the baby's face.0 8
Afterwards, Pixley wrapped her dead baby in the blanket and
placed the body in a trash bin.' °9 Later that day, her boyfriend came
home. She made him dinner, and they went out to visit with his
family.210 A relative later recalled that the conversation that evening
was about what a shame it was that young mothers in the District of
Columbia were killing their babies.211 Apparently, no one asked about
Pixley's newborn's whereabouts. The next morning, after making
breakfast for her boyfriend and her one-year-old son, Pixley began
crying and told her boyfriend that she had killed the baby.1 2 He did not
believe her, but went out to check the trash, whereupon he found the
baby's body, and called the police.1 3
Pixley was charged with first degree murder, but pled guilty to
second degree murder, which carried with it a possible prison term of
fifteen years to life. At her sentencing hearing, the state asked the
judge to impose the maximum sentence, arguing that "it is impossible
to imagine any more depraved and heinous behavior than that of
Latrena Pixely.... Ms. Pixley is a murderer and should be treated like a
murderer. 2 14  The defense presented expert testimony that Pixley
suffered from postpartum depression. Although this term was never
defined, the description of Pixley's behavior falls far short of a
diagnosis of postpartum psychosis.2 5 Instead, the defense expert
testified that Pixley was extremely depressed, and that her depression
was both pregnancy-related and an outgrowth of her deprived
background: Pixley was a high school dropout who had been
emotionally and physically abused as a child of two drug-addicted
211parents.
205 Catherine Toups, Mother Gets Weekends in Jail for Killing Infant, WASH. TIMES,
June 5, 1993, at A10.
206 Id.
201 Id.
208 id
20Id.; Duggan, supra note 204, at A .
29Duggan, supra note 204, at Al.
210 Id.
211 Toups, supra note 205, at A10.
212 Duggan, supra note 204, at Al.
213 Id.; Toups, supra note 205, at A10.214 Toups, supra note 205, at A10.
215 For a description of this disorder, see supra notes 140 through 154 and
accompanying text.
216 Duggan, supra note 204, at Al.
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Judge George Mitchell followed the defense attorney's
recommendation and imposed a sentence of weekends in jail for three
years. In sentencing Pixley, he remarked that people seem more
inclined to "understand these psychological phenomenons [sic] [when
they occur] in high-level people, but it becomes un-understandable in a
poor person sometimes. I don't want to be victimized by that kind of
thinking.... I want to treat all people the same, whether they be poor,
rich or whatever.,
21 7
Given that the law generally does not reduce the penalties for
homicide when a defendant establishes that she was depressed,2 8 the
judge's claim that he was treating all people alike is ironic.
Nevertheless, it demonstrates that, having classified the defendant as
mad, it became permissible to treat her with extraordinary lenience.
Unlike the "mad" infanticide defendants, those who are viewed
as "bad" are portrayed as "ruthless, selfish, cold, callous, neglectful of
their children or domestic responsibilities, violent or promiscuous. 1 9
In addition to being tried for infanticide, the media "tries" these women
for all "crimes" relating to their lack of maternal altruism.2
For example, consider Sabrina Butler's story. Butler was
indicted for capital murder in the death of her nine-month-old son.22'
At around midnight on April 12, 1989, Butler noticed that her son was
not breathing, and brought him to a local hospital 2  The baby was
pronounced dead on arrival, and the doctors suspected that child abuse
may have led to his death.223 An autopsy revealed that death occurred
as a result of an infection following from a perforation in the small
intestine. Doctors inferred that a "substantial blunt force to the
217 id
21, For an overview of criminal law defenses related to a defendant's mental state, see
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §§ 161, 171, 173 (1984 & Supp. 1996).
29 Wilczynski, supra note 7, at 78.
"0 Note that this categorization may be seen in the media, long before the trial occurs.
For example, Jennie Bain, a 20-year-old single woman living in a trailer park in Tennessee
was indicted for first degree murder in the deaths of her two children, ages 23 months and
one year. According to the news accounts, she left the children unattended in her parked
car for eight to 10 hours on a Saturday evening while she was inside a motel room
partying with some friends. When she returned to the car in the morning, the boys had
died of dehydration and suffocation. The father of Bain's children was a truck driver who
was infrequently present in the lives of Jennie and her children. The first line of one article
covering the story reads, "Jennie Bain just wanted to have fun." Charles Laurence, Parent
First, Child Last: The Mother Who Left Her Two Babies to Die in a Hot Car is the Latest
Child Neglect Case to Shake America, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 9, 1995, at 21.
22 Butler v. Mississippi, 608 So. 2d 314, 315 (Miss. 1992).
222 Id. at 316.
223 id.
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abdomen" caused the perforation. 4 The police were summoned, and
Butler was questioned through the night by several detectives.
Butler gave numerous conflicting stories about the
circumstances of the prior evening, first telling the authorities that the
baby had been left with a babysitter, then admitting that the baby was
with her throughout the day. 5 Butler was similarly vague about how
she discovered that her baby was not breathing. It is not clear whether
she found the baby dead, or whether it stopped breathing while she was
with it. Her stories include the fact that she went out for a brief jog
around the block at around 10:00 p.m., and that she was expecting a
male visitor that evening, although the timing of both of these events
226
remains uncertain.
As a result of these inconsistent stories and the ambiguities
surrounding the baby's death, Butler's public defender sought funds
from the court to hire a psychiatrist and an investigator.2 7 The judge
denied both of these requests, asserting that an investigator was not
legally necessary, and that sufficient information about the defendant
was obtained from the brief psychiatric evaluation conducted by the
state's psychiatrist, who found her competent to stand trial.228 The judge
229likewise denied defendant's request for a manslaughter instruction.
The jury convicted Butler of killing her son while engaged in the
commission of felonious child abuse, and sentenced her to death. 30
Everything about the case against Butler called out for
explanation, especially in view of the penalty she received. There were
questions concerning what led to the baby's death, what role Butler
played in the baby's death, and what Butler's background was. Even
the Mississippi Supreme Court, which ultimately granted Butler a new
trial on procedural grounds, rejected defense claims of error based on
the trial court's refusal to provide funds for a psychiatric evaluation. 3
Interestingly, Butler was acquitted upon retrial after the judge heard
expert testimony that Butler could not have caused the infant's death,
224 Id.
25 Id at 316-17.
226 Id
227 Id. at 321.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 319.
230 Id. at 318. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court overturned the conviction
and remanded for retrial because the prosecutor, in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
asked the jury to infer guilt from the fact that Butler did not testify at trial. Id.
231 Id. at 321. The Mississippi Supreme Court remanded for retrial on the basis of only
one error: that the prosecutor asked the jury to infer guilt from the defendant's failure to
testify.
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which was attributable to either cystic kidney disease or sudden infant
232death syndrome.
Although it is useful to observe the binary pattern of madness
and badness in considering the broad range of penalties assigned to
infanticide cases, upon closer inspection, the categories are not
particularly descriptive or discrete. First, despite the association
between the perceived madness of a particular defendant and lenient
treatment, the concept of madness is so nebulous as to be meaningless.
So little is reported about the women's mental status and capacity that
one gets the sense that the defendant's actual mental health is almost
beside the point in these cases, and that madness is simply a way for
judges or .juries to explain actions they view as otherwise inexplicable,
and to justify the mercy shown to those defendants whom they find
sympathetic. The cases in my sample in which infanticide defendants
received particularly harsh sentences (life imprisonment or death)
predominantly involved poor women and/or women of color. Although
my data is insufficiently complete to permit an analysis of the extent to
which maternal race and class affects case outcome, it is quite likely
that the harsh treatment visited upon poor women of color in other
areas of the criminal justice system also is manifested in infanticide
233
cases.
Second, a more critical scrutiny of the cases reveals that,
particularly in high profile cases, the categorization process is not an
immutable one. Instead, the infanticide defendant's image may
alternate between "mad" and "bad," and ultimately, the jury's decision
may reflect a sense that the woman is both mad and bad. In other
words, the dialectic of madness and badness is simply another
manifestation of jury ambivalence about allocating blame in infanticide
cases. Thus, the shifting characterizations of an infanticide defendant
232 56 Inmates Executed in 1995, Most Since 1957; U.S. Total is Expected to Rise
Further with 3,000 on Death Row, BALT. SUN, Jan. 2, 1996, at A3.
233 The exceptionally severe punishment visited upon poor women of color by the
criminal justice system is discussed in the following works: Annette Appell, On Fixing
"Bad Mothers" and Saving Their Children; Four Stories (June 26, 1996) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author); Oberman, Control, supra note 6; Oberman, Sex, Drugs,
supra note 184; Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95
(1993) [hereinafter Roberts, Motherhood]; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
who have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1419 (1991). See also Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Monster Stories: Women Charged
With Perinatal Endangerment, in UNCERTAIN TERMS 282 (Faye Ginsburg & Anna
Lowenhaupt Tsing eds., 1990) (neonaticide study suggesting different outcomes for young
white women, whose actions often went unpunished, as opposed to older women and all
women of color, who received stringent punishment).
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from bad to mad, and sometimes back again, reflects a systemic
struggle to devise an appropriate punishment for her.234
Perhaps the quintessential "bad" infanticidal mother is Susan
Smith, whom the media relentlessly portrayed as bad, even when the
jury ultimately voted to spare her life. In the fall of 1994, after having
led the nation on a phony manhunt for a mysterious black man who she
claimed had kidnapped her children, Susan Smith shocked the nation
by confessing that she strapped her two children into their car seats, and
then rolled the car into a pond. In the immediate aftermath of Smith's
confession, crowds screamed for her death.2" And yet, as the case went
to trial, David Smith, Susan Smith's former husband, released a book
detailing Susan's sexual exploits, explaining that "his only motive is to
ensure that public sympathy remain with the boys rather than Susan.
236
He won that battle, as 63% of Americans surveyed by the Princeton
217Survey Research Associates favored the death penalty in her case.
But upon closer examination of this rough classification, we see
familiar signs of strain and ambivalence. David Smith felt compelled
to write his book, in part, because he feared that public sympathy was
shifting toward Susan. Indeed, soon after the immediate shock of the
story wore off, some commentators began to view Susan Smith as an
extraordinarily troubled young woman who had intended to take her
own life, not just those of her children. These stories portrayed an
image of madness at odds with the original images of Smith's evil
238nature. When it finally came time for the jury to rule, it seemed to
view her as both mad and bad rather than choose between these two
images. They saw her life in context--the abusive step-father, the social
isolation, the limited options, her failure to reach out for help, her
234 The attempt by jurors to resolve the mad or bad dilemma concerning the mother
who kills her child, and as a result determine the appropriate punishment for her, also was
evidenced in the case of Rebecca Hopfer. See supra notes 109 through 128 and
accompanying text.
... See, e.g., Linda Ellerbee, Smith will live--Does white make right?, HOUSTON
CHRON., Aug. 6, 1995 (Outlook), at 6 (stating that Susan Smith should have received the
death penalty).
236 Gail Wescott, The Reckoning, PEOPLE, Aug. 7, 1995, at 73.
237 Brad Warthen, Editorial, Jury's Wisdom Beats 'Dittohead Justice', DENVER POST,
Aug. 10, 1995, at BI 1. In one of its cover stories on Susan Smith, NEWSWEEK magazine
called her a "promiscuous, sexually exploitive adult ... [who] ended her marriage to the
poor boy who loved her and gambled on a rich boy who didn't. When it all came apart she
committed an act of savagery that defies understanding." Tom Morgenthau, Condemned to
Life, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1995, at 19.
238 Perhaps the most thoughtful essay on the subject was written by Barbara
Ehrenreich, Susan Smith: Corrupted By Love?, TIME, Aug. 7, 1995, at 78.
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vindictive, immature behavior,"' and despite having been carefullydeath-qualified,4 they refused to sentence her to death.
IV. THE LEGACY OF AMBIVALENCE ABOUT INFANTICIDE
The preceding sections point to a widespread pattern of ambivalence
about whether, how, and whom to punish for the crime of infanticide.
This pattern seems to be consistent throughout much of Western culture
and history. Therefore, this Article could end here with the simple
conclusion that, like other societies, modem American society
differentiates infanticide from murder. Because it seems that the
United States is not alone in its ambivalent response to this crime, it
might be argued that our impulse toward mercy is somehow "natural"
and, therefore, not necessarily objectionable.
As is the case with other societies, the impulse toward
exceptionalizing infanticide cases is just that--an impulse. There is no
dialogue about the sources of our ambivalence, nor is there any
formalized justification for the generally sympathetic treatment these
defendants receive. For those inclined to be sympathetic with these
defendants, there might be a sense of taboo in recognizing the tendency
toward lenience--as if it is so lacking in legitimacy that it must be
overcome. For those opposed to such sympathetic treatment,
articulating this phenomenon as a pattern only reconfirms what they
already suspected: that without any apparent explanation, these crimes
get special treatment.24' Regardless of whether one is inclined for or
239 See Mona Charen, The Lessons of the Susan Smith Verdict; Children are Like
Property, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 7, 1995, at A6 (arguing that society views strangers
who mistreat children more harshly than mothers who mistreat their own children); Mike
Doming, Abusive Stepfather Testifies for Smith; He Says He Must Share in Her Guilt,
Pleads for Her life, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1995, at 4, zone N (describing how Susan Smith's
step-father admitted to abusing her as a child and pleaded for leniency on her behalf);
Robert Scheer, Small-Town Values Like Hiding Terrible Secrets, PALM BEACH POST,
Aug. 6, 1995, at F1 (discussing how moral corruption is often hidden, as exemplified by
the sexual abuse to Susan Smith at the hands of her step-father); Alice Steinbach, Why
Mothers Kill: Two women confessed to murdering their children, and now the question
remains: How could they?, BALT. SUN, Dec. 12, 1994, at DI (discussing characteristics
common to women who kill their children).
240 See Eric Zom, 'Witherspooning' May be the Death of Susan Smith, CHI. TRIB., July
20, 1995 at 1, zone N (discussing how 16 potential jurors were kept off the jury in the
Smith trial because they would not impose the death penalty on her); see also David C.
Baldus, Keynote Address: The Death Penalty Dialogue Between Law and Social
Science, 70 IND. L.J. 1033 (1995) (discussing the relationship between social science
research and death penalty decision making).
141 See, e.g., Brusca, Note, supra note 141, at 1133 (arguing that infanticide is
excusable only when the defendant meets the pre-existing insanity defense); Gardner,
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against sympathy for women who kill their children, there are dangers
inherent in this unarticulated impulse to exceptionalize infanticide.
There are at least four pernicious results that follow from the failure to
acknowledge or explain why infanticide is different from other forms
of homicide. 242 After describing the various dangers inherent in treating
these cases differently without acknowledging how or why, this section
undertakes a direct exploration of the ways in which these cases are
exceptional.
A. Exploring the Legacy of Ambivalence
The failure to explain or justify treating infanticide cases as exceptional
may yield a host of unfounded and problematic inferences. First, one
might interpret the reluctance to punish infanticide as an indication that
society values the lives of children less than those of adults. In fact,
this line of cases could be seen as evidence to support the argument
made by abortion opponents that a society that tolerates abortion
devalues not only fetal life, but life in general. 243 The fallacy in this
reasoning lies in the fact that, generally speaking, most states penalize
the killing of a child at least as harshly as the killing of an adult. In
fact, in American death penalty jurisprudence, the killing of a child
under a certain statutorily prescribed age, by definition, renders the
defendant eligible for the death penalty.2 4 Moreover, research suggests
that when men kill their children, there is no pattern of ambivalence or• 245
mercy in terms of the punishment they receive.
Note, supra note 143, at 953 (arguing that postpartum depression should not receive
special recognition under the law).
242 See infra notes 243 through 249 and accompanying text.
243 In her study of a series of neonaticide prosecutions, Anna Tsing notes that
[vIalue statements from the abortion debate have emerged in practically every case I
have found in which a white high school or college student has been charged with
perinatal endangerment. For those who oppose abortion, the connection is simple. As the
sheriff who arrested one college student put it, 'This was just a nine month abortion to her.
She's been told it's legal and she stretched it all the way.'
Tsing, supra note 233, at 290.
2" See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(7) (West 1994) (declaring that murder
of an individual under 12 years of age makes certain defendants eligible for the death
penalty).
245 P.T. d'Orban's study of women who killed their children found that "rel ighty per
cent received a noncustodial sentence." d'Orban, supra note 54, at 569. He contrasts these
results with sentences received by 29 battering fathers who killed their children. Id. (citing
P.D. Scott, Parents Who Kill Their Children, 13 MED. SCIENCE & L. 120 (1973a)). "In
Scott's study, 86% of the fathers were given a prison sentence, only one Probation Order
was made (without a treatment condition), and none of the men received a medical
disposal." Id.
Additional evidence of our lack of mercy for nonmothers who kill children is found
in the fact that we readily punish the killing of infants, and even fetuses, when the
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A second danger inherent in the unarticulated impulse toward
exceptionalizing infanticide is that it threatens to undermine the
credibility and integrity of the law. At the very least, the wide range of
responses to infanticide in the United States reflects an arbitrary and
incoherent approach to the crime. The range of outcomes points to the
inescapable conclusion that society not only is unsure about how
severely to punish women who kill their children, but that at times, it is
unsure whether to punish them at all. To the extent that society
punishes law-breakers in order to deter criminal activity, the unjustified
and sporadic tendency toward lenience in these cases risks undermining
deterrence. More importantly, the reluctance to penalize those who
break this particular law indirectly calls into question the legitimacy of
punishing those who break other laws. "6
Third, the effect of this ambivalence is to create a set of cases
involving women defendants that are treated differently from similar
cases involving men. Those critical of the frequently lenient outcomes
in these cases may argue that the law is "sexist" and displays an
antiquated chivalry in this reluctance to convict and punish women.
Despite the fact that, as a general matter, there is little evidence that the
law treats women defendants differently from men, because the
lenience in these particular cases is neither explained nor justified
• • 247
based on gender, it is difficult to respond to these claims. Moreover,
perpetrators are not mothers. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:32.5 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1996):
A. Feticide is the killing of an unborn child by the act, procurement, or culpable
omission of a person other than the mother of the unborn child. The offense of feticide
shall not include acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were
committed during any abortion to which the pregnant woman or her legal guardian has
consented or which was performed in an emergency as defined in R.S.40:1299.35.12. Nor
shall the offense of feticide include acts which are committed pursuant to usual and
customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
246 Recall that this was precisely the concern that led Parliament to enact the modern
British Infanticide Act. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
247 There is considerable debate about gender differences in the enforcement of
criminal law. In many cases, women are sentenced more harshly than are men who
commit comparable crimes. For a comprehensive exploration of the criminal justice
system's differential treatment of women, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist
Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2151 (1995). Ania Wilczynski and
Allison Morris summarize this research in their article on parents who kill their children,
noting that
ra] continuing debate in both conventional and feminist criminological writings is
whether or not women are dealt with more leniently than men throughout the criminal
justice system. There is little agreement. The closest there seems to be to a consensus is
the answer: it depends (for example, on the offence, the offender's race or class and so on).
Wilczynski & Morris, supra note 2, at 31. Although it nevertheless is possible that the
ambivalence about punishing infanticide reflects vestiges of paternalism, it seems likely
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history teaches that there is reason for caution and skepticism whenever
the law determines that women should be treated differently from men-
-even if such determination arises out of an ostensibly benevolent
impulse. 248  As Professor Coughlin observes, exceptionalizing women
threatens to deny them the "same capacity for self-governance that is
attributed to men.
249
Fourth and finally, because there is no explanation for why we
treat infanticide differently, or even an acknowledgment that we do so,
there is no opportunity to view these cases as interrelated. Indeed, the
unexamined impulse toward lenience has obscured the very patterned
nature of these cases. The intensity and exclusivity of our focus on the
wisdom of punishing the defendant channels society's attention away
that this impulse arises out of the gendered structure of parenting. In other words, because
the tasks of mothering differ dramatically from those of fathering, the system
differentiates between mothers and fathers who kill their children. See infra notes 297
through 323 and accompanying text (exploring the structure of motherhood as it relates to
infanticide). There is a long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases illustrating the double-
edged sword of laws ostensibly designed to protect women. See, e.g., Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding exclusion of women from mandatory draft
registration); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding law that limited the
number of hours women could work daily); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1873) (upholding state's refusal to grant married woman a license to practice law). The
pernicious effect of such laws was memorialized by Justice Brennan, who noted that "[t]
raditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism'
which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (striking down federal law that automatically
granted housing and medical benefits to married men in the military, but required married
women to demonstrate husband's dependence in order to receive the benefits).
248 There is a long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases illustrating the double-edged
sword of laws ostensibly designed to protect women. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding exclusion of women from mandatory draft registration);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding law that limited the number of hours
women could work daily); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873)
(upholding state's refusal to grant married woman a license to practice law). The
pernicious effect of such laws was memorialized by Justice Brennan, who noted that "[ti
raditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism'
which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (striking down federal law that automatically
granted housing and medical benefits to married men in the military, but required married
women to demonstrate husband's dependence in order to receive the benefits).
249 Anne Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1, 6 (1994). Professor
Coughlin elaborates on this point, noting that
if women achieve leniency by exploiting, rather than challenging and revising, the
existing categories of excuse, they not only leave the theory of criminal responsibility
intact, they also leave intact the competing life stories that the theory constructs and makes
available for excused actors and responsible human beings to experience. The experience
of the responsible actor is one that resonates powerfully in our culture and, by securing
excuse, women assure that it is one that will continue to be denied to them.
Id. at 25.
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from the remarkably patterned circumstances that surround these
crimes. Thus, despite the patterned nature of these circumstances, each
case generates the same tired dialogue regarding the defendant's
culpability and the merit and utility of punishment. Society becomes
trapped in this ongoing dialogue and, therefore, never comes to grips
with the role played by families and communities in contributing to
these infants' deaths. Simply put, the failure to articulate the
justifications for exceptionalizing infanticide leads to the failure to
identify circumstances latent in society that contribute to and
perpetuate this crime.
B. Identifying the Sources of Ambivalence
The only way to avoid the problems arising out of the unexamined
impulse toward exceptionalizing infanticide is to attempt to identify
and acknowledge the reasons for our ambivalence about infanticide.
This process requires that we reexamine the various forms of modern
American infanticide in order to understand exactly what makes these
cases seem different.
At its foundation, the response to infanticide is ambivalent
because society simultaneously expresses moral outrage at the offense
and treats the offenders with lenience. This ambivalence reflects a
difficulty, not with condemning the act, but rather with condemning the
actor. The problem with infanticide lies not in the crime itself, but
rather, in isolating the blameworthy party in these cases.25° Thus, the
facts surrounding the women's lives and their infants' deaths lead us to
treat these cases as exceptional.
In order to begin exploring the circumstances surrounding the
lives of the women who commit infanticide, it is necessary to return to
the distinction between neonaticide and infanticide. As I noted in
describing the two types of infanticide, there are significant factual
differences between infanticides occurring within the first twenty-four
hours after birth and those occurring thereafter. Therefore, this section
will begin with an exploration of the circumstances surrounding
neonaticide and will then turn to a discussion of infanticide stories.
250 This is consistent with historical accounts of the resistance to punishing
infanticide. See supra notes 34 through 50 and accompanying text (regarding Victorian
Juries' reluctance to punish the infanticide defendant due to their sense that one of the
guilty parties was missing).
[Vol.8.1:3
INFANTICIDE
a. Getting Beyond the "Gory Part ": Understanding the Sources of
Neonaticide
In considering how best to explore the circumstances
surrounding the lives of those who commit neonaticide, I found myself
struck by the eerie consistencies in the stories. Surprisingly accurate
representations of these stories are found in contemporary literature
25
'
and in film. 252 Although the use of narrative in legal scholarship has
generated considerable controversy, it is certain that narratives help to
provide a more nuanced understanding of a given situation to those
outside of it.213 Moreover, the patterned nature of neonaticide cases
lends itself to narrative, as the seemingly incomprehensible nature of
the crime cries out for explanation. I was fortunate enough to find a
woman willing to share her story with me.
i. A Neonaticide Narrative
In November 1991, a suburban Chicago high school senior was
arrested and charged with first degree murder in the death of her
newborn daughter. I became aware of A.'s 2 4 case as a result of my
involvement with a similar case in Illinois.255 I followed A.'s case over
the months preceding trial, eventually meeting her lawyer and working
peripherally with him as he prepared A.'s defense. I attended the trial
in May 1992, in which A. was convicted of involuntary manslaughter
and given a probationary sentence. In September 1995, A. agreed to
meet with her former lawyer and me to talk about her recollection of
2" See, e.g., BARBARA KINGSOLVER, ANIMAL DREAMS (1990) (although the narrator
refers to the incident as a miscarriage, the circumstances surrounding the "birth" are
similar to neonaticide in that the teenage pregnant girl told no one that she was pregnant,
delivered her six-month-old baby in the bathroom, failed to obtain medical assistance, and
secretly disposed of the body).
25' See, e.g., JUST ANOTHER GIRL ON THE IRT (Paramount 1992) (depicting a high
school student's conflicts over how to resolve her unplanned pregnancy and illustrating the
manner in which denial becomes a daily coping mechanism; an impulsive decision to
abandon a newborn becomes a comprehensible, if not a reasonable, response to an
unattended delivery).
23 For an excellent evaluation of narrative's unique role in legal scholarship, see
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991).
2 A. agreed to speak with me only on the condition that the utmost efforts be taken to
maintain her anonymity. She explained to me that, ever since the trial, all that was private
about her has become public. She feels extraordinarily vulnerable to public scrutiny and
Judgment, and worries constantly that people recognize and despise her. Therefore, I have
elected to use the initial A., which is not her first initial, but evokes the sense of public
branding experienced both by Hester Prynne in Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter,
and by this woman. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Alfred A. Knopf
1992) (1850) (fictional tale of adultress sentenced to wearing the letter "A").
25 For a description of this case, see Oberman, Control, supra note 6, at 2-4.
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the circumstances that led up to the terrifying events of November
1991.
25
At the time of our meeting, A. was twenty-one years old and
living with her grandparents in Chicago. She was extremely reluctant
to speak about the incident, and indicated that in the years since the
trial, she had not discussed that time in her life with anyone. Despite
the fact that A. thinks about what happened "almost constantly," neither
her family nor her best friend has ever asked her about what happened,
257nor attempted to explore where things went wrong.
The story A. told unfolded haltingly and nonchronologically,
almost as if we were circling around her pregnant seventeen-year-old
self from a distance, then quietly and slowly moving increasingly
closer. We began by talking about how she came to live with her uncle
and his fiancr, which is where she lived throughout most of her
pregnancy and where her baby was delivered. A.'s parents were
divorced when A. was young. A. lived primarily with her mother, but
frequent personality clashes led to A.'s temporary residence with her
father and step-mother, and also with her grandparents. When she was
fourteen, the situation at home became particularly tense. A.'s mother
became involved in a relationship, and A. frequently was left to babysit
her eleven-year-old and two-year-old sisters. After months of fighting,
A. went to live with her grandparents.
A. describes her grandparents as being "of a different
generation." Having immigrated to this country years before, they
remain balanced between two cultures, with perhaps the larger part of
their ways reflecting the reserved demeanor common to their country of
origin. A. was then, and remains today, an exceptionally quiet person,
with few close friends. She spent most of her time with her best friend,
S., a classmate of hers. She frequently slept over at S.'s house, and had
relatively little contact with her mother.259
In the summer between her sophomore and junior years of high
school, when A. was sixteen, she went to live at S.'s house for several
months. She recalls that S.'s mother was concerned because A.'s
mother did not know where A. was living and never called to see how
A. was doing. Finally, S.'s mother called A.'s mother, told her that A.
had been living with them, and asked for some financial support. This
apparently was not forthcoming, and A. moved back to her
grandparents' house. At some point shortly thereafter, A.'s uncle asked
116 Interview with A., Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 21, 1995).
257 Id.
258 Id
259 Id.
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her to come live with him and his fianc6. A. was upset and nervous
about this, as this uncle was an intimidating man regarded by everyone
in the family as having a fierce temper. Nevertheless, A. felt pressured
to accept his offer and, in the early spring of her junior year, she moved
n.260
By the time she moved into her uncle's house, A. was pregnant.
During the winter of her junior year, A. had had a brief relationship
with B., who was her second boyfriend. B. attended a different school,
and they had met each other through a mutual friend. Although they
were sexually intimate on several occasions, there was little emotional
relationship between them. When A.'s period was late, she told B. that
she suspected she might be pregnant. B. responded by breaking off the
relationship.26'
The early months of her pregnancy were filled with doubt,
denial, and confusion. A. recalls living day-to-day, believing that her
condition was not real or that it would somehow go away. She was
terrified to tell any of the adults in her life that she suspected she was
pregnant. She felt it would be impossible to tell her uncle or her
grandparents because they never communicated with her about
anything but the most superficial matters. What most terrified her was
the thought of telling her mother, since she feared that her mother
would hate her for this and banish A. from her life. Although she had
occasional contact with her father and her step-mother, their
interactions were distracted and brief, and A. was afraid that they, too,
would hate her.262
A.'s fears were based in part upon her family's reaction to her
teenage cousin Leslie's pregnancy during the previous year. Leslie was
treated with ridicule and was considered a failure by the entire family.
On occasion, relatives would warn A. not to become a "fuck up" like
Leslie. Additionally, A. recalled a conversation with her mother when
she was fifteen, in which she asked her mother how she would respond
if A. got pregnant. Her mother first inquired whether she was, and then
responded that, if A. became pregnant, she would "kick her ass and
throw her out and send her and her baby to live with her boyfriend."
Finally, A. was afraid to reveal her pregnancy because B. was African-
American. A. is Latina, and because her family often made racist
generalizations against African-Americans, she feared that her family
would be doubly angered if they learned who had fathered her baby.1
63
260 Id.
261 Id
262 id,
263 Id
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As her pregnancy advanced, A. began to hope that someone
would notice. She recalls that her face swelled with the pregnancy, and
that her chest and hips grew considerably. A. is not a heavyset person,
but she tended to wear loose clothing, which continued to fit her
throughout the pregnancy. She reports that others commented on her
chest size, and that she occasionally noticed her uncle and his fianc6
staring at her chest. Once a girlfriend in gym class said to her, "You
know, from far away, you look like you're pregnant. But up close, it's
different. "264
When A.'s family failed to acknowledge her condition, A. began
"dropping hints." A. recalls asking her mother whether she thought A.
was getting fat. Her mother paid little attention to this, although A.
remembers that on one occasion late in her pregnancy, her mother
responded to A.'s inquiry by touching her belly, feeling its roundness,
and then simply telling her she was fine. A. tried other hints as well.
She recalls repeatedly telling her mother and her father and step-mother
that she needed to find a job, a house to live in, and a salary so that she
could get insurance. No one picked up on these remarks, other than to
215ask what her hurry was.
Throughout the pregnancy, A. discussed her pregnancy only
with her friend S. "It was like our little secret," A. remarked wryly,
although she often wished that someone would find out. Once, while
hanging out in S.'s bedroom with S. and S's boyfriend, A. lifted up her
shirt and exposed her belly. S. told her to pull her shirt down.
"Someone's gonna find out," she warned A. A. recalls hoping that
someone would notice, and would call her family and just tell them,
"You know, A. is pregnant."
266
Despite the fact that she "just kept wishing and hoping someone
would say something," no one ever did until late in her pregnancy,
when A.'s mother took her to a school nurse to get a booster shot. The
nurse looked at A. and asked her whether she had made arrangements
for the baby. A. recalls shrugging and looking away in shyness and
shock, because this was the first time any adult had acknowledged her
pregnancy. The nurse said nothing further, and A. left the examining
room. Her mother noticed that A. seemed shaken up, and said to her,
jokingly, "What happened in there? You look like someone told you
were pregnant or something." A. did not know how to respond, so she
said nothing.267
264 id.
265 id.
266 Id
267 -d.
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From the fifth through the ninth months of her pregnancy, A.
worked with her father at a local warehouse. She spent considerable
time with her father and her step-mother, and on the day that she went
into labor, she was at their home. She told them that she was having
terrible cramps, and they asked her if she wanted to stay with them. It
was her friend S.'s birthday, though, and A. wanted to return to her
uncle's so that she could see S. On the bus ride home, A. became
increasingly uncomfortable. Upon arriving at her uncle's home, she
withdrew to her bedroom and labored alone until the early morning
hours of the next day, when she went into the bathroom and delivered
the baby into the toilet.268
A. did not want to talk with me about the "gory part" of her
story--about what happened and how she felt during those long hours in
the bathroom. What I know, then, is what she testified to at trial.
Although her uncle and his girlfriend were in their bedroom, which
adjoined the bathroom, A. made no noise during the labor and delivery.
She later told police officers that she was afraid of her uncle, and did
not cry out because she did not want him to find her. As soon as the
baby was delivered, A. got up from the toilet and, leaving the baby in
the water, began cleaning the blood she had lost during the delivery
from the bathroom floor and walls. After several minutes, she took the
baby out of the toilet and placed it on a towel on the floor. The baby
did not cry or move, and A. realized it was dead. She wrapped the
baby inside the towel and returned to her bedroom, where she fell
asleep cradling the bundle against her body. 6 9
Later in the day, S. called A. to see why she hadn't come by to
celebrate S.'s birthday. A. told S. what had happened, and S. told her
parents. Toward evening, the police arrived at A.'s house and asked her
uncle if they could question A. Moments later, A. was arrested for the
homicide death of her daughter.270
At trial, the state accused A. of deliberately concealing her
pregnancy and intentionally drowning the baby. The .jury nevertheless
refused to convict A. of first degree murder, and instead found A. guilty
only of involuntary manslaughter.27 '  The judge sentenced her to
probation, including one thousand hours of community service. 72
268 Id.
269 Id.
2 70 id
27' Illinois law defines involuntary manslaughter as follows:
[a] person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification
commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the
death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he
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After the judge announced his sentence, A. was stunned and
unemotional. She recalls feeling overwhelmed by the pressure of the
trial and sentencing, by the result, and by the thought that it was now
over. A.'s mother, who had attended the trial and sentencing, thought
that A. should have been more emotional at the outcome. She told A.
that she should be "grateful" at the result. A. responded quietly, "I'm
sad. I .just had a baby." Her mother and uncle left her at the courthouse
to take the bus home. As they left, her mother shouted back at her, "It's
not my fault--I'm not the one that slept with B." '273
ii. The Road to Neonaticide
A.'s story leaves many puzzling questions unanswered. In order
to understand why this entire nightmare occurred, it is necessary to
examine the various factors that contributed to A.'s actions and
reactions throughout the extended crisis. This analysis begins with
questions about A. herself, then extends to her family and support
system, and finally reaches issues of the broader community she lived
in.
Although there are many possible starting points for considering
how A.'s predicament came to be, perhaps the most obvious place to
begin is with the act of unprotected intercourse. There is nothing
exceptional about A.'s having had intercourse without contraception.
In fact, particularly for girls who are .just becoming sexually active, the
174failure to contracept is the norm. Moreover, the fact that A. was
sexually active tells us nothing about her level of maturity. As I have
summarized elsewhere, psycho-social research consistently reveals that
"for girls, adolescence is a time of acute crisis, in which self-esteem,
body image, academic confidence, and the willingness to speak out
decline precipitously., 275  This self-doubt manifests itself in many
276
venues, including adolescent sexuality. As a result, many girls
performs them recklessly, except in the case in which the cause of death consists of the
driving of a motor vehicle, in which case the person commits reckless homicide.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3(a) (West 1994).
272 Interview with A., supra note 256.
273 Id.
274 Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modem
Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, nn.270, 278 (1994)
[[[hereinafter Oberman, Turning Girls].
275 Id. at 22.
276 Id. at 65-66:
Girls express longing for emotional attachment, romance, and respect. At the
same time, they suffer enormous insecurity and diminished self-image. These two
factors are clearly interrelated--the worse girls feel about themselves, the more they
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become sexually active not out of feelings of autonomy and maturity,
but rather out of a sense that sex will bring them greater security.
Just as many girls seek sexual relations in order to obtain the
emotional and social validation they need, they frequently are harmed
by another uniquely adolescent phenomenon: the difficulty in
277
appreciating the long-range consequences of their actions.
necessarily "will" her pregnancy, nor did she even anticipate it; instead,
she experienced it with shock and denial.
By virtue of pregnancy, a teenage girl is not miraculously
transformed into a mature woman, aware of her alternatives and able to
make comprehensive, long-term plans for the pregnancy and beyond.278
Some girls may possess this capacity--they probably had it before they
conceived--but most pregnant girls do not attempt to develop these
abstract plans on their own. Instead, upon discovering that they are
pregnant, most girls seek the assistance of a parent, friend, or
counselor.279 Equipped with this support, the girls decide to have the
baby and either raise the child or give it up for adoption, or they obtain
an abortion.
As we know, A. did not seek support and did not pursue any of
these options. Instead, she shared her secret with someone who was
look to males for ratification of the women that they are becoming.... Girls negotiate
access to the fulfillment of these emotional needs by way of sex.
277 One tragic but unsurprising result of this is that teens between the ages of 15
and 19 suffer not only high rates of unplanned pregnancies, but also the highest rates
of sexually-transmitted diseases and the fastest growing rates of new cases of HIV of
any age group in the United States. Karen Hein et al., Comparison of HIV+ and HIV-
Adolescents: Risk Factors and Psychosocial Determinates, 95 PEDRIATRICS 96
(1995); Steven Shelov et al., Sexuality, Contraception, and the Media, 95
PEDRIATRICS 298 (1995); Robert M. Siegal et al., The Prevalence of Sexually
Transmitted Disease in Children and Adolescents, 95 PEDRIATRICS 1090 (1995);
James E. Strain, Jacobi Address-- Pediatrics: Where Do We Go From Here?, 95
PEDRIATRICS 924 (1995).
27' For a critical evaluation of the mature minor doctrine and the confusion and
ambiguity surrounding the law's understanding of adolescent maturity, see Michelle
Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J. LAW MED. & ETHIcs 118 (1996).
279 A substantial proportion of pregnant minors voluntarily consult with a parent
regardless of the existence of a notification requirement. See, e.g., Torres et al., Telling
Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services,
12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284, 287-88, 290 (1980) (stating that 51% of minors discussed
abortion with parents in the absence of a parental consent or notification requirement),
cited in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 464-65 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Minors 15 years old or
younger are even more likely voluntarily to discuss the abortion decision with their
parents. Id. at 290 (finding that 69% of such minors voluntarily discuss abortion with
parents), cited in Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 464-65.
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equally ill-equipped to devise a long-term plan.28° A.'s behavior
reflected a uniquely short-term calculation wherein the immediate costs
associated with acting on any of the alternatives available to her,
including seeking the advice of an adult, seemed far higher than the
costs of simply postponing any decision. Thus, she found herself
paralyzed, and she lived from day-to-day, much as she did before she
became pregnant.28'
In order to make sense of A.'s short-term calculation, it is
important to explore what A. feared would follow from taking action
regarding her pregnancy. As noted above, A. feared that her family
would abandon her if they found out she was pregnant.18  A.'s family
held traditional social, cultural, and religious values regarding teenage
sexuality and disapproved of teenage pregnancy as well as abortion.8
Thus, despite the fact that A. lived in a society relatively permissive
about sexuality, pregnancy, and childbearing by unmarried women, she
felt that her pregnancy posed a direct and serious threat to her
284immediate social network.
280 Recall the Hopfer case, described supra at notes 109 through 128 and
accompanying text. In Hopfer, like A.'s case, the defendant told her best friend that she
was pregnant. The girlfriend, who ultimately reported Hopfer to the police, testified that
Hopfer had told her that she was pregnant several months earlier, but that their
conversation never reached the issue of what Hopfer planned to do about the pregnancy.
... In his article on neonaticide, psychiatrist Phillip Resnick noted that this phenomena
occurs among passive, less mature girls:
[wiomen who seek abortions are activists who recognize reality early and promptly
attack the danger. In contrast, women who commit neonaticide often deny that they are
pregnant or assume that the child will be stillborn. No advance preparations are made
either for the care or the killing of the infant.
Resnick, supra note 83, at 1416.
282 See supra note 263 and accompanying text (regarding A.'s conversations with her
mother and other family members about out-of-wedlock births).
283 In a recent article, Latina writer Sandra Cisneros sheds light on the manner in
which such a background might shape a girl's attitude toward her body and her incipient
sexuality:
I am overwhelmed by the silence regarding Latinas and our bodies. If I, as a graduate
student, was shy about talking to anyone about my body and sex, imagine how difficult it
must be for a young girl in middle school or high school, living in a home with ... no
information other than misinformation from the girlfriends and the boyfriend. So much
guilt, so much silence, and such a yearning to be loved; no wonder young women find
themselves having sex while they are still children, having sex without sexual protection,
too ashamed to confide their feelings and fears to anyone.
Sandra Cisneros, Guadalupe the Sex Goddess, Ms., July/August 1996, 43, 44-45.
284 There are several reasons for believing that A.'s fear and her decision to avoid
making a decision are frighteningly common tendencies among adolescents. Certainly, we
know that teens commonly fear the repercussions that might follow should their parents
find out that they are sexually active. It is largely in response to the negative consequences
that might follow from this fear that the law facilitates minors' access to family planning,
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, and abortion. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
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In a curious way, one might find evidence to support A.'s fear in
the fact that no one noticed her pregnancy. Although in A.'s case, as in
virtually all of the discussions of neonaticide, the media and the
criminal justice system viewed A. as having "concealed" her
pregnancy, no one ever questioned how she managed to accomplish
this .2 " The fact that those most intimately involved in the lives of
women who commit neonaticide claim not to have noticed that the
women were pregnant tells us something about them and about their
relationship to the women.
A. was neither morbidly obese nor inventive--she simply grew
bigger and bigger, and nobody commented on her condition. A. was
worried that, once she had her baby, there would be nowhere for her to
live. Given her shifting living arrangements, this fear was not at all
irrational. A.'s remarks indicate reason to believe that several, if not all,
622 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional a law requiring a minor girl seeking an abortion to
obtain the consent of both parents before the procedure could be administered); Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (granting minors privacy rights, including
those related to procreation and contraception). But cf. Peck v. Califano, 454 F. Supp. 484
(D. Utah 1977) (holding that restrictions on minor's ability to be surgically sterilized are
constitutional); Voe v. Califano, 434 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Conn. 1977) (same).
Throughout the 1980s, I served as a volunteer counselor at various Planned
Parenthood clinics. During that time, I was struck by the number of teenage girls who,
upon happily learning that they were pregnant, asked whether we would be notifying their
parents. I always responded that their medical status was entirely confidential, but that
their families would most certainly discover that they were pregnant sooner or later. Still,
even the girls who were not worried about their ability to care for a child dreaded having
their parents find out that they had had sex. Many girls shared the belief that, if and when
they disclosed their pregnancy, they would be kicked out of their homes.
285 The media descriptions of neonaticide often attribute the defendant's success in
concealing her pregnancy to the fact that she wore loose clothing or was somewhat obese.
Several of the articles indicate that the defendants invented explanations for their changing
body shape--telling others that they had a tumor, or that they had recently gained weight
due to a job in an ice cream parlor or to prescription oral contraceptives. See, e.g., Illinois
v. Ehlert, 654 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Il. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 660 N.E.2d 1274 (1995)
(stating that the defendant told her hairdresser, who testified as a defense witness, that she
had a cancerous tumor and "she had been unable to get the hospital to have it removed"
when the hairdresser told defendant that she looked pregnant).
Nevertheless, the vast maiority of neonaticide cases in my sample involved
defendants whose pregnant bodies had been visible to many different people. There were
many whose parents passed them in the halls of their homes and saw them at meal times,
whose classroom teachers and gym coaches watched them over the course of semesters,
whose teammates showered with them in locker rooms, and whose boyfriends saw them
and even slept with them in narrow twin beds of college dormitory rooms. See Tsing,
supra note 233, at 286-88 (describing the 1985 case of Donna Sloan, who left her
boyfriend asleep in her dormitory room twin bed while she delivered a full-term newborn
in the dormitory bathroom); Janine DeFao, Woman is Charged in Baby Case,
SAcRAmENTo BEE, Jan. 10, 1996, at BI (noting that the defendant's husband said he did
not know she was pregnant, perhaps because she was overweight).
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of the adults in her immediate family suspected that A. was pregnant,
yet found it easier not to mention it.
286
Whether they chose not to intervene out of politeness,
uncertainty, embarrassment, or a fear that, once the issue was
identified, they would be forced to become more involved in A.'s life,
their failure to reach out meant that A. lived in a world of silence and
isolation--a world not of her own making. The deafening silence of
those around her had the effect of reaffirming A.'s strategy of passivity
and denial. Her refusal to acknowledge her pregnancy and her vain
efforts to prompt others to take the initiative in addressing her situation
were mirrored by the responses of those around her.
The final questions that haunt A.'s story stem from A.'s failure
to act. Given her conviction that her family would not welcome this
new addition, she might have elected to terminate the pregnancy, to
arrange for the baby to be adopted, or to move out and become a single
parent. A., however, was extraordinarily ambivalent about the
pregnancy itself. To the extent that she felt unnoticed and unloved by
her family (and there is every reason to believe that this was the case),
A. may have viewed the baby as a potential source of unconditional
love.287
A second possible reason for A.'s inaction has to do with the
numerous factors that limit the accessibility and attractiveness of all of
the available options. Given that A. could not imagine her family
adjusting to the fact that she was pregnant, and that she was convinced
that having the baby would shatter the fragile bonds that held her
286 Interview with A., supra note 256. In addition to A.'s mother's occasional cryptic
references to pregnancy, A. had a conversation with her step-mother sometime after her
arrest in which A.'s step-mother told her that she and her father had noticed that A.'s
"stomach was getting bigger." Her step-mother added that she noticed that A. used to fall
asleep with some frequency while at their home, and that her father reported that A. had
napped while at work. Her step-mother reminded her of a time, several months earlier,
when she had said to A., "You know, girls can get pregnant the first time they have sex."
She told A. that she had been trying to broach the conversation, but that A. had not
responded so she did not push her. A.'s step-mother also told her that, when they asked her
to stay at their house on the day that she was in labor, it was because they suspected that
A.'s "time" had come.
... Some recent studies among African-American teens indicate that, for poor Black
adolescents, teenage pregnancy and parenting are viewed as developmentally appropriate
and as rites of passage into adulthood. Kari Sandven & Michael D. Resnick, Informal
Adoption Among Black Adolescent Mothers, 60 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 210, 211
(1990); see also Evelyn Landry et al., Teen Pregnancy in New Orleans: Factors that
Differentiate Teens who Deliver, Abort, and Successfully Contracept, 15 J. YOUTH &
ADOLESCENCE 259 (1986) (explaining study indicating that many black teens became
pregnant because they wanted to have a child).
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family network intact, adoption and single parenting did not seem like
real possibilities to her.
A.'s failure to consider adoption as a potential solution to her
dilemma is not atypical, particularly for a young woman with her
background. First, less than 3% of all adolescents resolve an
unplanned pregnancy by opting to relinquish their children.28 Second,
the girls and young women who do give their children up for adoption
can generally be described as those young women who have the
information necessary to do so; have made rather definitive decisions
about their future in terms of education and employment (and, thus, see
raising a child as an obstacle to the completion of those goals); and
have the clear and definitive support of family or friends (specifically
in that the family's cultural background and beliefs do not forbid such a
choice). Thus, most of the young women who fit this profile are
relatively well-to-do Caucasian girls with supportive families who are
committed to the girl's future success.289
Clearly, A.'s situation does not match the general profile of the
young woman who chooses adoption for her child. It is not evident that
A. even considered adoption as an option. As unbelievable as this may
sound to some, acquiring information about how to give up a child for
adoption is not easily obtained in general (as I discovered while trying
to find the information myself), let alone in a community that
discourages it as a solution. Moreover, A. had no definitive plans for
her future. She refused to accept that the pregnancy was real and that
she had to choose a means of handling the dilemma. Finally, A. did not
have the support of her family or a stable living situation.
The assertion that A.'s behavior regarding adoption was not
unusual is further supported by evidence about teens' attitudes
concerning adoption. When teens were asked how they would resolve
a pregnancy, only 23% indicated that they definitely or probably would
relinquish their child, whereas 40% said they would not. Studies show
that, among pregnant teens, "adoption is the least discussed option,"
289 Kerry J. Daly, Adolescent Perceptions of Adoption: Implications for Resolving an
Unplanned Pregnancy, 25 YOUTH & Soc. 330, 330 (1994).
289 See Christine A. Bachrach et al., Relinquishment of Premarital Births: Evidence
from National Survey Data, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 27, 27 (1992) (according to 1982 and
1988 National Survey of Family Growth data, the decision to relinquish a child is
positively associated with being a caucasian girl with a well-educated mother, being in
school at the time of conception, and having no labor force experience); Rosalind J.
Dworkin et al., Parenting or Placing: Decisionmaking by Pregnant Teens, 25 YOUTH &
Soc. 75, 76-77 (1993) (citing studies showing that placement for adoption is associated
with sociodemographic characteristics such as race, class, and education level, with
poorer, minority girls being less likely to place their children).
2004]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
and only 13% of the girls interviewed "indicated that they knew how to
go about placing a baby up for adoption."2'9
Abortion, on the other hand, might have been an option. A
woman who successfully obtains an abortion has overcome numerous
obstacles--obstacles that may range from financial and geographic to
psychological and religious. In order to obtain the most affordable and
least medically risky abortion, a woman must acknowledge that she is
pregnant within the first twelve weeks and decide to terminate her
pregnancy within that time.2 9' As Resnick noted in his article, the girls
who commit neonaticide tend to lack the maturity and responsibility to
take the necessary actions of locating an abortion clinic, gathering the
•.  292
necessary funds, and transporting themselves to and from the clinic.
If the girl is a minor, she also may face the intimidating problem of
mandatory parental notification, depending on her state of residence.293
Even if state law does not require parental notification, there is such
extensive misinformation among minors about their rights to
confidentiality that they often assume that their parents will be told
about any reproductive health care they request.294  Of course, these
barriers are overcome by those girls and women who become pregnant
and who ultimately obtain abortions. But the fact that many obtain
abortions does not minimize the significance of the barriers. Those
290 Daly, supra note 288, at 330.
291 Although it sounds rather obvious, this actually may be the biggest hurdle for
neonaticidal girls. As I have noted, they are consumed with denial of their pregnancy and
denial of the inevitable need to take action. Many come from families that, in addition to
opposing premarital sex and contraception, view abortion as murder. As a result, the
pregnant girl may be ambivalent or even opposed to abortion, and therefore the abortion
option may generate enormous internal dissonance. Thus, a course of action that may
seem logical and easy is rendered less so when viewed through the psychological lens of
one whose entire social network and cultural identity may be threatened by it.
192 Resnick, supra note 83, at 76. After the first trimester, the woman will require an
inpatient procedure, which is much harder to come by and far more costly. For a
description of the limitations on access to abortion, see Carole A. Corns, Note, The Impact
of Public Abortion Funding Decisions on Indigent Women: A Proposal to Reform State
Statutory Constitutional Abortion Funding Provisions, 24 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 371, 384-88
(1991).
... See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding constitutionality of
mandatory parental notification provisions for minors seeking abortions); City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (same); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of
Kansas v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (same); H.L. v. Matheson, 445 U.S. 959 (1980)
(same).
'94 See supra note 284 (describing the author's experiences volunteering at Planned
Parenthood); see also Tina L. Cheng et al., Confidentiality in Health Care: A Survey of
Knowledge, Perceptions, and Attitudes Among High School Students, 269 JAMA 1404
(1993) (concluding that a majority of adolescents have health concerns that they wish to
keep confidential, and that a high percentage of these adolescents indicate that they would
not seek health services because of these concerns).
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women who commit neonaticide represent some small fragment of the
295
number of women who find the barriers to abortion too steep.
In light of this analysis, A.'s failure to obtain an abortion is not
surprising. Likewise, her failure to make plans for the baby, either
through parenting or adoption, is viewed more easily as a part of her
general failure to take action--a failing that was reinforced by her
family and by all of those who surrounded A. There simply was no one
around who cared enough about A. to make sure that the horrible,
inevitable disaster did not come to pass.
This story certainly is incomplete. There were family members
at trial whose sympathetic demeanor may have contributed to the
favorable verdict. There was testimony from witnesses who spoke on
A.'s behalf, such as her employer from a high school vocational
program, who testified to her quiet, yet extremely responsible and
competent manner, and an emergency room nurse, who testified to A.'s
distressed state upon admission, during which time she repeatedly
asked for her baby. Yet even the basic facts suffice to permit an
understanding of the challenges inherent in assessing culpability in
such a case.
The language of murder statutes varies across jurisdictions, but
these laws generally center on the defendant's intent to kill or intent to
do serious bodily injury. 96 Although it is possible to view A.'s failure
to take action during her pregnancy as tantamount to an intent to harm
or kill her baby, this interpretation is far from dispositive. One might
just as easily reason that, having never truly acknowledged her
pregnancy and the need to take action, by definition, A. never
formulated an intent to harm the child. The circumstances surrounding
this crime, extending back for long months prior to the child's death
and encompassing the roles played by others in A.'s life, complicate the
process of determining responsibility and allocating blame. Because
A.'s background and story are typical of the neonaticide cases in my
295 The major barriers are financial and geographic. A recent Florida case involving a
20-year-old woman named Kawana Ashley serves as a grim reminder of these barriers.
Ashley could not afford a mid-trimester abortion and was determined to terminate the
pregnancy. Finally, when she was seven months pregnant, Ashley obtained a handgun and
shot herself in the stomach in order to end the pregnancy. The state charged her with third
degree murder, but eventually a judge threw out the murder charges, only allowing a
charge of manslaughter to stand. See, e.g., David Barstow & Tim Roche, Life Appeared to
Hold Few Options, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 9, 1994, at Bl-B2 (noting that Ashley
was unemployed and ill-equipped to handle a newborn); Craig Pittman, Abortion it may
be, Murder, no, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 24, 1995, at Al (noting that the death of the
baby was caused by its premature birth, not the bullet wound directly).
296 See infra notes 367 through 379 and accompanying text (describing first degree
murder charges as they apply to neonaticide).
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sample, her story helps to illuminate the ambivalence these cases
generate when they reach the criminal justice system.
b. Exploring the Circumstances Surrounding Infanticide
As Section III of this Article described, the defendants in
modem infanticide cases tend to be perceived as either mad or bad.297
Yet, because these defendants only infrequently plead insanity, this
dichotomy reveals far more about the source of jury sympathy than it
does about the women's actual mental health status.2 98 The tendency
toward mercy in these cases reflects not so much a legal conclusion as
an intuitive sense that the mother had diminished capacity. This sense
permits juries and judges to reach a merciful ruling without ever
expressly acknowledging the circumstances in the woman's life that
contributed to her supposed diminished capacity.
By all accounts, we are not a society that recoils from holding
accountable individuals of limited mental capacity who commit
crimes. 299 Thus, there is a puzzle in our tendency to forgive infanticide
defendants their crimes. I believe the answer to this puzzle lies in our
tacit awareness of and sensitivity to the circumstances that surround
infanticide--the circumstances of motherhood.
Although there are at least four basic infanticidal scenarios,
reflecting a spectrum of mental health vulnerabilities, there is one
constant across all of these situations: all of these cases involve women
who, at the time of their children's deaths, were their primary
caretakers. As much as these cases are about mental health
vulnerabilities, they also are about motherhood. Many commentators
have written about the structure of motherhood, the half-truths of the
cultural myths of bliss surrounding it, and society's resistance to
acknowledging the burdens and difficulties of mothering.3°° The work
297 See supra notes 194 through 240 and accompanying text (discussing the mad/bad
dichotomy).
298 Id.
299 See PERLIN, supra note 43, at 192 (referring to infanticide defendants as "empathy
outliers" in order to make the point that, for the most part, the American criminal justice
system does not excuse criminals on the grounds of mental capacity). The Supreme Court
has held that evidence of a defendant's mental capacity is relevant to his culpability. Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 304 (1989). Perlin notes that "relmpirical inquiries, however,
illuminate society's degree of ambivalence about this proposition." PERLIN supra note 43,
at 213. Scholars express concerns that such evidence may suggest to a jury that the
defendant continues to pose a risk to society. Moreover, "fact-finders demand that
defendants conform to popular, common-sensical visual images of 'looking crazy.' " Id. at
214. Thus, when they do not conform to such popular images, the jury often will opt for
capital punishment regardless of the defendant's actual mental capacity. Id. at 213- 15.
300 For several thorough and informative overviews of this subject, see MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SExuAL FAMILY AND OTHER
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associated with parenting tends to fall overwhelmingly upon mothers.
In her landmark article, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for
Parental Equality, Professor Czpanskiy explores the division of labor
within the home by utilizing a military metaphor: fathers volunteer for
service, whereas mothers are conscripted.30 ' She notes that "[t]he
average father living with his child spends less than ten minutes a day
caring for his child, while the average mother spends several hours,"
and that "[t]hese figures do not change significantly in families where
both parents are fully employed outside the home."30 2 Moreover, "in
over 80% of families with two parents and young children, mothers do
far more child care and housework than do fathers.0
03
The deaths in infanticide cases result in part from this division
of labor, and from society's fervent commitment to the notion that it is
normal and healthy for mothers to care for their babies in isolation in
the home during the early months and years of their babies' lives.
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TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Katharine K. Baker, Taking Care of our
Daughters, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (reviewing FINEMAN, supra); Mary
E. Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 193-94, 203-23 (1992) [hereinafter Becker, Maternal Feelings]; M.
Rivka Polatnick, Why Men Don't Rear Children: A Power Analysis, in MOTHERING:
ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORIES (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983); and Carol Sanger, M is for the
Many Things, I S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 15 (1992). The persistence of a norm of
compulsory maternal altruism generates a societal expectation that mothers are fully
accountable for their children's well-being. The stress that accompanies the fulfillment of
that expectation is extraordinary, even for a woman with considerable emotional and
financial support. Adrienne Rich's work on motherhood describes the pernicious effect of
these expectations:
[wihatever the known facts ... it is still assumed that the mother is "with the child." It
is she, finally, who is held accountable for her children's health, the clothes they wear,
their behavior at school, their intelligence and general development.... Even when she
herself is trying to cope with an environment beyond her control--malnutrition, rats, lead-
paint poisoning, the drug traffic, racism--in the eyes of society the mother is the child's
environment. The worker can unionize, go out on strike; mothers are divided from each
other in homes, tied to their children by compassionate bonds; our wildcat strikes have
most often taken the form of physical or mental breakdown.
RICH, supra note 46, at 53. The cumulative evidence of infanticide in modern
America provides ample evidence of these maternal "wildcat strikes."
301 Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality,
38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991).
wId at 1435.
30' Id. at 1452. This extra load of work, particularly when undertaken by women who
are fully employed outside of the home, has been termed "the second shift." ARLIE
HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME
(1989). When results of major studies are averaged together, the extra workload of a
working mother amounts to an extra month of 24 hour days each year. Czapanskiy, supra
note 301, at 1452.
304 As the authors of an article on depression in postpartum women conclude,
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Consider the impact of thc structure of motherhood on women in each
of the four categories of mental health vulnerabilities associated with
infanticide. It is obvious that women suffering from postpartum
psychosis, with its characteristic symptoms of sleep disturbances,
hallucinations, delusions, violent behavior, and frequent mood shifts,
cannot tend to their infants' needs without assistance.0 5 Recall Sheryl
Massip, whose husband recognized that she needed help and sent her to
stay with her mother for a night.306 Nevertheless, when she returned
home from her mother's in the morning, she once again was expected to
be her baby's full-time caretaker.
This expectation was not unique to the Massip family. There is
a false dichotomy inherent in societal assumptions about motherhood--
one is either wholly capable of assuming the tasks of motherhood, or
wholly incapable. The Massips knew that the latter choice--
acknowledging that Sheryl was incapable of mothering--brought with it
severe censure. Sheryl would have been stigmatized as a bad mother.
Both she and her husband would have had to alter their expectations of
parenthood dramatically, either by arranging for the father to become
the primary caretaker, or by finding (and paying) someone else to care
for their child. Hence there were overwhelming social, economic, and
interpersonal incentives for everyone involved to pretend that Sheryl
was capable of caring for her infant alone, for hours at a time, even
though her mother, her doctor, her husband, and ultimately the judge all
recognized that she never should have been entrusted with that task.
Infanticides committed by women who are chronically mentally
disabled, yet living and parenting independently, present very similar
issues. Even without a specific definition of mental disability, it is self-
evident that some women, by virtue of their mental health status, are
less equipped than others to adapt to the challenge of motherhood. The
case of Simone Ayton provides an example of this.0 7 At the time she
killed her infant son, Ayton was a mildly retarded, manic depressive
woman with cerebral palsy, living alone without financial or emotional
our cultural myths of 'blissful motherhood' and parenthood as 'doing what comes
naturally' keep us from acknowledging how difficult and potentially painful the
adiustment to parenthood can be.... [We are a society which provides increasingly little
opportunity to learn parenting skills and roles before parenthood and few available
supports once parenthood is reached.
Atkinson & Rickel, supra note 141, at 215.
305 See supra notes 140 through 154 and accompanying text for a detailed description
of postpartum psychosis.
'06 See supra notes 150 through 154 and accompanying text.307 Laurence Hammack, Woman Accused of Murder; 7-Month-Old Son Died in
Bathtub, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Dec. 6, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Hammack,
Accused].
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support from either the baby's father or her family.3 8 When her son
was twenty-two days old, Ayton brought him to a community hospital,
where he was diagnosed as suffering from dehydration and fever.3 °9
She claimed he would not eat because he did not like her. This
triggered a custody hearing, at which the judge ordered the child placed
in foster care based upon his finding that Ayton was "emotionally
unable to care for the child.
310
Ayton spent the next several months working to meet the state's
requirements for reunification with her child. She ultimately earned the
support of her caseworkers, and her child was returned to her
custody."' Less than two months later, Ayton's son was dead.32 Ayton
first told authorities that she had been bathing her son when he slipped
from her arms and fell into the water."' Later, she admitted to a
detective that she was frustrated with the child's crying, so she held him
under the water until he stopped struggling.
31 4
It is difficult to view Ayton as solely responsible for her son's
death. At the very least, one might be inclined also to blame the state
for returning Ayton's son to her without supervision. After the fact,
however, state officials insisted that they had no other option under the
law, and that they made similar decisions to release children to their
parents every day.
Here again, one sees the effect of the binary structure of
motherhood: either Ayton was fully capable of mothering in complete
isolation, or she was wholly incapable of so doing. Either option is
absurdly extreme. It seems at least plausible that Ayton, who was able
to live and function independently, could have parented her son if she
had had such help, as through an assisted living situation or even a day
care program."' Yet, because the work of parenting is entirely
Laurence Hammack, Roanoke Mom Admits Drowning Son; Pleads No Contest to
Infant's Murder, ROANOKE TIMEs & WORLD NEWS, Apr. 8, 1995, at Al [hereinafter
Hammack, Roanoke Mom].309 d.
310 id
311 Id.
312 Id.
33 Hammack, Accused, supra note 307, at Al.
314 id.
3," There is a rich literature describing support systems that enable parents with
mental disabilities to cope with and even excel at child-rearing. Linda Dowdney & David
Skuse, Parenting Provided by Adults with Mental Retardation, 34 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHIATRY & ALLIED DISCIPLINES 25-47 (1993); see also Mona Hughes, Group Offers
Problem-Solving Guide With Fquipment for Disabled Parents, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb.
15, 1996, at 12 (describing a Berkeley, California organization called "Through the
Lookingglass," which specializes in clinical and support services, including training and
research, for families with disabilities).
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privatized, there are no readily available intermediate options between
full custody and no custody. As a result, an entirely foreseeable and
preventable death occurred.
Ayton was charged with first degree murder and chose to plead
guilty to a reduced charge of second degree murder.316 In the
sentencing hearing, her attorney urged the judge to spare Ayton a
lengthy sentence, arguing that Ayton was not solely responsible for her
son's death. The judge reduced the standard forty year sentence to
eighteen years."'
This same ambivalence also is generated by the cases involving
infanticidal women who suffer from affective disorders with
postpartum onset." ' Of all infanticide cases, these cases involving
women who kill their children in seemingly unprovoked displays of
violence would seem to be the least likely to engender a sympathetic
response. Yet there is an increasing sense of ambivalence about these
cases as well. This ambivalence arises as those who are .judging these
women come to understand the sociocultural and economic influences
on these women's lives and the way that these women's pasts impair
their capacity to respond appropriately to the pressures associated with
being the sole caretaker for an infant.
For example, recall the Pixley case, in which the judge
implicitly defended his lenient sentence for a defendant who suffocated
her infant on the basis of the defendant's socioeconomic status and
abusive childhood.319 Although he did not condone her act, he found
too simplistic the notion that a nineteen-year-old woman who had
endured years of abuse at her parents' hands, and who, on scant income,
spent her days and nights caring for two children under age two, was
solely to blame when she silenced her screaming, hungry baby with a
blanket.1
20
Perhaps the most ironic source of ambivalence in infanticide
cases involves women who kill their children while suffering from an
addiction-related disorder. Given the "war on drugs" and the societal
tendency to view addiction as a disfavored lifestyle choice rather than
an illness, one might expect that judges and juries would not be
particularly sympathetic to women who killed their children while they
316 Hammack, Roanoke Mom, supra note 308, at Al.
317 Laurence Hammack, Motherhood Ends In Prison, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, Sept. 16, 1995, Al.
38 See supra notes 163 through 183 and accompanying text for a description of this
category of cases.
311 See supra notes 203 through 218 and accompanying text.
320 Duggan, supra note 204, at Al.
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were using drugs."' In reality, though, women who kill their children
while abusing drugs tend to have lives that are so desperate that their
children's deaths come to seem almost foreordained.322 The more aware
a judge or .jury is of the circumstances surrounding these women's lives
and their children's deaths, the less likely it is that they will find that
these women intentionally brought about the deaths of their children.323
Infanticide deaths are caused not simply by the mother's sudden
and/or severe mental disturbance, but also by the failure of those
around her to recognize that the mother was ill and that she desperately
needed relief from the twenty-four hour a day care that her infant was
demanding of her. Our ambivalence in punishing these women comes
not so much from our sensitivity to issues of diminished capacity as
from our awareness that the mothers had precious few options. At the
time they killed their children, all of these women were emotionally,
intellectually, socially, and/or financially unable to cope with the
demands of motherhood in isolation--motherhood as it is structured in
modem American society.
V. TOWARD RECONCILIATION: A COHERENT
APPROACH TO INFANTICIDE
A critical analysis of circumstances surrounding infanticide helps to
explain what might otherwise seem to be an incomprehensible act.
Likewise, the sense of pathos these stories generate helps to explain the
perennial ambivalence that accompanies official efforts to sanction
these women. Indeed, it seems that much of the ambivalence
321 For discussions of substance abuse as a "disease," see Gordis Enoch, Critical Issues
in Alcoholism Research, 30 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 497 (1995); Gordis Enoch, The National
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism: Past Accomplishments and Future Goals, 19
ALCOHOL HEALTH & RESEARCH WORLD 5 (1995); Douglas Frans, Social Work, Social
Science, and the Disease Concept: New Directions for Addiction Treatment, 21 J. Soc. &
Soc. WELFARE 71 (1994); and Harvey Siegal, The Strengths Perspective of Case
Management: A Promising Inpatient Substance Abuse Treatment Enhancement, 27 J.
PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 67 (1995).
121 See supra notes 184 through 193 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
psycho-social status and life circumstances that correlate with drug addiction in women.
It is important to note that the majority of cases involving an infant's death at the hand
of a substance abusing mother also involve the mother's male partner. These cases
generally involve child abuse as well as neglect. For purposes of this study, however, I am
considering only those cases in which the mother alone is accused of her infant's demise.
These cases tend to involve neglect, rather than abuse. At Least 2,000, supra note 2, at 21.
323 An example of this is the case of Pamela Rae Stewart, a pregnant woman so
intimidated by her partner's abusive behavior that she failed to obtain prompt medical
care, despite the fact that she was hemorrhaging. Oberman, Sex, Drugs, supra note 184, at
505-06.
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associated with allocating blame for infanticide grows out of a tacit
communal awareness that the tasks of motherhood can be oppressively
difficult. Therefore, the legacy of these stories is one of profound
uncertainty about culpability--uncertainty that is manifested in the
inconsistent treatment these cases receive in the media, and more
importantly, in the criminal justice system.
In this section, I will explore culpability in two distinct
manners. First, I undertake a broad-scaled analysis of the societal
factors that contribute to infanticide and propose structural reforms
that, if implemented, could help to prevent these deaths. Second, given
that these reforms are long-term in nature and unlikely to take effect
any time soon, I propose an alternative construction of the crimes of
neonaticide and infanticide under current American law.
A. The Structural Components of Neonaticide and Infanticide
Discussing the factors that lead women to the edge of desperation
necessarily invites a critical analysis of the structure of motherhood--an
analysis that extends far beyond the scope of this Article.324 Yet,
without at least noting the societal mechanisms that contribute to
infanticide, any attempt at legal reform only deepens the legal system's
involvement in the dialectic of moral outrage and legal mercy, while
leaving unaltered the various factors that contribute to the persistence
of these crimes.
In Southeast Asia, infanticide is widely acknowledged as a by-
product of cultural norms that devalue females. Deep-seated practices
such as dowry contribute to a distinct preference for sons, who will
bring money into the family upon marriage, as opposed to daughters,
who not only leave their families of origin upon marriage, but who take
considerable wealth with them when they leave. Those who have
endeavored to reduce female infanticide in these societies have
recognized the manner in which these cultural practices create
incentives to kill baby girls. Therefore, anti-infanticide policies in
these cultures have undertaken, albeit with limited success, to protect
and promote the status of girls and women and have endeavored to
324 For several excellent discussions of the institution of motherhood and the law, see
FINEMAN, supra note 300; Baker, supra note 300; Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note
300; Czapanskiy, supra note 301; Roberts, Motherhood, supra note 233; Dorothy E.
Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER
& L. 1 (1993); and Sanger, supra note 300.
3 See John Van Willigen & V.C. Channa, Law, Custom, and Crimes Against
Women: The Problem of Dowry Death in India, 50 HUM. ORGANIZATION 369 (1991)
(describing the custom of dowry as it operates in modem India).
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dismantle systems such as dowry that perpetuate female
subordination.326
In this country, infanticide occurs against a similar cultural
backdrop of normative behavior surrounding sex, pregnancy, and
motherhood. Just as the stories surrounding neonaticide and infanticide
are distinct, so, too, are the societal norms contributing to each. As in
the preceding sections, my analysis will begin with the societal
contribution to neonaticide, and then turn to the structures underlying
infanticide.
1. The Culture of Neonaticide. Self-Esteem, Sex, and Pregnancy
Although infanticide can be seen in part as a horrifying by-
product of the structure of motherhood, it is far more difficult to isolate
the structural factors that contribute to neonaticide. Indeed, many of
the factors that contributed to neonaticide in past centuries would seem
to be greatly diminished today. The twentieth century has witnessed a
considerable expansion of options for women with regard to pregnancy
and single motherhood. First, the common law sanctions relating to
nonmarital children have been reversed.327  Many speculate that a
primary motivation for neonaticide throughout history was the stigma
of illegitimacy. This stigma permanently attached to the unmarried
mother and her child, thereby diminishing their status in society
generally, and limiting their access to employment, housing, and
subsequent marriage. 8  Second, the past century has witnessed the
expansion of child support laws to include men who fathered children
out of wedlock. Despite the fact that these laws are notoriously under-
126 See id. at 374 (noting that the "criminalization of dowry may have been a
politically useful symbol, but it has not curtailed the practice"). Sharon K. Hom's article
on female infanticide in China provides another example of the law's limited capacity to
reverse the incentives that contribute to a society's devaluation of female children. Horn,
supra note 66, at 271; see also Susan Greenhalgh & Jiali Li, Engendering Reproductive
Policy and Practice in Peasant China: For a Feminist Demography of Reproduction, 20
SIGNS 601 (1995) (examining the demographic consequences of reproductive politics
inherent in China's one-child policy).
3217 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized children born outside of wedlock as "persons"
under the Equal Protection Clause in 1968. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968);
Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968). In subsequent
decades, the Court slowly has expanded the legal rights of nonmarital children.
Nevertheless, at least one contemporary source demonstrates the continuing legacy of
discrimination against children born outside of wedlock. MARTHA T. ZNGO & KEVIN E.
EARLY, NAMELESS PERSONS: LEGAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-MARITAL CHILDREN
IN THE UNITED STATES (1994).
... For a description of the legal harms historically inflicted upon children born
outside of wedlock, see HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1971); AND ZINGO & EARLY, supra note 327, at 15-27.
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enforced, unmarried mothers have the same legal entitlement to child
support as do married mothers.329 Finally, the advent of effective
contraception, accompanied by safe and legal abortion, has undeniably
reduced the impulse toward neonaticide.33 °
The persistence of neonaticide therefore remains somewhat of a
puzzle. The neonaticide stories hint more at individual and familial
dysfunction than at broader societal disjuncture. At the individual
level, the girls involved in neonaticide cases possess so little self-
esteem that they are incapable of acting to protect themselves. Their
insecurity almost certainly contributes to their becoming pregnant in
the first place, and it leads to their paralysis once pregnant. Diminished
self-esteem is commonplace for adolescent girls and seems to be a
331product of the socialization process by which girls grow into women.
Its manifestations include a growing reluctance to speak out and take
initiative, and a desire to be perceived as "feminine" or compliant.332
These characteristics help place in context the passivity of the girls who
commit neonaticide.
Although less is known about the families of the girls who
commit neonaticide, it seems likely that they, too, play a considerable
role in contributing to these crimes. Even if society has halted the legal
discrimination against children born out of wedlock, there still is
considerable shame and guilt associated with a teenager's pregnancy.
The fear that these girls consistently express--that they will be exiled
from their families as a result of their pregnancy--speaks volumes about
family expectations. In an era when the majority of adolescents are
329 Cf. Levy, 391 U.S. at 70 (granting same rights to children born out of wedlock as
those born to married parents, under the Equal Protection Clause); Glona, 391 U.S. at 75-
76 (same).
330 One brief study attempts to prove this by using statistics gathered from the
National Center on Vital Statistics. David Lester, Roe v. Wade Was Followed by a
Decrease in Neonatal Homicide, 267 JAMA 3027 (1992). Of course, it is important to
remember that legalizing abortion does not guarantee access to abortion. See supra notes
291 through 295 and accompanying text (regarding the barriers to abortion). Note also that
the extent to which abortion may be viewed as a successful strategy for preventing
infanticide obviously depends on whether one views abortion as murder. From the
perspective of those who equate abortion with murder, its legalization provides a false
cover for what might otherwise be viewed as infanticide. From this perspective, we still
have relatively high rates of infanticide, some legal, and some illegal.
"' One survey found that, among elementary school children, 60% of girls and 69%
of boys felt happy with themselves, but by high school, the numbers had dropped to 29%
of girls and 46% of boys. Although both boys and girls experience difficulty in
adolescence, girls consistently feel worse about themselves. Oberman, Turning Girls,
supra note 274, at 56.
332 Id. at 57.
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sexually active,"' it remains the case that the majority of parents would
prefer their daughters to be "good girls. 334 Thus, there is considerable
pressure associated with confronting one's parents with the news that
one not only has had sex, but also is pregnant.
At a somewhat more abstract level, these cases show evidence
of families that are remarkably disinterested in their children's lives.
Those who commit neonaticide lack relationships with open, caring,
reliable adults--adults who will recognize the signs of pregnancy,
confront the girls about their situations, and initiate the difficult
conversations about the alternative resolutions to pregnancy, including
motherhood. This isolation from loved ones, even within the home,
clearly constitutes a structural factor that contributes to neonaticide.
At a societal level, there are both symbolic and pragmatic
factors that contribute to neonaticide. The repeal of common law
discriminatory provisions against nonmarital children has not been
accompanied by a whole-hearted embrace of the practice of single
parenting. Indeed, society is rife with negative societal
characterizations of single mothers, welfare mothers, and teenage
mothers.335 Contemporary social pundits now recommend that the
United States revive "illegitimacy" as a concept and use stigma as a
tool in the battle against teenage pregnancy.3  Even President Clinton,
... See Teenage Pregnancy Myths Debunked, NEWS (The Alan Guttmacher Institute,
New York, N.Y. and Washington, D.C.), June 7, 1994, at 2 (most teenagers, regardless of
race, income, gender, or religious affiliation, begin to have sex in their middle-to-late
teens). For a fascinating exploration of the myths and realities surrounding teenage sexual
activity, pregnancy, and related policy-making, see KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS
CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY (1996).
34 The persistence of slang terms like slut, for which there are no male equivalents, is
but one indication that the double standard for sexual behavior is alive and well. Oberman,
Turning Girls, supra note 274, at 15- 19.
... This is perhaps best exemplified by the series of responses to Vice President Dan
Quayle's condemnation of fictional television character Murphy Brown for being a single
mother. Despite the initial ridicule generated by his remarks (the character was
impregnated by her ex-husband, and thus, the pro-life Quayle's opposition to her
becoming a single mother seemed to be an ironic endorsement of abortion), over time,
many have voiced their support for his position. See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan
Quayle Was Right, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 1993, at 47 (describing the Dan
Quayle/Murphy Brown debate and arguing that single motherhood and divorce are
harmful to children). For a thorough critique of these views, see Judith Stacey, The New
Family Values Crusaders: Dan Quayle's Revenge, THE NATION, July 25, 1994, at 119.
336 These commentators seldom explain how they think single women should resolve
their pregnancies. Their political conservatism usually makes it taboo to mention abortion,
yet the reality is that many of the men who impregnate them are neither willing nor able to
support the child. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Defining Deviancy Up: The New
Assault on Bourgeois Life, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 1993, at 20 (discussing the
problem of single mothers, but offering no alternative suggestion). For a thoughtful
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in his 1995 State of the Union address, claimed that "[t]he epidemic of
teen pregnancies and births where there is no marriage" is "our most
serious social problem., 3 7 Certainly,.these characterizations contribute
to the sense of shame and anxiety these girls experience as they face (or
rather, deny) their options.
In addition to the impact of society's perception of single
mothers, social policies have concrete ramifications that limit these
girls' options. Recall A.'s principal concerns upon learning that she was
pregnant.38  In addition to her fears about her family's response, she
was overwhelmed by worries about money, insurance, housing, and
work.33 9 These very practical concerns are dictated by a society that ties
health insurance to the workplace, tolerates shortages of affordable
housing, and privatizes the costs of child care. Without a full-time job,
A. could not afford child care, insurance, or a place to live. Had her
family kicked her out, she and her baby easily could have become
homeless. 340 A.'s concerns only would have been amplified had her
story occurred today, amidst the ongoing efforts at welfare reform,
including proposals allowing states to deny welfare payments to
teenage mothers who are not in school or living with an adult.1'
Coupled with the lack of family support and the costliness of abortion,
these proposals might be viewed as a veritable prescription for
neonaticide.342
Although these varied factors--individual vulnerability, family
dysfunction, and societal rhetoric and structures--are wide-ranging,
everything we know about neonaticide points to a nuanced set of
critique of proposals to "restigmatize" unwed motherhood, see Katha Pollitt, Subject to
Debate, THE NATION, Dec. 12, 1994, at 717.
... Charles Krauthammer, A Social Conservative Credo, PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1995,
at 15-16. For a fascinating exploration of the social (mis)construction of the "epidemic" of
teenage pregnancy, see generally LUKER, supra note 333 (demonstrating that the rates of
teenagers bearing children have not risen since the 1950s, but noting that the rates of teen
mothers who marry has declined).
338 See supra notes 256 through 273 and accompanying text.3 39 
Id.
340 For a profoundly disturbing collection of the accounts of homeless families, see
JONATHAN KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN: HOMELESS FAMILIES IN AMERICA (1988).
34 The Welfare reform debate, poverty, and some useful numbers, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1996, at A12 [hereinafter Welfare Rbform (noting that the 1996 welfare
legislation essentially eliminates Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
replaces the program with federal block grants).
342 See Cynthia A. Bailey, Workfare and Involuntary Servitude--What You Wanted
to Know But Were Afraid to Ask, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 285, 312- 16 (1995)
(discussing welfare reform and single mothers without child care); Corns, Note, supra note
292, at 384-88 (discussing the impact on poor women of the lack of funding for
abortions).
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causes. Therefore, defining preventive policies for neonaticide, like for
infanticide, leads back to an analysis of family and community.
Neonaticide is not so much about a lack of economic resources as it is
about a lack of communication and community. As is the case with
infanticide, neonaticide is not merely an individual problem; it is a
reflection of an atomized society that places little value on the mental
and physical well-being of its most vulnerable constituents. Those who
would prevent neonaticide must begin by identifying and remedying
girls' vulnerability long before they become pregnant.
2. The Culture of Infanticide: Motherhood in Isolation and Poverty
The isolation of mothers and infants is just one of the many
consequences of the gradual fragmentation of the extended family.
Although there are both benefits and detriments to living in close
proximity to extended family members, certainly one of the benefits is
the considerable assistance available from family members upon the
birth of a child. In the United States today, many new mothers lack any
such community. Of course, there is enormous variation in terms of
community, and it is impossible to generalize about the experiences of
new mothers given the diversity of maternal experiences across class,
race, and ethnic lines. 34 Nevertheless, a large number of women in the
United States today are not merely the primary, but essentially the only,
caretakers of their infants.)4 Even when intact, the nuclear family
structure presupposes this division of labor, and current figures indicate
that at least one-third of American children live in single parent
families.345
The tasks associated with caring for an infant are extraordinarily
demanding. When performed by one parent, twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week, throughout the early months and years of a child's
life, this work is arguably the most difficult labor any human ever
engages in. In a joumalistic account of the first year of her son's life,
writer Anne Lamott provides a rare glimpse into the fused joys and
struggles of motherhood. As a single, self-employed parent in her mid-
thirties, Lamott was somewhat vulnerable to isolation and financial
worries, but she was surrounded by a supportive network of family and
friends. In her diary, Lamott records the exhaustion she experienced
during her son's first four months.
3 This point is perhaps best illustrated in Carol Stack's classic study of African-
American family structure in impoverished neighborhoods. CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR
KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY (1975).
See supra notes 297 through 323 and accompanying text.
34 More Americans marry later, get divorced, census shows, DALLAS MORNING
NEWs, Mar. 13, 1996, at A5.
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He's so fine all day, so alert and beautiful and good, and then
the colic kicks in. I'm okay for the first hour, more or less, not happy
about things but basically okay, and then I start to lose it as the colic
continues. I end up incredibly frustrated and sad and angry. I have had
some terrible visions lately, like of holding him by the ankle and
whacking him against the wall, the way you "cure" an octopus on the
dock.346
Despite Lamott's closely-knit community, she frequently found
herself alone late at night with a screaming baby.
I wonder if it is normal for a mother to adore her baby so
desperately and at the same time to think about choking him or
throwing him down the stairs. It's incredible to be this fucking tired
and yet to have to go through the several hours of colic every night.
It would be awful enough to deal with if you were feeling healthy
and upbeat. It's a bit much when you're feeling like total dog shit.
When he woke me up at 4:00 this morning to nurse, I felt like I was
dying.347
The fact that the work of mothering routinely is undertaken by
the female half of the population without financial compensation serves
to minimize the strenuousness of this work. Indeed, even calling
motherhood "work" seems somehow subversive and taboo. As a result,
new mothers may view their physical and emotional exhaustion as a
personal failing, rather than as the result of their having undertaken an
overwhelmingly difficult task. It is therefore all the more challenging
for these women to seek assistance and confide in others that they need
help.
The isolation of mothers is reinforced by the paucity of
nonpunitive community support services for parents and children. The
bulk of state child advocacy agencies are punitive in nature, designed to
identify children "at risk" of abuse or neglect and remove them from
their homes. 348 Although there is an obvious and indisputable need for
child protection agencies that intervene to remove children from
dangerous environments, there is an equally compelling need for
_4 ANNE LAMOTr, OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS 36 (1994).
141 Id. at 59.
14' Annette Appell, an attorney with Northwestern University's Center for Children
and Family Justice, notes that, although the enabling acts of many state child protection
agencies require the agencies to strive toward family preservation and reunification, in
recent years law and policy have shifted away from this priority. In Illinois, for example,
the family preservation policy was blamed for several notorious deaths from child abuse,
and as a result, the agency is now bound by a "best interests" standard, rather than the
former statutory mandate of family preservation. Interview with Annette Appell, in
Chicago, I11. (Aug. 23, 1995).
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agencies that exist primarily to offer support to parents.3 49 Not only are
there very few such agencies, but a parent who seeks support from
existing child protection agencies runs a risk of being punished, rather
than assisted. 50
In the Chicago area, I was able to locate two private, not-for-
profit, nonpunitive parental support organizations: Parents Anonymous
and Child Abuse Prevention Services. The former consists of eight
city-wide support groups, each comprised of approximately ten
349 Anne Lamott describes the assistance she received from one such agency in the
following passage from her journal:
Last night was death. Vietnam. He was colicky from 10:00 till nearly 1:00. At
midnight I broke under the strain and called this organization called Pregnancy to
Parenthood. They help stressed-out parents and have a twenty-four-hour switchboard that
I think is to prevent child abuse. I felt humiliated calling and was crying quite hard, and
Sam was crying quite hard, and I told the person on the line that I didn't think I was going
to hurt him but that I didn't think I could get through the night. So the person rang the
clinical director at home, spliced my call through, and we talked for over an hour. Sam
eventually went to sleep. She recommended I go on a wheat-free, dairy-free diet to see if it
helps. Mostly she was just there for me in the middle of the night. We talked until I was
okay again. Sam woke up a few hours later and nursed peacefully.
LAMO'rr, supra note 346, at 71. One poignant example of this involves Denise
Perrigo, who in 1992 called a community volunteer center in Syracuse, New York,
seeking. a referral for a question she had about breast-feeding. Lisa Levitt Ryckman, A
simple question leads to jail, CHI. TRJB., Feb. 9, 1992, at 16, zone C. She wanted to know
whether it was normal for a woman to become sexually aroused while nursing her two-
year-old daughter. Rather than referring her to the La Leche League, a breast-feeding
support group, (which incidentally would have informed her that this response was
completely normal, and that, although most American women stop nursing by age one, the
international average is 4.2 years), the agency reported Ms. Perrigo to a child abuse
hotline. Id. The county Department of Social Services took Perrigo's daughter into
custody, and Perrigo was jailed under charges of criminal child abuse. Experts were hired
to investigate the case, and Perrigo's daughter was placed in foster care. Id. Despite the
department's family reunification policy, the child's grandparents were rejected as foster
parents because "they did not believe any abuse had taken place." Id. It took eight months
and a private attorney before Perrigo recovered custody. Id
30 One poignant example of this involves Denise Perrigo, who in 1992 called a
community volunteer center in Syracuse, New York, seeking a referral for a question she
had about breast-feeding. Lisa Levitt Ryckman, A simple question leads to jail, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 9, 1992, at 16, zone C. She wanted to know whether it was normal for a woman to
become sexually aroused while nursing her two-year-old daughter. Rather than referring
her to the La Leche League, a breast-feeding support group, (which incidentally would
have informed her that this response was completely normal, and that, although most
American women stop nursing by age one, the international average is 4.2 years), the
agency reported Ms. Perrigo to a child abuse hotline. Id. The county Department of Social
Services took Perrigo's daughter into custody, and Perrigo was jailed under charges of
criminal child abuse. Experts were hired to investigate the case, and Perrigo's daughter
was placed in foster care. Id. Despite the department's family reunification policy, the
child's grandparents were rejected as foster parents because "they did not believe any
abuse had taken place." Id. It took eight months and a private attorney before Perrigo
recovered custody. Id.
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parents.35 1 Part of a national network that advocates against corporal
punishment, each self-help group meets weekly so that members can
share stories and seek advice. Members use only their first names; the
law, however, requires the reporting of members who describe behavior
that indicates the possibility of child abuse or neglect. 52 This necessity,
along with the powerful cultural taboos against acknowledging a need
for help in parenting, makes it challenging to recruit members and to
encourage them to rely upon the support group for comfort. 53 The
second agency, Child Abuse Prevention Services, runs several support
groups that differ from Parents Anonymous only in that they are
facilitated by a professional counselor, rather than a trained volunteer
parent. In addition, this agency sponsors a twenty-four hour "Parental
Stress" hotline, which receives an estimated 5,500 calls annually.354
Although these organizations represent a powerful positive
force, clearly they cannot fulfill the emotional, social, and financial
support needs of millions of isolated parents in the greater Chicago
vicinity. Neither of these groups can offer what is perhaps the most
basic of services: the availability of an alternate caretaker who might
provide a brief respite to an exhausted parent. The child care shortage
has received considerable media attention, yet many fail to recognize
the spiral of problems created by this shortage. A parent who cannot
find work that pays enough to cover the costs of day care cannot afford
to work outside of her home. And a parent who lacks income cannot
afford to hire someone to assist her in caring for her child when she
needs a break.3 55 It is both natural and inevitable that a parent will need
to take breaks from her child, and in light of the foregoing, it is perhaps
unsurprising to find that many parents simply leave their children
unsupervised from time to time. In Illinois, over 80% of the Illinois
351 PARENTS ANONYMOUS: STATEWIDE NEWS 11, Fall 1995 (on file with the author).
352 Interview with Maureen Blaha, Executive Director of Parents Anonymous, in
Chicago, I11. (Oct. 8, 1995).353 id.
354 Telephone interview with Claire Dunham, Counselor at Child Abuse Prevention
Services, in Chicago, Ill. (July 8, 1995).
355 One of the counselors at Child Abuse Prevention Services related to me an
anecdote that illustrates the widely-felt need for respite care. Her church, which is located
in a Chicago neighborhood that borders both Cabrini-Green, one of the city's poorest
neighborhoods, and Chicago's wealthier Old Town neighborhood, decided to provide a
charitable "drop-off' afternoon day care service. They posted notices about their service in
the Cabrini-Green housing proiects, and within several days, they had to begin turning
away inquiries because the program had reached capacity. The organizers were upset
because rather than serving the poorer women in their vicinity, they had been swamped by
babies from Old Town mothers, who had heard about the program by word of mouth and
were thrilled at the idea of taking an occasional break. Id.
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Department of Children and Family Services' caseload consists of
mothers who left their children unattended.356
The difficulties associated with parenting are not created by
poverty alone, but in a fragmented community, money can buy a parent
some respite. It may be that economic supports to mothers, of the sort
common throughout Europe, are part of a solution.357 Yet, because part
of the impetus toward infanticide derives from social and emotional
isolation, child allowances and maternity stipends are incomplete
solutions at best. Without dramatically increasing the number of
nonpunitive resources for parents, we will fail to address the problems
inherent in the solitary burdens associated with motherhood. This is
not to suggest that the solution to infanticide is to resurrect foundling
homes or to train and employ thousands of professional caretakers to
take the place of mothers."' The isolation of mothers is not an
individual problem, but rather, a structural one.9
356 Interview with Benjamin Wolfe, Staff Attorney, Illinois ACLU, in Chicago, Ill.
(Sept. 2, 1994).
117 Originally intended as wage supplements, and later as a mechanism for
encouraging births in countries concerned about declining population growth, family
allowances exist as a statutory benefit in 67 countries, including every industrialized
country except the United States. Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, Notes on Policy
and Practice: Income Transfers and Mother-Only Families in Eight Countries, 57 Soc.
SERVICE REV. 448, 459-60 (1983). Although they have failed to effect population
increases, the allowances play a significant role in the incomes of single-parent, female-
headed families, constituting between 13% and 27% of family income for mothers not
working outside of the home, and between 10% and 24% for those with outside
employment. Id.
... Professor John McKnight's essay on "Professionalized Service and Disabling
Help" discusses the danger of developing solutions without recognizing the systemic
nature of these social problems:
[a] study of children who became state wards exemplifies the process. The children
were legally separated from their families because their parents were judged to be unable
to provide adequate care for the children. Therefore, the children were placed in
professional service institutions.... Quite correctly, officials who were involved in
removing the children from their homes agreed that a common reason for removal was the
economic poverty of the family. Obviously, they had no resources to deal with poverty.
But there were many resources for professionalized institutional service. The service
system met the economic need by institutionalizing an individualized definition of the
problem. The negative side effect was that the poverty of the families was intensified by
the resources consumed by the "caring" professional services. In counterproductive terms,
the servicing system "produced" broken families.
JOHN MCKNIGHT, THE CARELESS SOCIETY: COMMUNITY AND ITS COUNTERFEITS 44
(1995).
359 For example, recall the circumstances surrounding the suffocation death of Latrena
Pixley's six-week-old child. See supra notes 203 through 218 and accompanying text. At
the time of her baby's death, Pixley was an unemployed high school dropout with two
children under the age of one. She lived in a small apartment, without a telephone, and
although she had a live-in boyfriend and a family, they were so detached from the realities
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Any anti-infanticide policy must begin by recognizing the way
in which existing policies and structures contribute to the problem. For
example, consider the impact on single mothers of the ongoing efforts
at dismantling welfare. 60 Ostensibly designed as an effort to encourage
mothers to seek paid employment, both the federal and state
governments have drastically reduced economic support to single
women and their children."' Even the most conservative figures
estimate that these policies will result in an increase of at least one
million American children living in poverty.362 Few discuss the impact
on the mothers. Unless accompanied by a dramatic increase in
subsidized day care, poor women will be forced to choose between
leaving their children inadequately supervised to earn money working
outside of their homes and sacrificing this potential income while
trying to survive on limited government assistance in order to keep
their childrensupervised.3 63 This trade-off carries with it a subtext of
incipient desperation.
B. Rethinking the Crime of Infanticide
Under Modem American Law
The magnitude of reforms required to alter the cultures of infanticide
and neonaticide is daunting in scope. It is therefore important, in the
interim, to revisit the current legal responses to these crimes and to
identify necessary short-term reforms.
The American approach to infanticide varies by jurisdiction, but
essentially consists of zealous prosecution in accordance with the
maximum penalties permitted under homicide laws. The states rely
upon juries and judges to take into account the women's stories when
determining culpability. This often leads to the defendant being found
of Pixley's life that they did not even notice the baby's absence until Pixley informed them
that she had killed her baby. Id. Pixley's isolation was by no means extraordinary. Indeed,
similar conditions were evident in virtually all of my infanticide cases.
360 See Welfare Reform, supra note 341, at A 12.
361 Id.
16' The nonpartisan Urban Institute estimates that the actual number of children
impoverished by the 1996 law will be closer to 3,500,000. Richard Merlyn Cook, A
Terrible Price, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 1996. Regarding the July 1996 welfare
legislation, Senator Daniel P. Moynihan remarked, " '[iln our confusion we are doing mad
things .... The premise of this legislation is that the behavior of certain adults can be
changed by making the lives of their children as wretched as possible.' " Clarence Page,
Fearing the Best and Worst of Welfare Reform, CHI. TRIB, Aug. 4, 1996, at 19, zone C.
16' For a discussion of welfare reform and single mothers without child care, see
Bailey, supra note 342, at 312-16; Carla M. Da Luz & Pamela C. Weckerly, Will the New
Republican Majority in Congress Wage Old Battles Against Women?, 5 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 501 (1995); and Sherri Kimmel, Champions of Family and Community,
PENN. LAWYER, May-June 1995, at 12.
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either not guilty or guilty of a lesser offense than that charged.364 As we
have seen, even if she is convicted, the defendant stands a good chance
of receiving a relatively lenient sentence.
The impetus toward lenience has resulted in an incoherent body
of case law-- an incoherence driven not by difficulties in determining
the defendant's guilt, but rather by jury and judicial sensibilities
regarding the defendant's blameworthiness.365 In making plain the
patterns underlying these cases and their resolutions, and in evaluating
the complex factors that contribute to these children's deaths, we
recognize that cases involving mothers who kill their children not only
are unsettling, but also are distinctly unlike more "meditated"
homicides. Hence, the widespread consensus that it is morally wrong
for a mother to take the life of her infant is met with an equally
widespread resistance to equating such a homicide with murder.
There are both common law and statutory mechanisms by
which we might resituate the crime of infanticide as other than first
degree murder. Nevertheless, if this is accomplished without an
accompanying explanation for why this crime should be treated
differently, it will perpetuate all of the problems of "exceptionalism"
identified earlier.3 66 In order to explore these normative solutions in
context, I will first discuss neonaticide, and then turn to infanticide.
1. Neonaticide as Involuntary Manslaughter
Over the course of this project, many of my assistants,
colleagues, and friends have listened to the multiple accounts of
neonaticide, and have begun clipping and saving the stories themselves,
reacting to each story with ever-increasing sorrow and frustration at the
tragic waste of lives. I have noticed that many of them make an odd
sort of "Freudian slip" when referring to a woman accused of killing
her child--they call her the "victim." In a sense, these women can be
seen as victims, and their actions understood as an almost inevitable, or
at least comprehensible, response to an oppressive environment. There
is a spirit of mercy that inspires this recasting of victim and perpetrator,
a moral impetus that demands not that we forgive the defendant, but
rather that we recognize the source of her crime and permit that to
temper our judgment of her.
'6 See, e.g., A.'s story, supra notes 256 through 273 and accompanying text.
'6' Recall Perlin's "empathy outlier" analysis, in which he notes the select categories
in which juries seem to over-apply the insanity defense, despite the fact that these
defendants do not conform to our pre-reflective and allegedly "common-sensical" views of
the mentally disabled as "madmen" or "beasts." PERLIN, supra note 43, at 192-93.
366 See supra notes 247 through 249 and accompanying text.
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One might attempt to give legal effect to this moral recasting by
arguing that neonaticide be viewed as a crime of self-defense. In a
rather literal sense, the fetus poses an overwhelming threat to the
woman's identity. Once the fetus is born, she no longer will be simply
a woman, she will be a mother. If she rids herself of the fetus or baby,
she still will be a woman, and she will have kept her identity intact.367
Strictly speaking, this defense stands little chance of success. Self-
defense is a limited legal defense that was devised to address cases in
which the defendant believed herself to be threatened in an imminent
and life-threatening manner.38 Thus, the woman accused of killing her
newborn would need to convince the trier of fact that the fetus was an
aggressor who unjustifiably threatened harm to her, and that her
response was reasonable.369
To engage this argument further requires a thorough
jurisprudential discussion of the underlying purposes of criminal law
that exceeds the scope of this Article. Although there are philosophical
and legal arguments that challenge the assumption that neonaticide
should be considered immoral and illegal, it remains the case that
neonaticide defendants frequently are charged with murder.37° This
being so, rather than discussing whether they should be charged at all,
it seems far more pressing to explore the applicability of murder
367 The same reasoning also applies to the cases of infanticide, in which one might
hypothesize that the woman kills her children in order to free herself of her identity as
"mother" and to recover her own identity.
16' The law of self-defense requires the defendant to establish that: (1) an aggressor
uniustifiably threatens harm to the actor; and (2) the actor engages in conduct harmful to
the aggressor (a) when and to the extent necessary for self-protection, and (b) that is
reasonable in relation to the harm threatened. ROBINSON, supra note 218, at § 132.
There is some debate over the validity of psychological self-defense, but at the
present, these claims remain long shots. For an example, see Charles Ewing's proposal that
we permit a psychological self-defense theory. Charles P. Ewing, Psychological Self-
Defense: A Proposed Justification for Battered Women Who Kill, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
579 (1990). For a critique of Mr. Ewing's position, see Stephen J. Morse, The Misbegotten
Marriage of Soft Psychology and Bad Law: Psychological Self-Defense as a Justification
for Homicide, 14 L. & Hum. BEHAV. 595 (1990).
369 A related argument that has been unsuccessfully raised in a neonaticide case is that
of necessity. See Illinois v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 806 (Ill. App. 1991) (discussing case of 15-
year-old defendant who was unaware that she had been pregnant and who claimed that
killing her newborn was necessary to avoid disgrace of unwed pregnancy).
70 Philosopher Michael Tooley contends that killing a neonate is not intrinsically
wrong, because newborns are not persons. He explains that neonates are not persons
because their behavior does not indicate the existence of higher mental capacities, such as
the capacity for thought, rational deliberation, or self-consciousness. Moreover, he argues
that scientific evidence about neurophysical structures in neonates also proves they are not
persons. This is because data indicates that the neuronal circuitry thought to underlie
higher mental functions is not present at birth, but actually develops over a long period of
postnatal development. TOOLEY, supra note 129, at 407.
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charges, as opposed to lesser offenses, to women who commit
neonaticide.
First degree murder ordinarily implies an element of intent on
the part of the murderer.37' Although the precise language varies among
jurisdictions, murder codes generally require that the defendant possess
an intent to kill or an intent to do serious bodily injury, or else that the
state demonstrate that the death occurred while the defendant was
committing a felony or engaging in conduct so extremely reckless as to
reflect a "depraved heart."3"' For example, consider the Model Penal
Code's murder provision, which provides that criminal homicide
constitutes murder when:
a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life.373
As the previous discussions of neonaticide demonstrate, most
neonaticide defendants do not plan to kill their babies. Quite to the
contrary, everything about the circumstances surrounding labor and
delivery in these cases speaks to the sudden and impulsive nature of the
mother's response. Although one might argue that the defendant was
negligent in her failure to anticipate the impending birth of a child, and
in her failure to take precautions to insure the baby's survival, this
hardly can be seen as premeditated murder.374 At best, this failing
makes her reckless. The cases in which recklessness is so extreme as to
constitute murder involve defendants whose behavior is so calculated
to produce harm that it is otherwise inexplicable. We call these
"depraved-heart murders": 37
firing a bullet into a room occupied, as the defendant knows, by
several people; ... shooting into the caboose of a passing train or
into a moving automobile; playing a game of "Russian roulette"
with another person; ... driving a car at very high speeds along a
main street.376
371 See LAFAVE & ScoTIr, CRIMINAL LAW 603 (2nd ed. 1986) (tracing the evolution of
the "malice aforethought" standard).
372 id.
313 Model Penal Code § 210.2 (1962).
374 It is, of course, possible to imagine a neonaticide that demonstrates sufficient
intentionality to constitute murder. Typically, however, neonaticide defendants' behavior
is reflexive and unplanned. Moreover, the legal standard required to elevate a homicide to
murder is not negligence, but extreme recklessness. Id.
375 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 371, at 617.
376 Id. at 619-20. LaFave and Scott also cite a 1956 case from England for the
proposition that shaking an infant so long and so vigorously that it cannot breathe should
be considered a depraved-heart murder. Id. (citing Regina v. Ward, I Q.B. 351 (1956)). If
this were widely considered to be murder, then neonaticide arguably might be analogized
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In order to accommodate neonaticide under modem murder
codes, one must equate an unattended birth--the most commonplace
and natural event in human history-- with the pathological behavior of
the depraved-heart murderer. So doing has the curious effect of
criminalizing the birth process when it takes place without medical
supervision.3 77 This marks a significant deviation from present law and
from the reality that many thousands of women successfully deliver
their babies outside of the health care system, for reasons ranging from
personal preference to poverty to exceptionally speedy labors. 3" Are
we to consider these deliveries as cases of attempted murder?
Although neonaticide defendants frequently are accused of first
degree murder, they seldom are convicted of this crime. As one
Chicago criminal defense lawyer observed, there is a pattern of "over-
charging and under-convicting" in neonaticide cases." The result, as
was seen in the second section of this Article, is that the majority of
these cases plead out before trial, and that those that proceed to trial are
more likely to result in convictions for the lesser crime of involuntary
as murder also; however, the level of control and deliberateness demonstrated by the
baby-shaker is vastly different from the actions taken by many neonaticide defendants.
See Joanne Wasserman, The Anger that Kills: Doctors are Seeing a Rise in Fatalities and
Brain Damage Caused by Shaking, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 23, 1996, at 37 (quoting
several experts on the shaken baby syndrome). Dr. Margaret McHugh explains that "a
gentle shaking would not explain [the] retinal bleeding and brain hemorrhaging." Id.
Lucinda Suarez, of the Queens district attorney's office, notes that "[this is tremendous
force .... Medical experts compare it to the velocity and force of a high-speed car crash."
Id. Nevertheless, one expert remarks that, "despite the medical evidence, it's difficult to
get juries to convict those accused of shaking babies." Id.
... In her fascinating study of American women charged with endangering their
newborns during or due to unassisted childbirth, anthropologist Anna Tsing finds that
[ulnassisted childbirth, it seems, earns women a characterization as calculating
criminals.... In most of the cases I have studied, I found the events surrounding the
childbirth open to varied interpretations. Often the cause of death of the infant was
unclear, with no evidence of trauma .... Many of the women charged claimed they did not
know they were in labor; some were unaware they were pregnant. Yet rather than leading
to a discussion of these ambiguities, the fact that a woman gave birth alone was seen as
evidence or cause of her criminal neglect of the newborn.
Tsing, supra note 233, at 282-83. A recent case from Columbia, South Carolina
illustrates Tsing's thesis. Sheriff Tommy Mims arrested Ms. Connie Williams after she
delivered a baby in the bathroom of a Sumter County youth club in December 1996.
Although there was no evidence that Williams took any steps to kill the child, it seems that
the child died in the bathroom. Mims explained that "Williams was charged with murder
... because she didn't get medical assistance during the delivery." Police say woman killed
baby girl: Died after Birth in Sumter Bathroom, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 7,
1996, at B3.
... In 1993, of 4,000,280 total births in the United States, 40,000 were not in the
hospital. 44 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPT. 71 (Sept. 21, 1995).
379 Interview with Jeffrey Urdangen, criminal defense attorney, in Chicago, I11. (Oct.
15, 1995).
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manslaughter. Indeed, when one evaluates the range of factual
situations governed under the broad rubric of involuntary
manslaughter, it is immediately apparent that this crime is far more
applicable to neonaticide than murder.
Most states' criminal codes do not define involuntary
manslaughter with great specificity, although all American jurisdictions
undertake to punish it.3 ° At common law, manslaughter was broadly
defined to govern unlawful killings that did not involve malice
aforethought.8  Over time, several categories of manslaughter arose,
including what is commonly known as involuntary, "unlawful-act," or
"misdemeanor" manslaughter."2 Despite the fluctuating homicide
nomenclature, involuntary manslaughter generally exists as a less
severe offense than voluntary manslaughter or murder, and is
applicable in circumstances where the defendant's conduct lacked a
murderous intent, but involved a high degree of risk of death or serious
bodily injury to the victim. 383
This definition applies to neonaticide in that the pregnant
woman who fails to acknowledge her condition and to plan for her
impending delivery poses a distinct risk to her offspring's well-being.
Even if her behavior prior to the birth is both legal and unintentional, it
can be argued that, once the baby is born, the woman's failure to seek
assistance is either criminally negligent or reckless because a parent has
a legal duty to furnish medical care for her child.3 4
Of course, the applicability and availability of this lesser
homicide provision does not guarantee that neonaticide defendants will
not be charged with and convicted of murder. Moreover, even if it
were the case that all neonaticide defendants, including those charged
with murder, ultimately were convicted of manslaughter, this would be
an absurd manner of dispensing justice. One defense lawyer in a
380 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 371, at 668.
311 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 450 (1994) [hereinafter
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING].
382 Id.
... Id. at 450, 483-86; LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 371, at 669. The Model Penal
Code eliminates the unlawful act doctrine, and recasts involuntary manslaughter as
"criminally negligent homicide." Model Penal Code § 210.4.
384 "[A] number of reported cases have concerned criminal negligence or recklessness
in omitting to furnish medical care for helpless, sick or injured persons to whom the
defendant owes a duty of care." LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 371, at 671. The definition
of criminal negligence includes one or both of the following principles:
(1) the defendant's conduct, under the circumstances known to him, must involve a
high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury, in addition to the unreasonable
risk required for ordinary negligence; and (2) whatever the degree of risk required ...
the defendant must be aware of the fact that his conduct creates this risk.
Id. at 669.
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neonaticide case in which the client was tried for murder, but only
convicted of involuntary manslaughter, remarked, "[a] lthough we may
take comfort from the fact that these defendants seldom receive the
maximum allowable penalties under the law, this is most certainly an
unfair and arbitrary, as well as a costly and time-consuming manner to
handle these cases.
3 85
It is precisely the random, arbitrary nature of neonaticide cases
that lends appeal to the notion of creating a distinct statute to govern
this crime. Although the recognition of a separate crime for women
who kill their children inherently exceptionalizes women, there is no
denying that such a statute would be the best way to insure a uniform
application of the law. The challenge, therefore, lies in drafting a law
that would incorporate the dominant lenient response to neonaticide
without simultaneously treating women, by virtue of their biology, as
less than full citizens.386
One manner of accomplishing this goal lies in amending
existing involuntary manslaughter statutes. Many criminal codes list
specific circumstances under which a homicide will constitute
involuntary manslaughter. For example, the Illinois statute provides
that "[i]n cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence
of alcohol or any other drug ... at the time of the alleged violation shall
be presumed to be evidence of a reckless act unless disproved by
evidence to the contrary. 38 7 Thus, an involuntary manslaughter statute
might be amended to include the following provision:
In cases involving a woman who causes the death of her
newborn child under the age of twenty-four hours, during which time
the balance of her mind is disturbed by reason of the effect of giving
birth or of circumstances consequent upon the birth, the alleged
violation shall be presumed to be evidence of no more than a reckless
or negligent act unless disproved by evidence to the contrary.
This proposal may be criticized on several grounds. First, there
is the somewhat anachronistic "balance of the mind" language
borrowed from the British Infanticide Act. 388 Modern criminal law does
little to acknowledge that defendants who are not insane may
nevertheless demonstrate diminished mental capacity, whether
temporary or permanent, and thus the very concept of a temporary
311 Interview with Jeffrey Urdangen, supra note 379.
'86 See Coughlin, supra note 249, for a well-articulated argument regarding the
hazards of laws that excuse women for their actions on the basis of gender differences.
"' 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3(b) (West 1994).
38 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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mental imbalance is out of keeping with contemporary American law.38 9
Yet, the lenient impulse in neonaticide cases results from just such a
recognition. The "balance of the mind" language is designed to
acknowledge the extraordinary mental and physical trauma inherent in
an unattended labor and delivery, particularly when this follows months
of denial of pregnancy. The use of this language also operates as a
limiting factor, permitting the state to obtain murder convictions
against women whose actions were not the result of temporary mental
imbalance, but rather, reflected a knowing and purposeful intention to
kill their newborns.
Second, a statute so narrowly defined is somewhat awkward.
Certainly, there is a tendency in legislating to allow juries great latitude
in identifying reasonable conduct and, therefore, criminal codes
generally consist of broadly-defined standards of behavior and mental
states rather than specific factual provisions.' 90 Nevertheless, there are
myriad examples of criminal codes that identify objective excusing
components with great specificity. 9' The need for such detailed
description is amply demonstrated by the widely ranging outcomes
observed in these cases.
Finally, this proposal may be seen as a new effort to
"medicalize" women's responses to burdens placed upon them by virtue
of their subordinated status in society. The resort to scientific or quasi-
scientific explanations for women's criminal behavior helps cloak the
social and structural constraints on women, forcing women to attempt
to excuse their illegal actions as crazy, rather than permitting them to
reveal these actions as rational responses to a crazy environment.3 92
"9 In his comprehensive study of the insanity defense, Professor Michael Perlin
concludes that "[wihile we have grudgingly allowed a few defendants to seek exculpation
through the insanity defense, we usually limit it to defendants 'utterly and obviously'
beyond the reach of the criminal law." PERLIN, supra note 43, at 29-30.
'90 Professor Dressler notes that excuse theory is hard to legislate:
[u]nder an excuse theory, what conduct society deems harmful is not at issue. Rather,
the issue is whether the actor lived up to a standard of how 'reasonable' people act.
Although a legislature may properly codify an objective excusing component, it is more
plausible to leave its definition ... to jurors, who represent that objective standard.
Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73
J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 447 (1982) [hereinafter Dressler, Rethinking].
391 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 5.01 & cmt. (defining criminal attempt to include
behavior "constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in
[the] commission of the crime," and then providing a detailed list of activities that
constitute substantial steps).
392 For two fascinating discussions on the dangers inherent in pathologizing women's
behavior, see SUSAN SHERWIN, No LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHIcs AND HEALTH CARE
179-200 (1992) and Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379 (1991).
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Furthermore, by offering a scientific explanation for
neonaticide, this proposal courts the risks identified by Professor
Coughlin--it is gender-specific, and therefore exceptionalizes women,
potentially rendering them less than fully accountable for their actions
surrounding labor and delivery.3 93 Although this argument is no doubt
true, it is not necessarily dispositive. It requires no stretch of the
imagination to argue that, during the process of labor and delivery, a
woman's focus becomes so intensely internalized that she should not be
regarded as fully competent. Support for this proposition might be
found in federal and state regulations pertaining to the sterilization of
Medicaid patients. Specifically, these laws stipulate that informed
consent to an elective sterilization surgery may not be obtained while
the patient to be sterilized is in labor or childbirth.394 At least one court
has noted that "the clear implication of this requirement is that certain
circumstances, such as labor ... can impair an individual's ability to
consent in a fully informed manner. '
Ultimately, one might respond to this entire constellation of
arguments by noting that, just as there are harms in adopting such a
statute, so too are there harms in not adopting a statute. Both
approaches are limited and potentially harmful to women. Therefore, if
we are practically limited to these two models, as Professor Margaret
Radin observed, "the answer must be pragmatic. We must look
carefully at the nonideal circumstances in each case and decide which
horn of the dilemma is better (or less bad), and we must keep re-
deciding as time goes on. ,
396
It is clear that the lenient impulse in neonaticide cases is
integrally related to the ambivalence evoked in us by the horror of these
women's experiences in childbirth. To insist that these women's actions
'9' See supra note 249 (quoting Professor Coughlin on the dangers of exceptionalizing
women).
'94 42 C.F.R. § 50.204(e)(1) (1995); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 18, §
505.13(e)(2)(ii)(a) (1995). These regulations require that, absent a premature delivery or
emergency abdominal surgery, any consent to an elective sterilization by Medicaid
patients must be given at least 30 but no more than 180 days before the procedure is
performed. 42 C.F.R. § 50.203 (d) (1995); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18 §
505.13 (e)(1)(v) (1995).
395 Butler v. Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc., No. 91C-06-205, 1993 Del. Super. LEXIs 65, at
*7 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 1993). This proposal is entirely in keeping with the spirit of
adoption contracts and the common law resolution of many cases involving surrogate
mothers, wherein women are permitted to avoid their contractual promises because of
their feelings in the aftermath of labor and delivery. See Carol Sanger, Separating from
Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 442-45 (1996) (discussing various legal safeguards
that insure birth mothers' consent to adoption).
396 Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1699, 1700 (1990).
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be regarded and judged "equally," in some abstract sense, to the actions
of men is as absurd as it is impossible.397
2. Infanticide as Manslaughter
The varied stories of women who commit infanticide, like those
of neonaticide defendants, tend to reflect impulsive rather than
conscious actions. Regardless of which of the four subcategories of
infanticide is involved, the vast majority of infanticide cases
demonstrate none of the deliberate, intentional behavior associated with
murder. 9
Although some infanticide defendants are insane at the time of
their crimes, many suffer from mental disturbances that fall short of the
legal definition of insanity.'" It is unnecessary, however, to broaden
the definition of insanity in order to provide a partial defense for these
women. The common law contains a more accurate and effective
response--one that both acknowledges the desperation that led to the
homicide, and at the same time, treats the defendants as autonomous,
blameworthy actors. The "heat of passion" doctrine creates a partial
excuse to a murder charge, permitting a defendant who acknowledges
having killed her infant to argue that she is, at most, guilty of voluntary
manslaughter. 4°
39 For an exceptionally coherent explanation of the folly of pursuing a goal of
abstract equality, see Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT.
REV. 201 (1987).
... See supra notes 140 through 193 and accompanying text (describing each
subcategory of infanticide).
'99 See appendix, Infanticide Codes, Issues Existing Prior to Commission of the
Crime, mental illness.
The infanticide defendant whose crime was committed during an episode of
postpartum psychosis, and who therefore plainly was incompetent at the time of her
offense, may nevertheless find it difficult to establish an insanity defense, as she almost
always will be fully recovered by the time of her trial. Nelson, Comment, supra note 139,
at 633-36. Because postpartum psychosis is strictly time-delimited, once the postpartum
phase has passed, the woman returns to her former mental health status; in other words,
she is no longer psychotic, nor even mentally ill. Dent, Comment, supra note 141, at 363.
400I have omitted from my study the many cases in which a mother kills her child
entirely unintentionally, for example, by causing a car accident in which her baby dies.
These acts, assuming they involve defendants who manifested no criminal intent, are
entirely distinct from infanticide cases. Even if evidence suggests that the mother may
bear some fault, for example as a result of her failure to use a safety restraint (such as an
infant car seat or a safety belt), states consistently have refused to hold the mother civilly
liable, let alone criminally responsible for the infant's death. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Donna Jean Holland, 380 S.E.2d 100 (1989) (holding that a driver could
not win summary judgment in a wrongful death suit on the grounds that the parents of the
child-victim had not put the child in a seatbelt); see generally Christoper R. Drahozal,
Note, Liability for Nonuse of Child Restraints, 70 IOWA L. REv. 945 (1985) (arguing that
courts should impose liability on parents who do not put their children in seatbelts).
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Throughout history, "heat of passion" has lacked a consistent
rationale and has been invoked "largely for reasons of the heart and of
common sense, not the reasons of pure juristic logic. ' ' This sentiment
fits neatly into the pattern of lenience so consistently manifested in
infanticide cases. The heat of passion defense originally was developed
in order to distinguish the intentional killings committed during
sixteenth century "drunken brawls and breaches of honor" from
premeditated murders.4 °2 In more recent centuries, it has served as a
legal mechanism for differentiating and partially excusing homicides
that "involve relatives, lovers, and friends, as both perpetrators and
victims.,,403
In order to raise a "heat of passion" defense, a defendant must
establish that she committed an intentional homicide, and that she did
so under extenuating circumstances which mitigate, though they do not
justify or excuse, the killing. The principal extenuating circumstance is
the fact that the defendant, when [s]he killed the victim, was in a state
of passion engendered in h[er] by an adequate provocation (i.e. a
provocation which would cause a reasonable [wo]man to lose h[er]
normal self-control.)4
A rigid reading of this defense may lead one to doubt whether it
ever applies to a crime like infanticide. Indeed, at common law
"adequate provocation" was a matter of law, and defendants were
restricted to strictly-delineated categories. 4°'  Today, however, the
categorial approach has been replaced by an "objective standard,"
which requires juries to determine whether the reasonable person would
have been sufficiently impassioned by the provocation to kill.
4 6
The language of provocation commonly associated with this
defense also might lead one to question whether an infant could pose a
sufficient threat to allow its killer to raise this defense. There are two
responses to this concern. First, although the term "heat of passion"
traditionally has been used to refer to rage, some cases have pointed out
that other intense emotions--such as fright or terror or 'wild
40' Dressier, Rethinking, supra note 390, at 423 (citing D.P.P. v. Camplin, 67 Crim.
App. 14, 27 (1978)).
4Id. at 426.
403 Id. at 421-22. According to Professor Joshua Dressier,
[firom an early time in Anglo-American common law, such killings have been treated
differently from the meditated variety. The latter constituted murder. The former was
denominated as the lesser crime of manslaughter. Today it remains a lesser crime than
murder in England, 49 of the 50 states in this country, and in other portions of the world.
Id. at 422.
LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 371, at 653.
405 DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 381, at 490.
406 Id at 491-92.
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desperation'--will do.4°7 In fact, the Model Penal Code dispenses with
"provocation" altogether, and instead requires that the defendant be
"under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance., 408
More importantly, scholars have been careful to note that the "heat of
passion" defense is not so much about the actions of the provoker, but
rather about the reasonableness of the defendant's response to her
circumstances.4 As a result, the challenge for the infanticide
defendant is to explain why circumstances led her to lose her self-
control.
Convincing a jury that her loss of self-control was a reasonable
response to the turmoil caused by her child would be an impossible task
for most infanticide defendants. Although even the "reasonable"
mother or parent loses self-control with some frequency, and may
scream or even hit her child, she does not kill her child.41 ° It is critical
to recognize, however, that the law does not require that the mother's
action in killing her child be reasonable. If a mother acted reasonably
in killing her child, she would not be guilty of a crime. 41' LaFave and
Scott explain the distinction between self-defense and a heat of passion
defense by noting that
[wlhat is really meant by "reasonable provocation" is provocation
which causes a reasonable man to lose his normal self-control; and,
although a reasonable man who has thus lost control over himself
would not kill, yet his homicidal reaction to the provocation is at
4WId
The Model Penal Code's manslaughter provision applies with even greater ease to
infanticide defendants, as it eliminates the "heat of passion" language and introduces a
subjective component to the defense. Model Penal Code § 210.3. The Model Penal Code,
which has been adopted by a substantial minority of jurisdictions, states that criminal
homicide constitutes manslaughter when it is "committed under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The
reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be." Id.
4W See Dressier, Rethinking, supra note 390, at 443 (noting that "[t] he defense is
theoretically applicable even if the victim was not a provoker").
410 A recent nationwide Gallup poll indicated that "[n]early 1 in 20 parents disciplined
their children so severely that they were committing physical abuse." Joseph A. Kirby,
Survey: 1 in 20 Parents Committing Child Abuse, Gallup Numbers Much Higher Than
U.S. Data, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1995, at 22, zone N.
41 As Dressler notes, the law governing voluntary manslaughter differentiates
between criminal and noncriminal responses to circumstances that, by definition, are
emotionally extenuating:
[tihe actor's moral blameworthiness is found not in his violent response, but in his
homicidal violent response. He did not control himself as much as he should have, or as
much as common experience tells us he could have, nor as much as the ordinary law
abiding person would have.
Dressler, Rethinking, supra note 390, at 467.
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least understandable. Therefore, one who reacts to the provocation
by killing his provoker should not be guilty of murder. But neither
should he be guilty of no crime at all. So his conduct falls into the
intermediate category of voluntary manslaughter.4 2
Bearing this in mind, the heat of passion defense plainly is
applicable as a partial defense to murder charges in many infanticide
cases. There is no guarantee, however, that judges will permit these
defendants to raise it.4 3  Therefore, it is once again important to
consider the possibility of amending murder statutes to provide a partial
defense in the case of infanticide. This could be accomplished by
adding infanticide-related provisions to existing criminal codes. In so
doing, however, it is critical to bear in mind the Constitutional
prohibitions against gender discrimination41 4 and to consider the extent
to which infanticide truly is a gender-specific crime.
Unlike neonaticide, which is integrally related to the biological
experiences of pregnancy, labor, and delivery, infanticide is tied to the
culturally-dictated experiences of primary caretaking. In our culture,
this work overwhelmingly is performed by women, and thus,
throughout this Article, I have referred to infanticide as a crime
committed by mothers, and have distinguished these homicides from
those committed by a mother's partner or others who do not perform the
work associated with primary caretaking for a child. Nevertheless,
with the exception of postpartum psychoses, it is conceivable that the
infanticidal subcategories described in this Article might apply to an
412 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 371, at 654-55.
413 In one recent case, a defendant charged with murdering her newborn attempted to
raise a "heat of passion" defense. The judge refused to give the instruction, and the
defendant was convicted of first degree murder. On appeal, the court upheld the refusal to
permit a heat of passion defense, because none of the examples listed by the state statute
fit this crime:
An accused is guilty of second-degree murder when she commits first-degree murder,
but is able to prove either that she was acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting
from serious provocation, or she believed the circumstances, if they existed, justified the
killing. There is no evidence of either mitigating factor in this case.
The only recognized categories of serious provocation that, if proved, would reduce a
killing from first- to second-degree murder are substantial physical injury or assault,
mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender's spouse. None of
these categories is present here. Further, the supreme court has explicitly held that a young
child cannot cause the serious provocation required of second-degree murder.
Illinois v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. App. 1991) (citations omitted).
414 The following line of cases illustrate the Constitutional limitations on prima facie
gender-based distinctions: United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996); Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Personal Administrator of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971).
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adoptive mother, or a grandmother, or even a father, who finds herself
or himself permanently in the position of an isolated primary caretaker
for a child.415 Therefore, rather than utilizing gender-specific language,
infanticide should be acknowledged within criminal codes as a
homicide committed by one who maintains the permanent status of
primary caretaker (as opposed to those who undertake the time-
delimited work of baby-sitting).
As an example, the Illinois homicide statute provides that:
A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he
commits the offense of first degree murder ... and either of the
following mitigating factors are present:
(1) At the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense
passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed
...; or
(2) At the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be
such that, if they existed, would justify ... the killing under [self-
defense] .... but his belief is unreasonable.4 6
In order to insure that primary caretakers charged with
infanticide could raise a partial defense to murder charges, this statute
would need to be amended by adding a subsection such as the
following:
(3) The defendant is on trial for the killing of her or his child, and at
the time of the killing, the defendant was in a state of extreme
emotional disturbance as a result of psychological, social, or
socioeconomic circumstances consequent upon her or his status as
the child's permanent primary caretaker.
This provision is by no means a guaranteed defense against
murder charges arising out of infanticide. Indeed, the defendant would
bear the difficult burden of persuading the trier of fact that her state of
extreme emotional disturbance was reasonably explained by the
-- 411
circumstances surrounding her status as primary caretaker.
415 It is critical, in moving to gender-neutral language, to differentiate between the
adult cast in a temporary baby-sitting role, who kills a crying baby during a football game,
and the adult who is permanently cast as "mother," who retains the residual and constant
obligation to care for her baby. For two enlightening discussions of mothering as a
practice, rather than a status, see FINEMAN, supra note 300, and SARA RUDDICK,
MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE (1989).
416 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-2(a) (West 1994). The statute further specifies
that serious provocation is to be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-2(b).
4" Recall that Model Penal Code § 210.3 limits this partial defense to homicides
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Therefore, although one might criticize this approach as creating an
expansive loophole against murder charges, in effect, it should be no
larger than existing community norms permit it to be. In addition, this
narrowly defined defense is subject to many of the same criticisms as is
the provision regarding neonaticide.4 8 Ultimately, however, I believe
that the abstract "costs" of such a statute easily are outweighed by the
benefits it offers in terms of providing a consistent and just resolution
to these cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
History reveals three basic societal postures toward women who kill
their children--denial, punishment, or prevention. Ignoring infanticide
is probably the most popular approach, as societies throughout history
have found it less costly simply to look the other way when poor
women, or even poor families, find themselves unable to support
another mouth to feed.419 The punitive approach also has made frequent
but brief appearances in recent centuries, supported by those who argue
that infanticide, like any other violent crime, must be swiftly and
severely punished.42°  Yet societies that have demanded harsh
punishment for these defendants find that it eludes them. 4 ' As noted,
broad-scale efforts at preventing infanticide have been relatively short-
lived, due not to their failure, but rather to the extraordinarily high cost
of their success.4 22
In our own era, American public policy is fairly seen as an
amalgam of the first two of these strategies. We so studiously ignore
the frequency and similarity of infanticide and neonaticide cases that
the suggestion that America has an infanticide problem sounds utterly
absurd. And, when faced with a woman who has killed her child, we
charge her with the most severe crime applicable to her act. This
approach permits us to feel rather civilized compared to societies in the
committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or
excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under
circumstances as he believes them to be.
Model Penal Code § 210.3 (emphasis added).
418 See supra notes 388 through 395 and accompanying text.
419 Langer, supra note 9, at 354.
420 The Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and
Family Services, recently issued a report calling for harsher penalties for parents who
abuse their children. FATAL CHILD ABUSE, supra note 78, at 43, 67-7 1.
411 See supra notes 11 through 33 (describing England's struggle to force juries to
convict and punish infanticide defendants).
422 See supra note 10.
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past. For example, one commentator notes that [d]espite the outcry [of
nineteenth century Europeans against infanticide], infanticide continued
in England and throughout Europe. It persisted because the same
conditions that led a mother in 1580 to murder her child were still in
existence in 1880--social ostracism and financial concerns. However, at
least the upper and middle classes are now deeply offended by this
423
occurrence.
After my review of the subject, I am far from convinced that the
American middle and upper classes are in fact deeply offended by
infanticide. But even assuming this to be true, conditions present in
1580 and 1880 remain prevalent today. We must change the law that
isolates and blames only the mothers for this terrible crime. We must
begin to identify the myriad ways in which our society tolerates and
perpetuates infanticidal situations. We must acknowledge the role that
all of us play in driving these women to the edge of despair, where,
with our blessing and our curse, they take the lives of children who
should, by right, have inherited our future.
423 Moseley, supra note 9, at 361 (emphasis added).
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